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In adherence to its national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), Indonesia 
maintains a narrative of a culturally plural but unified nation. The government represents 
a people of over 1,000 ethnic groups across six nationally recognised religions, spread 
across more than 17,000 islands. Within the context of the national motto, people are 
expected to share a similar civic Indonesian national identity regardless of their ethno-
regional or religious backgrounds. At the same time, Indonesia’s approach towards 
multiculturalism extends various degrees of recognition, accommodation, toleration and 
even discrimination towards different socio-cultural groups in conjunction with the 
diverse ethnographic landscapes across regions in the country.  
Using theories of identity, nationalism and multiculturalism, this thesis examines 
how the Indonesian national identity is interpreted, experienced and understood both by 
elites and the people, particularly in consideration of the country’s ethno-regional, 
cultural and religious diversity. It begins with an explanation of the mixed methods 
within a qualitative paradigm used for this research and continues with an examination 
of the historical and constitutional framework for national identity and diversity in 
Indonesia. I then analyse the opinions of the people from Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and 
West Java on the aspects of their identity pertaining to the ethno-regional, cultural and 
religious diversity in Indonesia, using information gained through individual in-depth 
interviews with laypeople as well as questionnaires and focus group discussions with 
university students. The different demographics in each region provide a good 
comparison between more homogeneous and heterogeneous populations, as well as 
between Muslim-majority and Christian-majority areas. To add other perspectives, I also 
examine the opinions of various types of elites on issues pertaining to identity and 
diversity in Indonesia gathered through individual interviews. 
I argue that in its attempt to maintain national identity and unity, the Indonesian 
state has adopted an unequitable framework for multiculturalism. While its design is 
intended to safeguard diversity, this framework has fostered an environment which 
normalises privileges for Indonesia’s Muslim majority and disadvantages for minorities. 
This framework corresponds with the relationship between national, ethno-regional and 
religious identities in Indonesia. Participants tend to describe the Indonesian national 
identity in civic and cultural terms, such as the shared history of struggle against 
colonialism and values such as diversity and tolerance. Participants further share the 
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narrative of the subordination of their ethno-regional identity to the Indonesian national 
identity. In contrast, religious identity is largely regarded as the most paramount: for the 
general population, religion is perceived as a fundamental source of moral guidance and 
more salient than national identity. This salience of religion helps explain the continued 
Islamist demands for more accommodation for Islam and Islamic law within the state, 
which in some instances include demands for a constitutional status for Islam. 
Indonesia’s framework for multiculturalism mollifies these demands but has detrimental 
side effects for minority groups; this framework thus safeguards and challenges diversity 
at the same time. Ultimately, I argue that the Indonesian state has to strike a better balance 
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Indonesia is one of the most culturally plural countries in the world. According to the 
most recent national census in 2010, Indonesia is host to a population of over 260 million 
with more than 1,300 ethnic groups.1 In the Indonesian context, the term ‘ethnic group’ 
refers to local ethno-regional groups such as the Javanese, Sundanese, Acehnese or 
Moluccan rather than races such as Asian or Caucasian. The Indonesian word for ‘ethnic 
group’ is suku bangsa, which is applied to all types of ethno-regional groups, large and 
small, including traditional indigenous groups. In English, suku bangsa literally means 
‘sub-nation’. The narrative implied in this term portrays these ethnic groups as smaller 
groups which, together, make up the larger Indonesian nation. For this research, I decided 
to use the term ‘ethno-regional groups’ because it encompasses different dimensions of 
the Indonesian term ‘suku bangsa’ without the implication of its literal translation into 
English. My usage of this term further encompasses the cultural dimension of these 
groups. Furthermore, the explicit mention of the regional dimension of identity indicated 
that people in a certain region do not have to belong to the local majority but still share 
some local idiosyncracies with them. 
This thesis follows the classification of ethno-regional groups as defined by the 
2010 national census, according to which the Javanese constitute the largest ethno-
regional group in Indonesia, making up 40.2 percent of the population, followed by the 
Sundanese with 15.5 percent and the Batak with 3.6 percent.2 There are smaller ethno-
regional groups within larger ones. For instance, in the census, the term ‘Javanese’ also 
includes the Osing, Tengger, Samin, Bawean/Boyan, Naga and Nagaring, which share 
some significant characteristics with the Javanese in language or customs.3  
Ethno-regional groups across Indonesia have their own languages. Depending on 
the exact criteria used to classify languages and dialects, there are between 550 and 700 
languages spoken in Indonesia.4 Communication across the archipelago is enabled 
through Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian), the country’s official language. Historically, 
                                                 
1 Akhsan Na’im and Hendry Syaputra, “Kewarganegaraan, Suku Bangsa, Agama Dan Bahasa 
Sehari-Hari Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010,” (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik 
Indonesia, 2010), 5. 
2 Ibid., 9. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 James N. Sneddon, The Indonesian Language : Its History and Role in Modern Society 
(Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press, 2003), 196. 
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Indonesian was derived from a form of Malay used by seafarers and traders who roamed 
the archipelago.5 The language was first called Bahasa Indonesia formally in 1928. 
Formal language planning then began in 1942, and through various channels of 
dissemination including education and mass media, a standardised form of the language 
has been spread around the country.6 Nowadays, it is used as the primary language of 
instruction in schools and universities, in official communication, as well as in the 
national mass media. Meanwhile, regional languages continue to be taught in their 
respective areas of origin; they are mainly used in private circles and regional mass 
media.  
In addition, Indonesia is religiously diverse. Within the legal system, Indonesia 
recognises six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism. The holidays of these six religions are celebrated as national holidays and 
houses of worship can be found across the country.7 Furthermore, there are over 100 so-
called indigenous faith groups (kepercayaan), which are smaller, localised faith groups 
not affiliated with the aforementioned world religions.8 These faith groups do not enjoy 
the same privileges as the world religions but continue to exist locally.  
Over 87 percent of Indonesia’s population are Muslims;9 however, Islam is not a 
state religion. Instead, Indonesia adopts a set of principles as its ideology – the so-called 
Pancasila (Sanskrit for ‘five principles’). The Pancasila consists of five principles 
representing the values to be shared among people of all walks of life across Indonesia: 
belief in God, a just and civilised humanity, national unity, democracy and social justice. 
Indonesia’s national motto, ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’, written in ancient Sanskrit, 
translates into ‘Unity in Diversity’. Together, these values are supposed to reflect the 
Indonesian national identity.  
The diverse population of present-day Indonesia lives in relative peace across the 
country, with the exception of ongoing separatism in West Papua. Nevertheless, the issue 
of national identity and its relationship with ethno-regional and religious identities 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 7-9. 
6 Ibid., 10-11. 
7 Dian Abdul Hamed Shah, Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia : Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Sri Lanka (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 24. 
8 Ensiklopedia Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa,  (Jakarta: Ministry of Education 
and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017), v-ix. 
9 Na’im and Syaputra, “Kewarganegaraan, Suku Bangsa, Agama Dan Bahasa Sehari-Hari 
Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010,” 10. 
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remain salient. For instance, it has remained challenging to define the Indonesian national 
identity beyond the idea of ‘diversity’. Furthermore, people across Indonesia experience 
diversity in different manners, which in turn plausibly affects individual perceptions of 
identity, including how people interpret their own identity, the Indonesian national 
identity, and multiculturalism in the country. 
The inspiration for this research emerged during an intergovernmental meeting in 
Indonesia which I attended in my capacity as a government official in 2014. In this 
meeting, government officials discussed the selection of cultural heritage sites to be 
promoted internationally. Ethno-regional sentiments came into play as officials accused 
each other, even though half in jest, of favouring particular heritage sites solely due to 
their ethnic ties to the site. The awkward atmosphere that ensued following this exchange 
indicated that ethno-regional identity was still a point of contention in Indonesia. This 
situation contradicted the expectations of the government for public servants to let go of 
their own particular ethno-regional identity during service. Furthermore, this situation 
suggested that ethno-regional identity was competing with people’s shared national 
identity. The situation brought into question to what extent national identity was shared 
by the population, and to what extent other aspects of identity affected the former. More 
importantly, this encounter made me wonder about the factors that maintain the 
Indonesian national identity and unity. 
There is a considerable amount of previous research done on nationalism, 
national identity and multiculturalism10 in Indonesia. Some literature focuses on 
particular periods in Indonesia’s history of nation-building. For example, R.E. Elson 
argues that the Indonesian national identity was initially born out of the people’s shared 
experience of Dutch colonialism. The shared struggle for independence thus encouraged 
various ethno-regional groups to subjugate their respective identity for a newly created 
Indonesian nation.11 Benedict Anderson similarly argues that the Indonesian national 
identity was born out of the common plight of Dutch colonialism.12 Anderson further 
argues that the way Indonesian elites imagined their state-in-the-making in the last 
                                                 
10 In this thesis, the term ‘multiculturalism’ refers to a state’s policies pertaining to diversity, 
while cultural plurality or cultural diversity describes the situation of the population in itself. 
11 R. Elson, “Constructing the Nation: Ethnicity, Race, Modernity and Citizenship in Early 
Indonesian Thought,” Asian Ethnicity 6, no. 3 (2005). 
12 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 121. 
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decades of colonialism was not only shaped against, but also by the colonial powers. For 
example, in the era of Indonesia’s ‘national awakening’ in the 1920s, the mobilisation 
against colonial powers was led by the educated youth who were exposed to Dutch 
education and European ideas of nationalism, which first sparked the idea of an 
archipelago united under one administration.13 Meanwhile, James Peacock argues that 
ethno-regional groups in Indonesia usually share some similarities with each other in 
their cultural and social features, so that ‘no large group is divided from any other large 
group by all features’ which produces a ‘loose integration’ within the larger nation.14 In 
addition, Ian Chalmers argues that religious affiliations which cut through different 
ethno-regional groups in Indonesia provide social cohesion across them, as their 
members feel a sense of belonging to the same faith.15 
Literature on the period since Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945 
and President Soekarno’s take on nation-building typically focuses on his tendency 
towards syncretism; such as his attempts to consolidate nationalism with Islamism and 
communism as the three major political strands in the country.16 In addition, the literature 
on this period typically highlights the challenges for nation-building in a vast territory 
without adequate infrastructure for communication and governance, so that the idea of 
‘Indonesia’ was only circulated in limited circles and only gradually reached the 
grassroots of the population.17 There were contestations against the recently constructed 
Indonesian national identity from both ethno-regional and religious movements.18 As the 
political situation started to settle down, the Indonesian national identity, including 
Indonesian, was spread more systematically across the country through education and 
various cultural programmes.19 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 119-22. 
14 James Peacock, Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective, ed. Edward Norbeck, Goodyear 
Regional Anthropology Series (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1973), 149-51. 
15 Ian Chalmers, Indonesia: An Introduction to Contemporary Traditions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), xii. 
16 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia : Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 19. 
17 Tod Jones, Culture, Power, and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State : Cultural Policy 
across the Twentieth-Century to the Reform Era (Brill, 2013), 71. 
18 M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1983), 226-30. 
19 Jones, Culture, Power and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State, 110-11. 
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Literature on the following period of President Suharto’s New Order era between 
1966 and 1998 typically focuses on his centralistic and authoritarian approach towards 
nation-building. In this period, the Indonesian national identity was introduced 
systematically throughout the country, including through a standardised national 
curriculum which included exact instructions on the interpretation of the Pancasila.20 
Through his endorsed interpretation of the Pancasila, Suharto sought to ‘Indonesianise 
the Indonesians’.21 At the same time, movements along ethno-regional lines, religious 
lines and competing political ideologies were restricted, effectively limiting any 
contestations on the government’s narrative of the Indonesian national identity.22  
There is a wide range of research done on Indonesia’s national identity, unity and 
diversity following political reforms and democratisation in 1998. For instance, Robert 
Elson argues that the idea of Indonesia as a nation born out of the shared experience of 
Dutch colonisation remained relatively undeveloped until the post-1998 era.23 
Meanwhile, Krystian Wiciarz argues that the formation and maintenance of Indonesian 
national identity are attributed to four main factors: nationalism and national discourse, 
the modern nation-state, religion as well as the pervasive, if banal, symbols of the nation 
in daily life.24  
At the same time, the post-1998 democratisation in Indonesia has been 
accompanied by a ‘rise in regional sentiments and more strident assertions of regional 
identity’ which have ‘thrown into doubt the commitment of the diverse Indonesian 
peoples to live together in one nation’ and potentially ‘threatened the very future of the 
unitary republic’.25 For instance, Indonesia has faced challenges such as separatism in 
Aceh and West Papua, as well as the secession of Timor Leste following a referendum 
in 1999. Ted Gurr argues that a sufficiently prolonged frustration produces anger and 
violence; in this regard, the strong government and military presence during the New 
                                                 
20 R. E. Elson, Suharto : A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 228-29. 
21 David Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia : The Ideology of the Family-State 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 197-202. 
22 Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre, “Politics,” in Indonesia's New Order, ed. Hal Hill 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 302-04; Patrick Guinness, “Local Society and 
Culture,” ibid. 
23 Elson, “Constructing the Nation.” 
24 Krystian Wiciarz, “The Formation and Persistence of the Indonesian National Community,” 
Hemispheres 26 (2011): 163. 
25 Chalmers, Indonesia, 31. 
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Order have caused outbursts of violence post-1998.26 Ian Chalmers similarly argues that 
the weakening military presence in the country encourages the proliferation of conflict 
and rebellions.27 Melani Budianta, meanwhile, argues that Indonesia’s ‘weak governance 
of cultural diversity’ is a result of historical forces, including the colonial and Cold War 
era, as well as the New Order’s repressive approach towards diversity.28 The introduction 
of post-1998 regional autonomy laws addresses the demands for more room for the 
expression of regional sentiments; however, there are concerns that the proliferation of 
regional laws has caused significant confusion within Indonesia’s legal system.29 
Meanwhile, a study by John Gerring et al. suggests that religious diversity 
constitutes a greater challenge to democracy compared to ethno-regional diversity.30 In 
the Indonesian context, Islamist demands for more accommodation of Islam within the 
state challenge Indonesia’s framework for national identity and multiculturalism as 
enshrined in the Pancasila.31 Jeremy Menchik argues that religious organisations, and 
particularly Muslim organisations, have evolved together with the Indonesian state; 
however, they prefer principles of deliberation and consensus drawn from Islamic 
traditions to liberal democratic ones.32 Religious identity thus remains relevant in the 
discourse of the state. In addition, post-1998 interreligious conflicts, such as the 1999 
violent conflict in Maluku, further indicate the salience of religious identity.33 
With regard to the Indonesian political landscape, Edward Aspinall argues that 
the post-1998 era is marked by an absence of divisive ideological cleavages, with no 
significant differences in policy and mobilisation strategies across various major political 
parties. Within this environment, nationalism is more likely to be used as a means for 
politicians to build popular support as a ‘useful legitimating device’ regardless of their 
                                                 
26 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 237-38. 
27 Chalmers, Indonesia, 30. 
28 Melani Budianta, “Beyond Multiculturalism: Redefining Indonesian Nationhood in a 
Globalised Age,” in Multicultural Challenges and Redefining Identity in East Asia, ed. Nam-
Kook Kim (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 203. 
29 Simon Butt, “Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder : The Proliferation of Local Laws in 
Indonesia,” Sydney Law Review 32, no. 2 (2010): 195-97. 
30 John Gerring, Michael Hoffman, and Dominic Zarecki, “The Diverse Effects of Diversity on 
Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2018): 307-08. 
31 Shah, Constitution, Religion and Politics in Asia, 55-59. 
32 Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia : Tolerance without Liberalism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11. 
33 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 199-200. 
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actual position on the political spectrum.34 Marcus Mietzner, by contrast, argues that the 
nationalist and Islamist cleavage between political parties in Indonesia continues to be 
relevant to the present day.35 Hence, instead of a left-right political spectrum, the main 
ideological cleavage in Indonesian politics continues to be constituted by differing 
opinions on the ideal relationship between the state and religion. 
Despite the abovementioned challenges of diversity, Indonesia has remained 
largely united to the present day. This thesis thus aims to contribute to the literature on 
Indonesia’s present-day nation-building by examining the conditions pertaining to 
national identity and multiculturalism in the country. In this regard, the term 
multiculturalism in this thesis refers to policies adopted by the state in dealing with its 
cultural plurality. This thesis focuses on ethno-regional and religious diversity as two 
aspects of identity that have remained salient within the framework of the Indonesian 
state. The primary research question of this thesis is ‘How are the Indonesian national 
identity and unity presently maintained, considering the country’s internal cultural 
diversity and post-1998 democratisation?’  
Given the focus of Indonesia’s constitution on ethno-regional and religious 
diversity, this research question is dissected into the following two questions:  
• How do national, ethno-regional and religious identities relate to each other 
in Indonesia? 
• How multicultural is the framework for diversity in Indonesia? 
To address these questions, this thesis first outlines its methodology, discussing 
the relevant methods for my fieldwork, data collection and its subsequent interpretation 
and analysis. Chapter One discusses the necessity to use a mixed-methods approach 
within a qualitative methodology to address the research questions at hand. The methods 
used for this research include the examination of literature, laws and regulation pertaining 
to national identity, cultural diversity and multiculturalism in Indonesia. In addition, 
information is gathered through individual interviews with relevant elites, including 
policy makers, religious leaders and academics, as well as laypeople of varying 
                                                 
34 Edward Aspinall, “The New Nationalism in Indonesia,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 3, 
no. 1 (2016): 79-80. 
35 Marcus Mietzner, “Comparing Indonesia's Party Systems of the 1950s and the Post-Suharto 
Era: From Centrifugal to Centripetal Inter-Party Competition,” Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 39, no. 3 (2008): 440. 
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backgrounds. This two-pronged approach helped identify discrepancies between the 
perceptions of laypeople and those of elites in some instances. In total, 73 individual 
interviews were conducted: 56 with laypeople and 17 with elite participants. To identify 
larger trends, questionnaires were distributed to and returned by 237 university student 
participants. They also enabled comparisons in trends between older and younger 
participants. The questionnaires are further complemented by focus group discussions. 
Chapter One further explains the selection of appropriate locations for data 
collection for this thesis: Jakarta, West Java, Aceh and Maluku. These locations provide 
a good combination of central and peripheral locations in Indonesia, with a good variety 
of demographics between them. Jakarta and West Java are centrally located in Indonesia 
on Java, the most populated island in Indonesia, have large urban areas and are quite 
heterogeneous in terms of demographics. Meanwhile, Aceh and Maluku are provinces 
salient to the issue of identity, as both have undergone relatively recent violent conflict 
and periods of separatism. Aceh is a province with special autonomy that allows it to 
install partial Sharia law with its 98 percent Muslim population. By contrast, Maluku is 
one of Indonesia’s few Christian-majority areas.  
The selection of fieldwork locations presented the most significant limitation of 
this research. To begin with, there were limitations in time and budget. It was impossible 
for me as a single researcher to explore all of the 34 provinces of Indonesia within the 
time frame of a PhD project. In West Java, Aceh and Maluku, furthermore, my data 
collection was mostly contained to the capital area of each province due to limitations in 
the travel budget. Other interesting provinces in terms of identity, such as Bali, 
Indonesia’s only Hindu-majority province, or other Christian majority areas could not be 
covered due to these restrictions in time and budget. West Papua, with its ongoing issue 
of separatism, was not included in this research, as its inclusion would constitute 
significant security risks for the researcher. The paperwork required to obtain all the 
necessary permits and clearances to conduct a research of this kind in West Papua also 
would have been a significant and time-consuming hurdle. As a consequence, this 
research is by no means exhaustive, and its results cannot completely account for the 
entirety of Indonesia. However, the careful selection of variety in fieldwork locations and 
the amount of information gathered are sufficient to provide an in-depth insight into the 
state of national identity, diversity and multiculturalism in Indonesia, particularly in 
terms of ethno-regional and religious diversity. 
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Following the methodology, Chapter Two discusses the theoretical framework 
for this research, highlighting relevant theories of identity, nationalism and 
multiculturalism. This chapter argues that all social groups experience varying degrees 
of internal diversity and that internally diverse groups face more challenges in 
maintaining their cohesion. My analysis of nationalism, in turn, emphasises the interplay 
between different factors that contribute to the foundation of nations and states, including 
ethnic, cultural and civic factors and discusses the influence of colonialism on the 
formation of post-colonial nations and states. Afterward, the section on multiculturalism 
underlines the need to adequately recognise and accommodate particular identities in 
culturally plural societies, which is necessary to ensure the contentment of the people 
with the state. On a theoretical level, this thesis thus argues that a culturally plural state 
has to manage a delicate balance between unity and diversity by accommodating various 
identities while also maintaining its own cohesive narrative of a shared national identity.  
Drawing from the literature on multiculturalism, I propose three dimensions 
through which multiculturalism in a state could be measured to help answer my main 
research question. The first dimension is the historical context of the state’s foundations 
for multiculturalism. The second dimension is the extent of legal pluralism in a state, and 
the third dimension is the nature of the interaction between different cultural groups, 
including their perceptions of each other. To give an illustration, for example, countries 
which require their citizens to adhere to uniform standards that apply to everyone, 
regardless of their cultural background, are not multiculturalist countries. By contrast, 
multiculturalist countries recognise and respect the varying cultural needs within its 
population, allowing cultural diversity to flourish. 
Chapter Three then discusses the nation-building process in different periods of 
Indonesia’s history, focusing on the creation and maintenance of the Indonesian national 
identity. This chapter examines the way Indonesia’s elites frame the issue of diversity to 
proliferate their desired understanding of the Indonesian national identity. As such, this 
chapter also serves as the historical framework for this thesis, highlighting Indonesia’s 
‘National Awakening’ period in the 1920s, the years around the 1945 declaration of 
independence, as well as Soekarno’s and Suharto’s respective presidencies. These 
periods in Indonesia’s history show the primarily top-down approach to nation-building 
in the country. Furthermore, these periods demonstrate the persisting salience of religion 
and religious identity in Indonesia. This chapter closes with Indonesia’s transition into 
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the post-1998 reform era, during which democratisation processes revealed the ongoing 
salience of ethno-regional and religious identities. 
Chapter Four analyses the framework for diversity in present-day Indonesia, with 
a focus on ethno-regional and religious diversity. This chapter examines the 
interpretation of national identity in Indonesia’s constitution as well as relevant laws and 
regulations pertaining to ethno-regional and religious identity. This analysis is further 
complemented with information gathered from elite fieldwork participants. This chapter 
argues that ethno-regional identities enjoy more recognition and accommodation in 
comparison to religious identities, such as seen in laws pertaining to regional autonomy. 
Expressions of ethno-regional identities are encouraged because they do not pose a 
considerable challenge towards the Indonesian national identity, in accordance with the 
narrative which presents them as Indonesia’s sub-nations; instead, the room provided for 
their expression enhances the people’s contentment with the state. 
The expression of religious diversity, by contrast, is limited, as evident in 
Indonesia’s laws against blasphemy, which restrict the way established world religions 
can be interpreted and practised in public. Furthermore, the state extends considerable 
privileges towards Islam in an attempt to mollify the demands of political Islamists in 
order to safeguard Indonesia’s overall framework for diversity. These privileges have 
become perceived as normal, creating an environment which challenges the very 
framework for diversity that the state aspires to maintain. There are systematic 
disadvantages experienced by religious minorities, as minority world religions do not 
enjoy the same degree of accommodation as the Muslim majority. In addition, adherents 
of Indonesia’s indigenous faith groups face significant hurdles to be recognised and 
accommodated on the same level as world religions. 
Information gathered from laypeople and university student participants is then 
presented in Chapters Five and Six. Where appropriate, the information is complemented 
by or juxtaposed with relevant laws and the opinions of elite participants. Chapter Five 
argues that the Indonesian national identity is considered more salient than various ethno-
regional identities. Participants’ positive feelings about their ethno-regional identity do 
not rule out a similar, if not stronger, positive association with their Indonesian identity. 
In addition, these two facets of identity play different, yet complementary roles: the 
Indonesian national identity translates into a primarily civic attachment while ethno-
regional identity translates into a combination of ethnic and cultural attachments. There 
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are cultural elements in both national and ethno-regional identity, and they are further 
connected through the narrative of a joint effort in Indonesia’s history of struggle against 
colonialism. As such, ethno-regional identity does not act as a significant barrier to the 
formation of meaningful interpersonal relationships, including romance and marriage, 
particularly for younger generations. However, some issues with ethno-regional diversity 
remain, including persisting prejudices and unaddressed grievances between different 
ethno-regional groups, as well as the proper alignment of national, regional and 
traditional laws. 
In contrast, Chapter Six argues that religious identity is considered to be more 
salient than both national identity and ethno-regional identity. Participants consider 
religious identity to be profoundly fundamental as their primary moral compass, which 
will continue to affect them beyond death. There is no significant difference between the 
opinions of Muslim participants and those of minority religions. However, adherents of 
minority religions are far more likely to experience ongoing intolerance and 
discrimination, causing them to feel less than positive about their religious identity, and 
by extension, about their Indonesian national identity. Furthermore, differences in 
religious identity continue to be a significant barrier to courtship and marriage, thus 
contributing to the continued separation between religious groups. 
Overall, this research shows that while ethno-regional identities have become less 
salient, religious identities continue to be a significant marker of difference for the people 
in Indonesia. The same situation applies to the Indonesian state: the prevalent narrative 
of Indonesia as a culturally diverse nation which consists of various sub-nations 
decreases the salience of ethno-regional identities. However, the long-standing debate on 
the ideal relationship between the state and religion remains, turning religious differences 
into a hotbed for political contestations, particularly between political Islamists and 
secular nationalists. The Indonesian state provides privileges for Islam in order to 
safeguard its overall framework for diversity, resulting in varying degrees of 
accommodation, restrictions and even discrimination to various religious groups in the 
country. In turn, Indonesia’s approach to multiculturalism has resulted in an environment 
which normalises privileges for its Muslim majority, as well as disadvantages on the part 
of religious minorities, which threatens the very framework for diversity that the state 
seeks to maintain. Ultimately, the Indonesian state has to better manage the delicate 
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balance between maintaining its unity and celebrating its internal diversity, as reflected 




1 Research Methodology 
This chapter explains the methodology used in this research project, including the 
methods used for data collection on the field. Section one introduces qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies within political studies and explains the reasons behind 
choosing a qualitative methodology for research on the topic of identity. Section two 
addresses the main research question in this project, including its derivatives, and argues 
about the appropriateness of using mixed methods within a primarily qualitative 
methodology for answering the questions.  
In addition to discussing relevant research methods, this chapter discusses the 
selection of fieldwork locations, which consists of four different locations across 
Indonesia: Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West Java. The chapter then discusses snowball 
sampling as the primary recruitment method for participants. Subsequently, this chapter 
explains four methods of data collection used in this research: in-depth semi-structured 
individual interviews, self-administered questionnaires, focus groups and participant 
observation. Each method is discussed along with their advantages and challenges. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by outlining the ethical considerations of this research. 
 
1.1 Research Methods for Studying Politics 
Within social and political studies, there is an ongoing debate between proponents of 
quantitative and qualitative methodology, both with distinctive ontological and 
epistemological characteristics. Ontology is concerned with assumptions on the nature of 
the social world. While the realist or objectivist paradigm claims that there is a ‘real’ 
world independent of our knowledge, the constructivist paradigm claims that the so-
called truths of the social world are constructed by the actors within it.36 Meanwhile, 
epistemology is concerned with the character of knowledge, specifically with ‘what can 
be known’ and whether the observer is independent of the observed.37 In other words, 
epistemology determines whether a researcher can produce genuinely ‘objective’ results. 
The relation between ontology and epistemology is a contested issue; however, most 
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agree that consistency between the two must be observed.38 For example, the assumption 
that the social world is socially constructed implies that there can be no completely 
objective knowledge of it either. In order to do research, one must identify one’s place in 
the debate on both questions prior to determining a suitable methodology and research 
methods.39  
A realist or objectivist ontology and epistemology is most commonly associated 
with quantitative methodology, which is often considered more scientific compared to its 
qualitative counterpart.40 Within the quantitative paradigm, researchers are seen as 
‘dispassionate’ and ‘objective,’ and research is mostly in the spirit of testing theories 
empirically.41 To do so, quantitative research uses the ‘observation and measurement of 
repeated incidences’ of a social phenomenon, often with the help of certain kinds of 
surveys, questionnaires and various statistical tools.42 Because of their frequent usage of 
large datasets, quantitative methods are often associated with topics such as elections, 
voting systems and political attitudes, as well as other issues that concern public 
attitudes.43 However, a positivist epistemology is not exclusive to quantitative research; 
there is plenty of qualitative research based on positivism. Typically, such research takes 
place when qualitative information is required in a primarily quantitative environment 
such as medicine. For example, qualitative research can be used to examine the 
sociological aspects of certain practices of medicine, including the behaviour and 
relationships between recipients and providers of various health care services.44 
Qualitative research methods, meanwhile, are more commonly associated with a 
constructivist worldview. Within this paradigm, the social world cannot be captured into 
objective ‘universal truths’, because actors situated in particular conditions build their 
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own perspective by attaching subjective meaning to their actions and surroundings.45 
This paradigm is concerned with understanding and explaining those subjective 
meanings in people’s actions and experiences according to their own context.46 This 
paradigm is thus better suited to identify and explore the perspective of the people to 
analyse ‘the complexities of social and political life.’47 However, researchers also have 
to be aware of their own biases and perceptions of normalcy, as these biases can affect 
their interpretation and analysis.48 Qualitative methods include ‘observation, participant 
observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews’ which require 
in-depth exploration of the issues at hand.49 
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies have opposing epistemologies as 
described above. Beyond epistemological incompatibilities, however, on the technical 
level, the two methodologies are not always antagonistic.50 Debates between supporters 
of the respective methodologies should be viewed as healthy exchanges that can further 
enrich social and political studies. Each method is indeed more suitable for examining 
different aspects of the social world, and as such can complement each other to gain a 
more holistic understanding. This complementarity gives an important position to the 
intentions of individual researchers. As stated previously, a qualitative methodology can 
be used to explain the state of things and generate theory.51 Meanwhile, a quantitative 
methodology, with its deductive approach, can be used to test existing theories and 
explain causality between things.52 To achieve this, each methodology has its own set of 
preferred research methods with varying suitability for different purposes. Ultimately, it 
should be decided by each researcher which methodology and methods are the most 
suitable for the purposes of their research.53 
In addition to the traditional division between qualitative and quantitative 
methodology, a third approach has also emerged, combining aspects of quantitative and 
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qualitative approaches towards research. While some may believe that research methods 
carry irreconcilable epistemological commitments, this strategy allows researchers to 
capitalise upon the best of both worlds.54 Furthermore, upon further inspection, 
quantitative and qualitative methods are not exclusively tied to a particular ontology and 
epistemology.55 Therefore, it is possible for a researcher to be consistent in their 
epistemological persuasion and consciously apply technical methods usually associated 
with the other methodology. Indeed, there is now an increasing number of social and 
political researchers who employ mixed methods in their work.56  
There are multiple ways to employ mixed methods. Alan Bryman has identified 
nine ways to classify mixed methods by determining the order of priority of each 
methodology in the sequence of data collection. One of these nine ways to use mixed 
methods in a research project is by using a qualitative methodology with both qualitative 
and quantitative data collection taking place concurrently.57 This is the approach that I 
have chosen for my research. 
 
1.2 Mixed methods within a primarily qualitative methodology 
There are three main reasons that led me towards using mixed methods within a primarily 
qualitative methodology. First, the ontology of qualitative methodology, which perceives 
the social world to be actively constructed by actors within it, lines up with the definition 
of the main concept in this research: identity. As explained later in my theoretical 
framework, identity is neither rigid nor value-free. Identity is constantly constructed and 
interpreted both by the self and the other and plays a significant role in the operation of 
the social world.58 Hence, in studying identity, people’s role as ‘agents of self-definition’ 
has to be taken into account.59 The goal is to understand how the research participants, 
as agents in their own right within their particular setting, make sense of their identity 
and how this identity, in turn, affects their actions. This constructivist worldview lines 
up with the ontology of qualitative methodology. 
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Secondly, qualitative methods are better at facilitating the study of complex 
issues.60 Studying national identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia requires the 
consideration of an array of factors such as local ethnography, social dynamics, multi-
faceted identities and disparities in development, which can be examined in-depth 
through a qualitative lens. There is an interplay of all these factors that must be examined 
in their entirety as much as possible, and the isolation of insulated factors cannot present 
a comprehensive understanding of the issue at hand. 
Thirdly, the nature of the questions that drive my research is inductive. They seek 
to explore and describe existing situations and build a theory out of observations and 
findings. As mentioned in the introduction, the main research question in this thesis is 
‘How are the Indonesian national identity and unity presently maintained, considering 
the country’s internal cultural diversity and post-1998 democratisation?’ This research 
question is then dissected into the following questions:  
• How do national, ethno-regional and religious identities relate to each other 
in Indonesia? 
• How multicultural is the framework for diversity in Indonesia? 
In answering the abovementioned questions, this thesis examines three aspects of 
identity, which are national, ethno-regional and religious identity. The differentiation 
between the three aspects of identity does not mean that they are separate or independent 
of each other. However, the differentiation is useful for focusing on particular aspects of 
the participants’ identities, and they correspond to the categorisation of identities 
prevalent in Indonesia’s legal system.  
These questions are answered by analysing the existing literature on Indonesian 
history and the relevant Indonesian laws and regulations, as well as by gathering 
information on the field from elites and laypeople participants. The attempt to provide a 
more holistic view of the current state of multiculturalism in Indonesia necessitates using 
mixed methods. In addition to in-depth individual interviews, self-administered 
questionnaires with a larger number of participants provide an insight into the more 
general attitudes among the people.  
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To capture the subjective views of participants, the questions used during the 
fieldwork revolved around participants describing themselves and what values they 
attached to that description.61 The questions were also designed to be straightforward 
enough to be answered by participants and to limit elaborations on my part which could 
affect the participant. These questions included: 
• What characteristics do people think make Indonesia distinct? 
• How do people feel about being Indonesian? 
• How do people feel about being a part of their ethnic group? 
• How do people feel about being part of their religious group? 
• Which aspect of people’s identity takes precedence over others? 
• How do people display their respective identities through language and 
clothing? 
• Do ethnic or religious differences become an obstacle to various aspects of 
social interaction? 
• To what extent does discrimination occur, and what causes it?  
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are required to fully address these 
questions: qualitative methods provide depth in understanding, while quantitative 
methods provide insight into overall attitudes of the population. In this case, the 
qualitative methods are represented by in-depth individual interviews and quantitative 
methods by self-administered questionnaires. A mixed methods research approach must 
be mindful of this distinction between quantitative and qualitative data.62 In the 
individual interviews, the exploration of people’s interpretation of their national identity 
requires dynamic open-ended questions. The open-ended nature of the interview allows 
for different themes to be brought up by participants, which are analysed for their 
meaning. At the same time, the frequency of the themes is quantified to identify trends. 
Another example is the use of the Likert scale on the self-administered questionnaires, 
which is a distinctly quantitative method. The Likert scale is a psychometric tool which 
allows participants to choose between five response categories such as ‘very positive’, 
‘positive’, ‘indifferent’, ‘negative’, and ‘very negative’ to indicate their opinion on a 
topic. It is particularly useful for finding out the larger trend of how positive or negative 
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people are feeling about various aspects of their identity.63 Participants then explained 
why they chose a particular option on the Likert scale, which provided meaningful 
themes and a better understanding of why they felt a certain way.  
To give another example, the question on the extent of discrimination can be seen 
as a quantitative one at first glance. Participants could say whether or not they had 
personally experienced discrimination due to their ethno-regional or religious identity, 
choosing between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, providing a readily quantifiable answer. However, this 
range of options does not present a full picture of their experience of discrimination in 
Indonesia. The question is thus accompanied by an open-ended one that allows 
participants to describe their individual experience in depth. Furthermore, as the 
interpretation of discriminative behaviour can vary from person to person, the local 
context provides more guidelines of what constitutes permissible social behaviour.  
Mixed methods can be interpreted as a way of doing triangulation, which is 
traditionally concerned with the confirmation of the results of a particular method 
through another, including the checking of qualitative results against quantitative 
results.64 In this research, triangulation is a means towards more reflection and 
knowledge in a qualitative study beyond confirming the validity of results.65 More 
specifically, the intention of using mixed methods in this project is to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding and not exclusively to check the results of respective 
methods against each other. For example, the information gathered from different groups 
of participants is compared with each other to check for similarities and discrepancies.  
  
1.3 Designing Fieldwork 
1.3.1 Determining Locations 
This research project started in July 2016. The fieldwork itself was carried out in five 
months between January and May of 2018, which allowed me to move between four 
different locations across Indonesia with a reasonable amount of time in each location. 
Prior to the fieldwork, the first task was to determine these locations. Uwe Flick uses the 
term ‘sampling’ for the selection of cases, groups and material to be studied in qualitative 
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research.66 While the term ‘sampling’ may suggest a quantitative approach, Flick 
contends that there are similarities in how researchers must select suitable ‘cases, groups 
and materials’ to construct a ‘study with limited resources, from a more or less infinite 
horizon of possible selections’ in order to ‘make statements that we can generalise in one 
way or the other.’67   
In this regard, Flick supports a deliberate selection of locations that can construct 
a ‘corpus of empirical examples for studying the phenomenon in the most instructive 
way.’68 Several considerations to be taken are ensuring maximal variations in the sample, 
including politically important or sensitive cases (while also considering safety), as well 
as convenience. Maximal variations and politically important cases ensure range and 
depth, while convenience considers the ease of access towards desired data.69 
Convenience, however, must never be the first criterion for sampling. Researchers have 
to be rigorous in finding meaningful and valuable samples while remaining realistic about 
their ability to access data. I decided to conduct my fieldwork in four different provinces 
which provided both variety as well as significance to the issues of national identity and 
multiculturalism: Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West Java. The variation in the 
demographics of each of these locations and its comparison with Indonesia as a whole 
are shown in Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Comparison of demographics in the locations for this research 



























































Jakarta and West Java are centrally located in Indonesia. Both provinces are 
located on Java, the most densely populated island of the country. Both provinces have 
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well-developed metropolitan areas. Jakarta in particular, as both the political and 
economic capital of Indonesia, is a melting pot for the many ethnic and religious groups 
of the country. The latest national census in 2010 indicated that 85% of Jakarta’s 
population are Muslims, followed by Protestants (8%), Buddhists (3.3%) and Catholics 
(3.2%).70 Its largest ethnic groups are Javanese (36%), Betawi (28%), Sundanese (15%), 
Chinese (6.5%), Batak (3.3%) and Minang (2.8%).71 
West Java is not as diverse as Jakarta; however, Bandung, its capital area, was 
selected as one of the locations of the fieldwork because it is the third-largest urban area 
in Indonesia with prominent universities attracting students from all around the country. 
According to the 2010 national census, the largest religious groups in West Java are 
Muslims (92%), Protestants (5.4%), and Catholics (2.2%).72 Its largest ethnic groups are 
Sundanese (71%), Javanese (13%), Betawi (6.2%), Cirebon (4.2%), Batak (1.1%) and 
Chinese (0.6%).73 
Meanwhile, Aceh is the western-most province of Indonesia, and fieldwork was 
conducted in Banda Aceh, its capital city. Aceh’s population is largely homogeneous in 
ethnic terms, consisting of diverse tribes within the Acehnese ethnic group. The 2010 
national census shows the largest ethnic groups in Aceh to be Acehnese (85%), Javanese 
(8.9%) and Batak (3.3%).74 Aceh is also associated with a strong Islamic identity and a 
special autonomy which allows it to partially implement laws based on Sharia (Islamic 
law). 98 percent of Aceh’s population are Muslims.75 Politically, Aceh is significant due 
to its history of separatist movements, which was resolved comparatively recently 
through a peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and the Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM/Free Aceh Movement) in 2005.76  
Maluku is an archipelagic province in the eastern part of Indonesia. Fieldwork 
was conducted in Ambon, its capital, a Christian-majority area. The 2010 national census 
shows Maluku’s largest religious groups to be Protestants (58%), followed by Muslims 
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(39%) and Catholics (2%).77 Its largest ethnic groups are Moluccans (74%), Javanese 
(5.2%) and Bugis (1.7%).78 In terms of political significance, Ambon is interesting 
because of two things. Firstly, Maluku had a history of separatism in the 1950s, which 
could affect its population’s perception of identity and belonging.79 Secondly, Maluku 
underwent a large-scale violent religious conflict in 1999 between its Christian and 
Muslim population, which could affect the salience of religion in the identity of its 
population.80 Present-day Maluku is in peaceful conditions but it is interesting to explore 
how its history might affect its population’s understanding of national identity and 
multiculturalism. 
The diversity of potential fieldwork locations in Indonesia has its own advantages 
and disadvantages for the researcher. Many researchers of social and political studies 
choose to conduct their study in locations they are familiar with, with the advantage that 
there is minimal resistance to them entering the field. This familiarity significantly 
reduces the need to learn a new language or to become acquainted with local norms and 
customs.81 At the same time, this familiarity poses its own challenges for the researcher. 
This situation applies well to me and was considered in the designing of my fieldwork. 
On the one hand, my interest in studying multiculturalism in Indonesia stems from my 
direct experience with it. On the other hand, there is a risk of being too familiar or 
involved with the research topic. There is also a tendency not to notice subtle things about 
the cultures of one’s own background. Furthermore, a researcher within a familiar 
surrounding must be aware that despite a seemingly common background between 
researcher and participants, experiences may differ greatly between individuals. Thus, 
shared implicit meanings and values of socio-cultural labels cannot be assumed.82 
Another challenge is to let go of preconceived understandings of the state of things within 
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familiar surroundings, starting by recognising the researcher’s own assumptions that are 
sometimes based on stereotypes.83 
The dichotomy between the role of the researcher as an insider or outsider is not 
always useful, as a researcher is never completely one or the other; however, awareness 
of the complexity of the relationship between researcher and participant is necessary to 
conduct qualitative research. This awareness enables the researcher to anticipate how 
participants might react to him or her, and also to anticipate the least disruptive way to 
approach participants.84 In my case, I was never completely an insider or an outsider to 
my participants, even though to some, I was more of an outsider. My position relative to 
each participant certainly affected the way I interacted with each individual. While I had 
visited many places in Indonesia prior to this research, including Aceh, I have only lived 
for long periods in two areas, namely Bandung and Jakarta. This situation has both its 
advantages and disadvantages. For one, with regard to communication, I am fluent in 
Indonesian, the national language of the country. However, I only speak my own regional 
language, and my Indonesian has an accent which tells which part of the country I am 
from, which in turn indicated my other-ness to locals as I travelled to other regions. As 
such, participants from regions other than my own might be warier to answer my 
questions. With regard to social norms and customs, I am well versed in norms that have 
been accepted across Indonesia, such as using proper honorifics to indicate respect when 
addressing people. However, specific local customs must be learned and sometimes 
adopted quickly in the field. By contrast, subtle cultural traits of other regions become 
apparent more easily in my observations.  
During the fieldwork, people in Aceh and Maluku easily recognised that I was 
not a local through my accent, which was usually confirmed by my personal introduction 
to potential participants. As a result, some participants offered me their account of the 
way of things in Aceh or Maluku without prompting. The opposite happened in Jakarta 
and West Java, as participants assumed I knew the region well and did not require 
explanations. It occurred less naturally for participants to explain implicit meanings 
attached to local terms, and sometimes I felt that the participants found it strange for me 
to ask for explanations on such things. Instead, it was a task for me to remind myself that 
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the participants’ understanding of familiar local labels varied and could not be taken for 
granted.  
During the fieldwork, I felt that participants from Aceh and Maluku were more 
careful in voicing their opinion. A similar level of hesitation was not detected in Jakarta 
and West Java, as I was viewed as more of an insider by participants. Furthermore, as a 
Muslim woman who wears a headscarf, my religious identity was always visible to my 
participants. My visible religious identity made it more comfortable for Muslim 
participants to speak about their religious identity; reversely, with non-Muslim 
participants, more time was required to build confidence between the participants and 
myself. For example, it helped to mention my familial relation to someone of their own 
faith. Ultimately, my familiarity with Indonesia did help with choosing the actual 
locations for my fieldwork, and my connection with local figures and laypeople helped 
me to gain access to participants. 
 
1.3.2 Elites and Laypeople: Semi-structured One-on-one Interviews 
After selecting the appropriate locations for the fieldwork, I had to determine the 
appropriate methods and potential participants. One way to collect qualitative data is in-
depth interviewing, which allows one to explore others’ thoughts and feelings about their 
understanding of the world. The researcher guides participants through a number of pre-
determined topics and questions in what is called ‘semi-structured interviewing’. 
Participants are expected to answer the questions and discuss the topics in-depth by 
elaborating, providing examples and clarifying meanings behind terms.85 
The criteria for the most salient participants for this research were derived from 
the aforementioned research questions.86 Drawing from the research questions, there are 
at least two groups in Indonesia that needed to be examined on their understanding of 
national identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia: the elites and laypeople. Uwe Flick 
suggests that if a research project concerns institutional decision-making, experts and 
authorities should be sought out as prospective participants.87 They can provide the view 
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of an institution, including its policies and future plans, ‘albeit from their own limited 
and bounded perspective.’88 Thus, the first kind of participants under the elite category 
were government officials. They needed to be higher-echelon officials within 
government institutions that dealt with either national identity or multiculturalism. In 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy, there are four echelons within higher-ranking officials. For the 
purposes of this study, I targeted those with actual decision-making authority, namely 
the first and second echelons of the relevant ministries. I conducted one interview at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two interviews at the Ministry of Tourism and one interview 
at the Indonesian National Commission for UNESCO, which is attached to the Ministry 
of Education and Culture. All interviews involved officials in a position related to 
Indonesia’s national identity and image. These officials provided information on how 
they defined the Indonesian national identity, as well as the image of Indonesia that their 
institution sought to project. 
To acquire different perspectives on Indonesia’s national identity and 
multiculturalism, I also sought the perspective of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and intellectuals known for their engagement with the issues at hand. Three 
NGOs provided their insight. The first was the Wahid Foundation, an NGO aiming to 
promote ‘the development of a tolerant, multicultural society in Indonesia.’89 The Wahid 
Foundation is particularly known for its promotion of a moderate and pluralistic stance 
on religion. The second one was the Habibie Centre which aims to ‘promote the 
modernization and democratization of Indonesian society based on the morality and 
integrity of sound cultural and religious values.’90 It is known for its adoption of science 
and technology in its work and has a significant number of in-house researchers. The 
third one was Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of Traditional Societies of 
the Archipelago/AMAN) which works to advocate for the rights of traditional local 
communities.91 These NGOs shared stories about their work and their opinions on the 
challenges of diversity in the country. 
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After initial data collection indicated the salience of religion to the identity of 
Indonesians, I decided to add a third category, namely religious leaders who are in the 
capacity of leading a congregation or managing a place of worship. It was particularly 
interesting to explore the experiences and opinions of leaders of minority religions 
because they are less likely to have a platform in the national mainstream media. There 
were four religious leaders who granted me interviews: the manager of the Buddhist 
Vihara Dharma Bakti in Banda Aceh, the Parishioner of the Catholic Parish of the Holy 
Heart in Banda Aceh, the Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Amboina in Ambon, 
and a Minister from the Protestant Church of Maluku in Ambon. They provided insights 
on the activities of their respective house of worship, managing a congregation and issues 
relating to cultural diversity in Indonesia, particularly religious diversity.  
Challenges in finding elite participants primarily lay in getting access and finding 
time in their schedule.92 Institutional bureaucracy also meant that significant time was 
required for an interview request letter to be processed and answered, if it was answered 
at all. I found it particularly challenging to pursue the status of my interview requests in 
large institutions where I did not have any internal connections with enough traction 
within them. Some of my interview request letters, indeed, went unanswered. Some 
requests were declined on account of busy or conflicting schedules. One official granted 
me a meeting and answered my questions in an informal conversation, but declined to 
sign any consent forms and be recorded, citing the sensitivity of some of the issues at 
hand. 
In addition, I used a snowball sampling technique. In this technique, participants 
were requested for information on other relevant potential participants for my research, 
which enabled me to meet with unforeseen figures with valuable insight. For example, I 
initially sought out local experts on Islamic law and identity in Aceh. However, one of 
my laypeople participants in Banda Aceh offered me their connection to two previously 
high-ranking persons within Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement/GAM). 
While this type of elite participant was not foreseen in the initial research design, their 
position as ex-separatists provided a rare insight into their motivations. Excluding the 
meeting in which the official declined to sign a consent form and be recorded, I conducted 
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seventeen interviews with elites. The complete list of elite participants can be found in 
Appendix 7. 
The interviews were designed to be semi-structured in-depth interviews and 
typically more like conversations. There were several guiding questions and general 
topics as listed in Appendix 8 to shed light on the participants’ views on the research 
topic, but the interview process also followed the responses of the participant and the 
themes that they brought up. This method is based on a fundamental assumption of 
qualitative research, namely, that the participants’ valuable perspective on the issue at 
hand should unfold along their own line of thought instead of that of the researchers.93 
At the same time, some systematisation in the questioning enabled the drawing of 
comparisons, analysis and interpretation of the answers given by multiple participants.94 
Questions directed at elite participants were concerned with their area of work. 
Elite participants were asked to describe their institution’s understanding of national 
identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia, its related policies and programmes, as well 
as challenges faced in their execution. They were also asked to describe their institution’s 
vision for Indonesia’s multiculturalism. In the case of the Free Aceh Movement, 
participants were asked to describe their motivation towards separatism and their terms 
of negotiation towards the peace agreement with the Indonesian government, as well as 
their current aspirations for Aceh.  
Meanwhile, in the case of laypeople, interviews allow an insight into the 
meanings that everyday activities hold for them.95 The term ‘laypeople’ in this research 
encompasses people beyond the age of eighteen who live in the aforementioned regions 
in Indonesia and were willing to share their understanding and experiences relating to 
national identity and multiculturalism. To avoid conflicts of interest, these participants 
could neither actively work for the government nor hold the position of community 
leaders. In addition, to avoid preconceptions about their person on my part, none of the 
interview participants were my own relatives, friends or other people with whom I had 
been personally acquainted in any capacity prior to this research.  
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However, this quest for previously unknown participants posed a challenge, as 
in-depth interviews require trust and direct personal cooperation.96 Participants must be 
comfortable to share their personal thoughts and experiences with the researcher.97 
Meanwhile, within Indonesia culture, personal connections are often important in 
building rapport and trust. Particularly older participants who experienced the New Order 
era as adults were often wary because of their experience with authoritarianism, in which 
researchers were often thought of as government agents. Initially, I tried to approach 
people in public places such as the local marketplace in Bandung, but this proved to be a 
difficult undertaking despite my familiarity with the local language and customs. After 
two unfruitful days, I had to abandon this recruitment method and I did not attempt it 
again in other locations. Most potential participants I approached were put off by the 
prospect of being interviewed and recorded on a political topic, some claiming no 
knowledge of politics, even though I emphasised that the questions only revolved around 
the participants and did not require specialised knowledge. Potential participants who 
were still listening at this point were discouraged by having to sign a consent form, citing 
privacy issues or fear of fraud. The use of written consent forms is unusual within 
Indonesian culture, particularly among the grass-roots, where an oral expression of 
consent is often considered sufficient. The grass-roots were also unfamiliar with 
academic standards of providing explicit written consent. Elite participants who were 
aware of the practice of using participant consent forms in research were more receptive 
to them. 
This situation required me to use a snow-ball sampling for laypeople participants, 
using my existing connections to introduce me to potential participants. In lieu of 
information sheets on the letterhead of an unfamiliar institution, potential participants 
were more trusting towards personal introductions by someone familiar. This personal 
warranty made them willing to sign the consent forms as well. As a result, my laypeople 
participants consisted of friends, neighbours, employees or colleagues of my personal 
acquaintances, who in turn ensured the former of my reputability. Sometimes participants 
referred me on to their own acquaintances.  
This sampling technique caused my laypeople participants to vary widely in terms 
of age, education level and occupation as shown in Table 1.2 below, which limits the 
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generalisability of my findings onto particular groups within the population. More 
detailed information on each participant, including their individual ethnicity, religion and 
occupation is available in Appendix 1. The variations in the participants’ identity were 
also considered in terms of their effect on the lived experiences of participants. The 
participants’ diversity in age and education provided a good variation in their experience 
and stories. One issue in the sample is the imbalance in the number of males and female 
participants, with more females than males. However, the analysis of the interviews did 
not show significant differences between the answers of female and male participants. 
Participants also did not frame their stories as gender-specific. As such, variation in 
gender had minimal salience, and this imbalance in the gender of participants did not 
have a negative impact on the results of this research. 
Table 1.2: Laypeople participants 
Location Amount of 
participants 
Age range Gender 
ratio 
Highest level of education 
Jakarta 12 21 – 58 years 
old 
5 males, 7 
females 
Senior high school: 6 
Academy/polytech: 1 
Undergraduate: 5 




Senior high school: 3 
Academy/polytech: 5 
Undergraduate: 8 





Senior high school: 5 
Academy/polytech: 4 
Undergraduate: 6 
Maluku 13 18 – 73 years 
old 
4 males, 9 
females 
Senior high school: 5 
Academy/polytech: 5 
Undergraduate: 3 












In addition to their recruitment, there were other challenges to the interviewing 
of laypeople. Just like their elite counterparts, laypeople participants were tied to busy 
schedules. Most of them were employed in some capacity or ran their own business. To 
avoid impeding the participants’ work, interviews had to be conducted outside their 
working hours. Finding interview locations was sometimes also a challenge. In contrast 
to their elite counterparts, most laypeople participants did not have an office space in 
which they could receive guests, much less conduct an interview with privacy. Some 
participants welcomed me into their homes. But with most participants, I had to be more 
creative and find a suitable space that was culturally appropriate yet still gave enough 
privacy for the participant and had a relatively low noise level such as cafés or public 
courtyards. 
After logistical arrangements were agreed upon, there were further challenges. 
Some participants either did not want to elaborate on their answers or lacked the skill to 
describe their thoughts and experiences in detail; they provided very short answers to my 
questions. Some were talkative while others were more reserved.98 This resulted in some 
variation in the lengths and depth of the interviews. I was, however, wary of explaining 
the aims of my questions too much or providing examples on how they should be 
answered, as I might have injected my own perspective in my attempt to coax more 
elaboration on their part. Sometimes participants gave short answers when they were 
uncomfortable with addressing certain topics such as past violent conflicts, in which case 
I refrained from causing them unnecessary emotional distress. In such cases, the 
researcher has to develop empathy for the participants.99 
Understanding the participants was sometimes a challenge on account of the 
linguistic diversity in Indonesia. All interviews were conducted in Indonesian, the 
country’s national language, but regional languages have an influence on the usage of 
the language, such as by including local terminology. Some terminologies included 
suitable honorifics for communicating with participants, and their correct usage was vital 
in establishing mutual respect between the participants and me.100 Prior to my fieldwork, 
I had never spent substantial time in Aceh, and I had never been to Maluku. Therefore, I 
had to familiarise myself with the local accents to better conduct and understand the 
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interviews. As anticipated, some participants had a heavy local accent and occasionally 
used local terms. Spending longer times (eight weeks each) in Aceh and Maluku allowed 
me to take the first couple of weeks to adjust to their local accent and terms. Sometimes 
I had difficulty understanding the participants’ answers during an interview. However, 
the immediacy of interviews enabled ‘immediate follow-up and clarification’ on the 
participants’ answers to avoid misinterpretations.101  
The right formulation of questions was particularly crucial for laypeople 
interviews.102 Firstly, the questions had to acknowledge the complexity of the issue of 
identity. For example, research has shown that people can develop similarly strong 
attachments to different aspects of their identity.103 At the same time, people may also 
associate entirely different feelings with different aspects of their identity; for instance, 
a person may think their ethno-regional identity is important because of its connection to 
their ancestry and at the same time think their national identity is important because of 
public services received from the state. Despite this complexity, questions have to be 
easily understood and answerable by participants.104 However, an oversimplification of 
sociocultural terms has to be avoided. Terms that describe ethno-regional or religious 
groups, in particular, may hold different meanings and values for different people. Thus, 
questions should not assume a similar understanding between researcher and 
participants.105 Instead, participants should be allowed to coin terms on their own and be 
asked to reflect on their meanings or value for themselves. To achieve this objective, my 
questions did not refer to any particular ethno-regional or religious group. If participants 
brought up certain terms or labels, they were asked to explain what they associated with 
those terms. 
As Appendix 2 shows, my questions for laypeople participants started with some 
personal information such as their age, occupation, religion, ethnic group, area of origin, 
and marital status. These details provided an idea of their background and how it might 
affect their answers to further questions as shown in Appendix 2. Participants could 
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describe their feelings in their own individual way, but a Likert scale was also used to 
help attain comparable results between participants, who could choose between ‘very 
positive’, ‘positive’, ‘indifferent’, ‘negative’ and ‘very negative.’ Then the participants 
were asked to explain why they chose a particular answer. They were also asked to 
explain which one was the most important to them among their national, ethno-regional 
and religious identity. Even though they might feel equally positive about these three 
aspects of their identity, these aspects of their identities might hold different importance 
or salience for them. In addition, as the fieldwork was conducted in 2018 in the months 
leading up to regional elections, participants were asked to describe the characteristics 
they would like to see in their provincial governor. Participants were specifically asked 
to explain to what extent the candidates’ religious or ethno-regional identity affected their 
choice in the elections. Lastly, they were asked to describe their hopes for Indonesia in 
the future and whether they had anything else they would like to add on the topic of 
diversity in the country.  
Audio recordings were taken and notes were made of non-verbal observations 
during all interviews. The recordings were subsequently transcribed and annotated. 
Transcripts were made verbatim in sections that were particularly salient to the findings. 
The findings from the laypeople interviews provide insight into how participants 
understand their identity and how identity manifests in their social life. They were 
grouped under themes such as ‘recollection of feeling Indonesian’, ‘feeling like part of 
ethnic/religious group’, ‘importance of different affiliations’, ‘intermarriages’, 
‘languages used’, and ‘political representation’. Each theme was divided into sub-groups 
according to the diverse answers given by the participants. In contrast, findings from elite 
interviews were grouped under themes such as ‘definition of Indonesian identity’, ‘vision 
for multiculturalism in Indonesia’ and ‘institutional features’. Together, the interviews 
shed light on both the elite’s and laypeople’s understanding of identity and 
multiculturalism in Indonesia. 
 
1.3.3 Tertiary Students: Questionnaires and Focus Groups 
In an effort towards a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand, I wanted 
to see patterns of attitudes among a larger number of participants. For this purpose, I 
needed another group of participants which could be efficiently recruited in a larger 
number and controlled more easily in terms of age and occupation. To address time 
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limitations, these participants also had to be able to fill out a self-administered 
questionnaire.106 For this purpose, questionnaires (shown in Appendix 4) were 
distributed to tertiary students in similar locations to the interviews with laypeople: Aceh, 
Jakarta, Maluku and West Java.  
In order to access student participants, I had to establish contact with relevant 
universities to gain their permission to recruit student participants on campus. Some 
students were approached by me outside of class and some were sitting in a classroom. 
The latter were students of lecturers who allowed me to use some of their teaching time 
to explain my research and to ask for their participation. Students who were interested to 
participate were provided with an information sheet and a consent form. Student 
participants were allowed to fill out the questionnaire on the spot or finish it somewhere 
else and return in to me on the same day to minimise the risk of lost questionnaires. 
Questionnaires were distributed to and returned by 237 participants across eight different 
universities; two universities in each region, as displayed in Table 1.3 below. A more 
detailed demographics of the university student participants, including their ethnicity and 
religion, are provided in Appendix 3. 
Table 1.3: Questionnaire Participants 
Location University n Age range Gender ratio 
Jakarta Jakarta A 30 18 – 22 years old 9 males, 21 females 
Jakarta B 30 18 – 20 years old 9 males, 21 females 
West Java West Java A 30 19 – 23 years old 14 males, 16 females 
West Java B 30 18 – 22 years old 11 males, 19 females 
Aceh Aceh A 32 18 – 24 years old 15 males, 17 females 
Aceh B 27 18 – 24 years old 9 males, 18 females 
Maluku Maluku A 28 18 – 25 years old 15 males, 11 females 
Maluku B 30 18 – 23 years old 11 males, 15 females 
There were noticeably more female than male university student participants. I 
attribute the tendency of having more female participants to my own gender, as gender 
contributes to the insider or outsider status between social researchers and participants. 
Thus, female students might have felt more compelled to respond to my request for them 
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to participate. There was some initial concern that the imbalance between the number of 
male and female participants might skew the results. However, the analysis of the 
findings did not show significant differences between the attitude of males and females 
after the answers were controlled for gender.  
The questionnaires provided a good overview of general attitudes among the 
participants, but in themselves they were not ideal for examining ‘tacit beliefs and deeply 
held values’.107 Thus, focus groups were conducted with tertiary students in addition to 
the questionnaires. The guiding questions for the focus groups can be seen in Appendix 
6. The focus groups provided more depth to the findings from the questionnaires by 
engaging in-depth with some of the questionnaire participants and thus helped in 
interpreting the questionnaire results. The focus groups also provided more ‘illustrative 
material’ for direct quotations in addition to the questionnaires.108 According to David L. 
Morgan, it is common to combine focus groups with other methods such as individual 
interviews or surveys; his content analysis of Sociological Abstracts, the international 
literature of sociology and related disciplines in the social and behavioural sciences, 
showed that a majority of published research articles utilises this combination.109  
Focus groups suit a qualitative methodology particularly well because they 
assume that ‘people’s attitudes and beliefs do not form in a vacuum.’110 Instead, focus 
groups have the potential to encourage ‘exchanges between participants as they co-
construct perspectives and responses’ as the researcher provides topics and questions that 
can be discussed by participants.111 By observing group dynamics, the researcher can 
pick up on how communities form a consensus or deal with competing views.112 This 
strategy allowed me to see how openly students could discuss their opinion among peers 
and how they dealt with dissent. Focus groups also provided room for participants to 
elicit responses that could not be articulated as well on the written questionnaires, and 
they shed more light on themes that were important to the student participants.  
However, due to logistical limitations, only one focus group was conducted in 
each university. The focus groups required a conducive space, and within a campus, the 
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most reasonable space for this purpose was a classroom. It was, however, a challenge to 
find free classrooms, as they were mostly already allocated to certain papers at any given 
time. Furthermore, there had to be a sufficient number of students who could participate. 
The groups’ sizes ranged from eight to twelve participants. Most participants were 
recruited from among the students who had already completed the questionnaire. This 
recruitment method enabled the focus group to directly discuss issues that required more 
exploration without spending substantial time on the participants’ own identities again.  
In addition to eight general focus groups, specialised focus groups with minority 
students were also conducted for several reasons. Rosaline Barbour argues that the 
engagement with marginalised or otherwise ignored groups can be empowering as it can 
‘give voice’ to their experience.113 However, minority students might not feel 
comfortable to speak about the discrimination they face in front of peers from majority 
groups. Setting up a smaller group exclusively consisting of minority students created a 
safer space for them to discuss these issues. The recruitment of minority students was 
done by snowball-sampling. At each university, I asked the faculty member who liaised 
with me if they could introduce me to a minority student who then, in turn, gathered their 
peers. This familiarity between participants for the groups contributed to a more intimate 
situation as the participants seemed to trust each other. Due to challenges in finding 
participants and logistics, only two focus groups of this kind were conducted: one focus 
group in Banda Aceh at University Aceh A with three students and one in Bandung at 
University West Java A with four students. In both focus groups, all participants were 
double-minorities, meaning that they belonged to a minority ethno-regional group as well 
as a minority religious group. 
For this type of focus group, questions were specifically directed towards their 
experience as minorities within the university. For instance, the participants were asked 
to describe whether the university facilitated their religious practices; whether they felt 
any disadvantage in their studies for being minorities; how their peers from majority 
groups behaved towards them; and whether their peers had ever shown concern for 
potential differential treatment faced by them. These questions elicited answers from a 
different perspective than the general focus groups and enabled a more comprehensive 
understanding of multiculturalism in Indonesia. 
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All focus groups were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcripts 
were analysed for the language and themes used by participants, as well as how their 
interaction created ‘the construction and reinforcement of discourses’.114 The transcripts 
were not always verbatim, as only certain sections were considered to be particularly 
salient. Themes were then grouped under headings such as ‘ideas on Indonesian identity’, 
‘personal experience with diversity’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘unity’. Some themes were derived 
from the research questions while some emerged from the participants. Participants’ 
behaviour during the discussions such as the expression of assent, dissent, long silences 
that signalled hesitation or particularly palpable emotions were also noted. Findings from 
the focus groups were subsequently used to help explain the findings from the 
questionnaires. 
 
1.3.4 Participant Observation 
The last method used in the fieldwork was participant observation, which stems from the 
field of anthropology and was originally used to study cultures other than the researcher’s 
own. It requires researchers to live within the social setting of their interest and 
participate in the daily activities of its inhabitants, producing field notes from 
observations and conversations with the locals.115 The researchers’ immersion in the 
local social setting enables them to ‘learn directly from […] experience.’116 This method 
is considered an essential element of all qualitative studies, as attempts to organise 
interviews or other research methods on the field undeniably involves observation of the 
local surrounding.117 There is a broad spectrum of participant observation, from the so-
called ‘full participant’ who lives and works as an active member of the observed 
community over an extended period, to a ‘mute observer’ who stays in the background 
without any actual involvement.118 My own participant observation lay more closely to 
the latter, in what is called a ‘limited observer’ role. In this role, the researcher lives 
among the local community but does not have ‘any public role other than researcher’.119 
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During my fieldwork, I lived among and regularly interacted with the local 
community during daily commutes and activities such as shopping for groceries or meals. 
I made notes of observations and conversations which were of interest to my research 
topic. These notes complemented the findings from the interviews, questionnaires and 
focus groups.120 Often, the observations revealed things that were not disclosed by 
participants in any of the aforementioned methods, such as off-hand remarks that 
suggested intolerant views against minority ethno-regional or religious groups. These 
observations allowed me to analyse topics considered too sensitive or embarrassing to be 
discussed in a formal interview but still acceptable or common enough to take place 
within society. The observations also allowed me to pick up on infrastructure and non-
verbal signals that communicated local understandings on identity, such as graffiti or 
physical displays of religious faith. 
During the fieldwork, my relatively undistinctive appearance compared to the 
local population helped me in being unobtrusive, thus minimising disruptions to the 
behaviour of the locals. Even in Ambon, where the majority of the population is 
Christian, there were plenty of local Muslim women with headscarves in public spaces, 
so that I did not particularly stand out from the crowd. In Banda Aceh, I had to adjust my 
way of dressing to appear more similar to local Muslim women. Local Muslim women 
in Banda Aceh tended to wear longer headscarves and looser clothing than I would 
normally, and wearing trousers in public was quite unusual. Meanwhile, particularly in 
Jakarta and Bandung, where I had lived before, I practically blended in among the locals, 
but this situation posed its own challenges. For instance, it was more difficult for me to 
label social situations as ‘remarkable’ because I was already very familiar with both 
locations. Situations that overtly involved aspects of multiculturalism such as remarks on 
politics or exchanges on topics relating to social identity were easier to pick up. In Aceh 
and Maluku, regional traits were more easily observable for me because they were 
‘different’ from what I was used to. In some situations, I openly told people that I was 
not originally from the region, which often led them to explain what they thought was 
remarkable about it and what they thought non-locals should know. The notes produced 
from my observations added another layer of findings and contributed a more holistic 
picture of diversity in Indonesia. 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 42-43. 
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1.4 Ethical Considerations 
Permission for this fieldwork was granted by the University of Otago’s Human Ethics 
Committee in September 2017, as shown in Appendix 17. Some main concerns of ethical 
considerations for social research include the protection of the researcher, protection of 
the reputation of involved institutions, and, most importantly, protection of the 
participants.121 With the application of institutional standards of ethical conduct and 
paired with the ‘good conscience’ of social researchers, most social research has 
minimum risk for the parties involved.122 The University of Otago has its own guidelines 
in this regard, which include standards in research design, informed and voluntary 
consent of participants, protection of vulnerable participants, privacy, minimising the risk 
of harm, limitation of deception, attention to cultural sensitivity and limiting conflicts of 
interest.123 The overall research design, attention to cultural sensitivity and limiting 
conflicts of interest have been addressed in previous sections of this chapter. For the 
participants involved, the most important aspects to consider were making sure that they 
were sufficiently informed about the research and voluntarily gave consent to participate. 
Subsequently, the risk of harm towards participants has to be minimised by protecting 
their privacy and anonymity.124  
To ensure informed consent, all prospective participants were provided with an 
information sheet and a consent form, individually adapted to their position. The 
information sheets and consent forms for all types of participants are provided in 
Appendices 9 to 16. For this project, rewards for participation were given in the form of 
souvenirs, and the type of souvenir varied according to the type of participants. Elite 
participants were all given a notebook. Student participants were given stationery while 
laypeople participants were asked to choose between items such as prayer mats, scarves 
or food items. The information sheet also stated that participants could withdraw from 
the project at any time with no disadvantage on their part, and they were given an 
opportunity to ask questions about the project. If prospective participants were satisfied 
with the information provided, they were asked to sign the consent form. 
                                                 
121 Paul Ransome, Ethics and Values in Social Research, Ethics & Values in Social Research 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 52-53. 
122 Ibid., 170. 
123 “Ethical Practices in Research and Teaching Involving Human Participants,” University of 
Otago, https://www.otago.ac.nz/administration/academiccommittees/otago015522.html. 
124 Flick, Designing Qualitative Research, 85. 
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The only situation when obtaining informed consent was impractical, if not 
impossible, was during participant observation. Within open and public spaces, it was 
impossible to obtain informed consent from everyone in my surroundings and requesting 
informed consent had the potential of significantly altering their behaviour.125 Certainly 
this posed a dilemma concerning the principle of ‘no deception’ within research ethics, 
but in this case, valuable data to complement other findings could not be obtained 
otherwise.126 However, there was neither any risk of harm to those observed nor 
disruptions to their activities. Most importantly, the identities of the observed were not 
essential to the findings, and thus the privacy of those observed was still upheld and their 
anonymity protected.  
The protection of the participants’ anonymity had to be handled differently for 
elites, laypeople and university students. For elites, the inclusion of their respective 
position gives considerable weight and adds value to the information they provided. As 
such, elites were requested to give consent, at least, to be identified by association. If the 
elite participants consented, their individual position and their names could also be made 
identifiable. However, identifying information of individual laypeople and student 
participants was not salient to research and confidentiality was important to gain their 
participation. Hence, field notes and recordings did not include any such information. 
Laypeople participants were instead given codenames, for example, the first participant 
from West Java is only identified as WJ-01. Similarly, after the collection of 
questionnaires from participants, consent forms were separated from answer sheets to 
minimise the possibility of identification. Tertiary student participants were also given 
codenames such as WJA-01; their respective universities are only identifiable by general 
location, such as West Java A and B. This inclusion of location in the codenames is 
prompted by the salience of the diversity of locations of the fieldwork, including the 
different characteristics of each region. 
During the data collection process, it was important to minimise the risk of harm 
to participants. While there were practically no physical risks in participating in this 
research project, participants could have been exposed to emotional stress or 
embarrassment, for example, by reactivating painful or upsetting memories.127 Therefore, 
                                                 
125 Managing Quality in Qualitative Research, 112. 
126 Ransome, Ethics and Values in Social Research, 46-47. 
127 Flick, Designing Qualitative Research, 89. 
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questions were limited to what was necessary for the project. If participants expressed 
discomfort in answering any question, they were given apologies and I offered to skip 
the question or even end the interview process or I informed them that they could leave 
the focus group. With regard to the questionnaires, participants could leave empty any 
questions they did not want to answer.  
After the collection process, all data was stored on a computer with a backup on 
an external drive. The computer and external drive are protected by passwords and 
encryptions, to which only my supervisors and I have access. Consent forms are stored 
separately from data to avoid the identification of the participants. At the end of the 
project, any personal information will be destroyed except that, as required by the 
university’s research policy, any raw data on which the results of the project depend will 
be retained in secure storage for five years in the Politics Department, after which it will 
be destroyed. The overall results of this project are published in the form of this thesis 
and will possibly form the basis of journal articles, but information which can 




A good research design is essential for the success of any proper research project. The 
research design begins with the researcher’s view on the nature of the social world and 
the particular research topic. A constructivist worldview is particularly suitable for 
studying issues pertaining to identity as a concept that is constantly constructed and 
interpreted by actors in the social world. This constructivist worldview leads to a 
qualitative methodology. To adequately address the main research question which 
examines the construction and maintenance of national identity and unity in present-day 
Indonesia, mixed methods are required. Analysis of existing literature as well as laws 
and regulations pertaining to identity in Indonesia is thus complemented by information 
gathered on the field. In this case, the fieldwork involved interviews with laypeople and 
elites; questionnaires and focus group discussions with university students as well as 
participant observation in Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West Java. 
In each location, elites provided an insight into the way they interpret national 
identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia through their respective institutions. 
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Meanwhile, laypeople and student participants provided an insight into their experience 
and understanding of national identity and multiculturalism. Appropriate methods of data 
collection were tailored to each type of participant and the kind of desired data, for 
instance, one-on-one interviews for individual elites and laypeople; self-administered 
questionnaires for university students; and focus groups to add more depth to the 
questionnaires. Participant observation on the field added another layer of information to 
the data.  
Furthermore, the ethical considerations for doing research must be upheld. In this 
regard, the participants’ confidentiality must be protected, particularly for laypeople and 
university student participants. The researcher also has to be aware of their position 
relative to the participants. For example, the extent to which the researcher is considered 
an insider or outsider by the participants may well affect their sincerity in providing 
information. By following the aforementioned guidelines, the research can achieve good, 




2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this research and serves as the 
foundation for the analysis in upcoming chapters. Using existing literature on issues 
relating to identity, nationalism and multiculturalism, this chapter argues that the 
governance of a culturally plural state requires a balance in the recognition and 
accommodation of the collective rights of various cultural groups. This balance, in turn, 
helps with preserving the overall unity and integrity of the state. The chapter is divided 
into three sections, focusing on identity, nationalism and multiculturalism. 
Section one argues that social groups are inherently internally diverse in varying 
degrees. Identity is complex and multi-dimensional, and a person holds multiple aspects 
of identity concurrently and can thus belong to multiple social groups simultaneously. In 
turn, no social group is truly uniform. Identity theories on in-groups and out-groups 
examine how similarities and differences as well as their perception cause people to 
distinguish between the self and the other. While people behave differently towards their 
perceived in-groups and out-groups, according to theories on intergroup relations, 
internally diverse social groups can be united by a narrative which emphasises their 
shared similarities or one that construes diversity as strength.  
Section two outlines theories on nationalism which deal with one particular type 
of group identity: the national identity. This section highlights the prevalence of top-
down and elite-led nation-building processes aiming to spread a uniform identity across 
the population of a demarcated state with varying degrees of pre-existing internal 
diversity. Traditionally, two main types of attachment can establish the people’s 
identification with the state. Firstly, a civic one, consisting of shared values and a shared 
sense of citizenship, and secondly, an ethnic one, consisting of kinship, common descent 
and culture, which includes similarities in language and customs. The distinction between 
civic and ethnic nationalism is not always clear-cut, as there are cultural elements in both. 
Nonetheless, the distinction itself acknowledges the underlying variety of factors in 
people’s identities that can be used for nation-building. 
Due to the inherent diversity within social groups, nations experience varying 
degrees of internal diversity. A common national identity is essential for the functioning 
of a coherent state, and a top-down approach to nation-building is effective for the 
systematic spread of this national identity. The simultaneous need for recognition and 
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accommodation of various socio-cultural groups through relevant rules and regulations 
in order to ensure contentment and identification with the state and nation, however, 
requires balance between a systematic top-down and an inclusive bottom-up approach to 
nation-building. 
Section three examines in more detail varying interpretations of multiculturalism 
as a means for governing culturally plural states. The term multiculturalism, while often 
interpreted as cultural plurality, refers here to a state’s policies pertaining to diversity; 
meanwhile, cultural plurality or cultural diversity describes the situation of the 
population in itself. Culturally plural states deal with their internal diversity in varying 
manners, depending on the way the state interprets the relationship between the 
overarching national identity and potentially conflicting diverse identities within the 
population. As a result, culturally plural states are not necessarily multiculturalist. The 
emphasis on uniformity typically stems out of the state’s desire to maintain their unity 
and integrity and simultaneous underestimation of the need to ensure the contentment 
and allegiance of its people by extending appropriate recognition and accommodation of 
their identities.   
 
2.1 Identity 
Identity is a widely used term in politics and political studies. An increase of interest in 
identity within political studies reflects a greater acknowledgement of particularities, the 
shifting away from one-size-fits-all universalistic theories and norms. Traditional value 
systems and power relations, which have caused or justified the marginalisation of 
different groups of people, are increasingly being questioned.1 
Different disciplines place their individual focus on different aspects of identity. 
For example, according to psychologist Erik Erikson, identity can be divided into three 
categories, namely, ego identity, personal identity and social identity.2 The more 
individualist and intrinsic nature of the ego and personal identity makes them more 
suitable for psychology, whereas a focus on social identity is more suitable for the social 
sciences, including political studies. This does not mean that personal identity is not of 
                                                 
1 Margaret Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network 
Approach,” Theory and Society 23, no. 5 (1994): 608. 
2 James E. Cote, Identity, Formation, Agency, and Culture: A Social Psychological Synthesis, 
ed. Charles G. Levine (Mahwah: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 8. 
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interest at all for political studies. For instance, the idiosyncratic factors of political 
figures play an important factor in their decision-making. Social identity, however, is 
more appropriate for examining intragroup and intergroup relations.  
According to Brubaker and Cooper, there are at least five dimensions of identity 
as an analytical tool; one of these dimensions views identity as a tool for ‘particularistic 
self-understanding’.3 People use identity to make sense of themselves as well as their 
surroundings, and to differentiate between the self and the other. Henri Tajfel argues that 
the distinction between the self and the other is related to the universal need of human 
beings to make sense of the world and to put things into categories.4 This differentiation 
involves a process in which individuals assess what traits define themselves – the ‘self’ 
– and what traits define the ‘other’. Through the recognition of particularly remarkable 
or meaningful traits in the self and in others, people create categories for social groups.5 
This categorisation can be useful, such as in the distinction between teachers and students 
which determines the rights and responsibilities attached to each role within the setting 
of a classroom.  
Nevertheless, the categorisation of people is challenging because each person has 
multiple aspects of identity, derived from various factors such as place of birth, language, 
religion, gender, age, economic class, level of education and occupation, as well as a 
variety of less transient ‘cultural factors and social roles’ such as ancestry or ethnicity.6 
These aspects of identity can become dominant interchangeably, depending on the 
situation at hand.7 For example, a person can act as part of a congregation at church, a 
parent or partner at home and as an employee at work, bringing particular aspects of their 
self to the front in different situations. The liberal paradigm argues that identities are 
acquired according to a person’s individual will and ‘based on choice rather than duty 
and obligation’.8 However, identity is socially embedded and does not form in a vacuum; 
therefore, a person’s agency, including the choices underlying their identity, is shaped by 
                                                 
3 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond "Identity",” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 
(2000): 6. 
4 Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories, 147. 
5 “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” in Annual Review of Psychology (1982), 2. 
6 Cote, Identity, Formation, Agency and Culture, 8. 
7 Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond "Identity",” 8. 
8 Cote, Identity, Formation, Agency and Culture, 15. 
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the norms and values of their social environment.9 Social interaction continuously shapes 
people’s identities, causing identity to constantly develop as a psycho-social reflection 
of a person’s experiences.10 Once identity is realised and projected by the individual, it 
continues to redefine itself in accordance with feedback from its environment.11 Thus, 
the only constant thing about identity is its performance as ‘a process of performative 
repetition of continuous instability’.12 
People interpret different aspects of their identity differently and attach varying 
degrees of salience to them. For example, a person can attach different meanings and 
degrees of importance to their national, ethno-regional and religious identity. While these 
aspects of identity can affect each other, the relationship between these aspects of identity 
is not predetermined. For instance, a strong national identity does not automatically 
negate a person’s ethno-regional identity.13 Therefore, different aspects of a person’s 
identity should be examined individually, including the meanings that people attach to 
them.14 Gary S. Gregg describes different aspects of a person’s identity as spheres or 
layers laid out in a concentric circle. Within this circle, aspects of identity represented by 
spheres closer to the centre are more important than outlying ones and are thus less likely 
to change or be suppressed.15 In this regard, Charles Taylor argues that identity can stem 
out of theistic sources, usually in the form of religious beliefs, which can be particularly 
central to a person’s value system and their understanding of the world.16 As such, 
religious identity can be very difficult to alter.17 Its central position further indicates that 
                                                 
9 Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, ed. Charles Taylor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 187-210. 
10 Josselson and Harway, “The Challenges of Multiple Identity,” 5. 
11 Penelope Oakes, “Psychological Groups and Political Psychology: A Response to Huddy’s 
“Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory”,” Political Psychology 23, no. 4 (2002): 820. 
12 Cordula Braedel-Kühner and Andreas P. Müller, “Introduction: Re-Thinking Diversity from 
a Cultural Science Perspective,” in Re-Thinking Diversity : Multiple Approaches in Theory, 
Media, Communities, and Managerial Practice, ed. Cordula Braedel-Kühner and Andreas P. 
Müller (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016), 8. 
13 Guinjoan and Rodon, “A Scrutiny of the Linz-Moreno Question,” 128-29. 
14 Naomi Levy, “Measuring Multiple Identities: What Is Lost with a Zero-Sum Approach,” 
Politics, Groups, and Identities 2, no. 4 (2014): 639. 
15 Gary S. Gregg, “Multiple Identities and Their Organization,” in Navigating Multiple 
Identities, ed. Michele Harway and Ruthelen Josselson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 33-34. 
16 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self : The Making of the Modern Identity, 1st pbk. ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), x. 
17 Gerald N. Sande and Mark P. Zanna, “Cognitive Dissonance Theory: Collective Actions and 
Individual Reactions,” in Theories of Group Behavious, ed. Brian Mullen and George R. 
Goethals (New York: Spinger-Verlag, 1987), 65. 
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the management of religious groups constitute one of the central challenges for culturally 
plural societies. 
Despite the challenges of creating social categories related to the diversity of 
aspects contributing to identity, the categorisation of people continues to take place both 
in everyday life and within the political sphere. By recognising a ‘common quality’ 
possessed by a large majority of a particular group, group identities can be developed.18 
However, as identity is developed on a social plane, self-recognition becomes 
insufficient. The self needs another to associate with or to distinguish itself from, as well 
as to perform for or react to.19 On occasion, some traits of the self may not become 
obvious until they are confronted by a social other. The self therefore requires foreign 
traits in the social other to demarcate its own identity.20 For example, people may not feel 
particularly aware of their own nationalism until they encounter foreigners or travel 
abroad. Similarly, people may only begin to question their own social practices when the 
relative strangeness of the said practices is pointed out by foreigners. 
There are at least three steps in the creation of social groups: a categorisation 
which is accepted internally and externally, identification with the said categorisation, 
and social comparison between groups.21 Once social groups have formed, group 
membership creates an emotional attachment towards the group.22 People who recognise 
themselves as part of a group will develop an in-group solidarity, and attach meanings 
and values to the group. More commonly, group members will attach positive meanings 
and values to their own in-group. However, social identification does not instantly 
generate in-group favouritism or the attribution of positive traits towards the in-group.23 
For the positive or negative evaluation of the in-group, a comparison with other social 
groups (out-groups) is necessary.24  
                                                 
18 Michael Billig, Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations (London: Published in 
cooperation with the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology by Academic 
Press, 1976), 20. 
19 Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity,” 613. 
20 David Weltman and Michael Billig, “The Political Psychology of Contemporary Anti‐
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(2001): 368. 
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The comparisons produced between social groups affect the way these groups 
interact with each other. For instance, a social group’s similarities with out-groups tend 
to be downplayed, while differences tend to be exaggerated.25 However, just as group 
membership does not always translate into positive associations with the in-group, 
neither do differences between groups, on their own, translate into negative 
associations.26 Ted Hopf, for instance, rejects the notion of automatic, inevitable ‘conflict 
and subordination’ in identity difference.27 The differentiation between teachers and 
students can serve as an example here too. The two groups are distinct from each other 
and the interaction between them may be positive or negative, depending on the 
immediate circumstances. At the same time, circumstances are affected by prejudice, 
which is created through ‘socially derived value connotations which are directly 
associated with intergroup categorisations’.28  
It is possible for an in-group to view itself as less valuable than an out-group, 
when out-groups display traits considered more desirable. Similarly, prejudice and 
devaluation can take place towards the in-group. An example would be when people 
project idealistic images of a foreign country and only focuses on the negative aspects of 
their own home country. Franz Fanon indicates that the experience of colonialism can 
perpetuate inequality in intragroup relations through an internalised inferiority on the side 
of the colonised and internalised superiority on the side of the colonisers.29  
As shown by the example of colonisation, the nature of the interaction between 
groups is affected by its setting. Muzafer Sherif created an experiment in which two 
groups of boys were asked first to compete against each other and then work together to 
solve a task that was otherwise unmanageable. This experiment showed that a 
competitive environment causes more negative sentiments towards the out-group vis-à-
vis a cooperative environment.30 However, because Sherif’s experiment used temporary 
and arbitrarily formed groups, a different result may appear when the groups in question 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 70-72. 
26 James L. Gibson, “Do Strong Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the South African 
Case,” Political Psychology 27, no. 5 (2006); David McCrone and Frank Bechhofer, “National 
Identity and Social Inclusion,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 7 (2008). 
27 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, 
Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3. 
28 Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” 25. 
29 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 222-23. 
30 Muzafer Sherif, Group Conflict and Co-Operation: Their Social Psychology (London: 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1967). 
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are less transient. For example, membership in political parties indicates a competition 
between differing political perspectives that cannot always be reconciled in facing 
common challenges. The relationship between less transient groups thus depends on their 
understanding of their supposed relationship with each other.  
The widespread understanding of the relationship between social groups is 
referred to as a ‘narrative’. Within a narrative, a group of people selectively attach 
salience to particular events and values to construct a particular story which then acts as 
a social glue. The creation of narratives also includes the selective ‘forgetting’ or 
repression of events or ‘episodes’ that do not support the coherence of the overall 
narrative.31 Margaret Somers defines narratives as a ‘constructed configuration or a 
social network of relationships […] composed of symbolic, institutional, and material 
practices’.32 Narratives are also described as a ‘socio-historical positioning’ or ‘cultural 
and ideological imprinting’ of events and phenomena, providing awareness of their 
particular, perspective-dependent value.33 Thus, narratives arbitrarily assign roles of 
good and bad, affecting people’s understanding of values and their biases in interpreting 
or retelling social cues, including identity. For example, a person is not simply recognised 
as having a certain gender or ethnicity; instead, their gender or ethnicity may be valued 
differently within different narratives.  
Narratives affect not only the relationship between social groups, but also the 
coherence within them. Tajfel argues that within in-groups, social identity is a ‘self-
concept’ which an individual derives from ‘their knowledge of their membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that 
membership’.34 Hence, an individual’s identity depends on their awareness of a group 
membership and how they value this membership, effectively producing a narrative of 
that membership. In addition, narratives play a significant role in linking different aspects 
of identity within a person. Narratives can combine seemingly contradictory traits into a 
coherent whole. For example, Markel Verkuyten argues that Polish Tatars are able to 
                                                 
31 Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity,” 606. 
32 Ibid., 616. Emphasis in original. 
33 Braedel-Kühner and Müller, “Introduction: Re-Thinking Diversity from a Cultural Science 
Perspective,” 9. 
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reconcile the Polish, Tatar and Muslim aspects of their identity as the result of a 
widespread narrative of their compatibility with each other.35 
In this regard, the formation of social groups does not imply a universal 
uniformity among its members. Within a group, there is a so-called ‘prototype’ who 
embodies most traits considered typical of the group at hand.36 A claim to group 
membership can then be made upon the identification of the typical traits in the self. The 
more sameness is found between the self and the prototype, the more likely a person will 
be admitted to the group.37 However, internal variations can be found in any social group, 
small or large, such as citizens of a country who share the same nationality and speak the 
same language but are otherwise different. 
Diversity within a social group can be recognised through descriptors which 
capture existing variations in identity, for example, by using compound nouns such as 
‘African-American’ or ‘French-Canadian’. However, there is sometimes a lack of proper 
adjectives, labels or conceptual narratives which can capture the entirety of identities and 
keep up with the recognition of increasingly complex combinations of identities. 
Ruthelen Josselson and Michele Harway ascribe this lack of complex ‘sociocultural 
categories’ or ‘categories of identity’ to the need to simplify categorisation of people, 
particularly in the media.38  
 Thus, members of one in-group can have an infinite number of variations in their 
traits and actions relative to the prototype of the group. The diversity within in-groups 
raises the issue of what factors contribute to a group’s cohesion and what factors 
challenge it. Tajfel argues that in-group similarities tend to be marked up while in-group 
differences tend to be disregarded.39 For example, a person from ethnic group A could 
share the same religion with a person from ethnic group B, creating a multi-layered 
network of relationships. This overlap between group A and B can contribute to the 
creation of a unifying narrative in which actual differences are less significant than the 
intangible values attached to the attributes of out-groups which shape intergroup 
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50 
 
relations.40 In other words, a blind eye can be turned to differences within the in-group 
as long as these do not challenge the fundamental similarities shared by group members. 
The way members choose to display their divergence from the prototype and how other 
group members perceive this divergence is key.41 A person’s divergence from the group’s 
prototype can decrease the value their group membership, but if the divergence is not 
considered threatening to the group’s narrative, it will not significantly affect a continued 
group membership.  
A continued cohesion within internally diverse social groups can be managed by 
adequately recognising and accommodating their differences instead of suppressing 
them. According to Charles Taylor, the misrecognition of identities may cause discontent 
and, within a culturally plural state, may cause feelings of belonging towards the state to 
wane.42 The correct recognition of identities has to include the interpretation of identity 
of the identified person, including the correct attribution of positive or negative value 
connotations. Furthermore, the recognition and evaluation of identity plays a significant 
role in ensuring functional relations between individuals as well as groups. For example, 
within a group of people where the majority adheres to religion A, religious minorities 
may be discontented if they are not allowed to freely express or practice their religion. 
The minority groups may also feel discontent if their religion is given negative value 
connotations by the majority, which in turn highligts the importance of self-identification 
and evaluation for diverse cultural groups. 
Alternatively, an internally diverse group requires a persuasive shared narrative 
to maintain its cohesion, for example, the narrative of a threatening out-group. This 
narrative of threat strengthens both the in-group’s cohesion as it faces a common 
challenge and projects a negative image towards the out-group.43 For example, a diverse 
group of people colonised by the same foreign power can unite to expel their common 
oppressor. In these situations, the prevailing narrative is typically created by a narrator, 
generally taking the form of political elites, as a ‘representational form/method of 
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presenting social and historical knowledge’.44 The narrator may choose to emphasise 
episodes of joint efforts in history rather than those of internal strife. A narrative of 
sameness and unity can further construe a national identity between people of different 
personal backgrounds who share one citizenship within the same state. 
 
2.2 Nationalism 
Nationalism is primarily concerned with the construction, socialisation and maintenance 
of the national identity. National identity, in turn, incites emotions, attachment and 
loyalty in a very large group of people on a state-wide scale.45 Within this thesis, national 
identity is interpreted as the connection between the people as a nation with the state, as 
the formal apparatus governing above them and legitimises common legal rights and 
duties, thus complementing the ‘legal and bureaucratic ties of the state’ to the people.46 
This identification between the people and the state positions the state as the people’s 
representative, as opposed to their oppressor, as the sole holder of power and ‘legitimate 
violence’.47 National identity further serves to ‘define and locate individual selves’ in the 
world, positioning one nation vis-à-vis others.48  
Nationalism, in this regard, is the desire of a group of people with a shared 
national identity to have their own state. It is a form of allegiance to the state which 
implies an ‘emotive presence’ that deeply affects people.49 Nationalism is thus more a 
form of social or political movement than an ideology. Different ideologies can, in fact, 
be used in conjunction with nationalism.50 Nationalism has been given a pejorative 
connotation in political studies, as an irrational and fanatical attachment to the nation and 
state which can easily turn into violence and warfare.51 This image of nationalism implies 
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that it is not desirable and has caused considerable criticism against nation-building 
processes for having enabled the oppression of cultural minorities for the sake of creating 
an idealised homogeneous nation.52 In addition, contesting narratives of nationalism 
between social groups have been the cause for violent conflict in various places 
throughout history.53 Elie Kedourie, for instance, argues that nationalism can easily turn 
into xenophobia when loyalty and affection towards one’s own state is accompanied by 
suspicion or dislike towards others.54 
In contrast to the negative connotations of nationalism, ‘patriotism’ is often 
construed as the good and rational kind of attachment to the nation and state. However, 
the term ‘patriotism’ has also been used to describe an uncritical support for the nation;55 
therefore, the distinction between nationalism and patriotism is contestable.56 Michael 
Billig, for instance, rejects this distinction between nationalism and patriotism. Michael 
Hechter further argues that the term ‘patriotism’ is often used to disguise and ameliorate 
the interest of particular groups ‘at the expense of others’.57 
The expression of nationalist sentiments is not always violent or confrontational. 
For example, Billig acknowledges that a person’s identification with the state can be 
expressed in a wide range of manners.58 National identity, for instance, can manifest in a 
person’s membership in a state’s military and their involvement in warfare; at the same 
time, national identity can manifest in the most ubiquitous, banal manners, such as in a 
person owning a national identification document.59 Furthermore, a stable national 
identity in a population enables a conducive environment for peace and welfare.60 While 
most people would not describe themselves as nationalists, national identity manifests 
itself in more ways than people may be aware of. Nationalism is thus more pervasive 
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than assumed because its manifestations are seen as commonplace.61 The reproduction 
of the nation can be found everywhere, such as in the production of national newspapers 
and other forms of mass media.62 
National identity, therefore, acts as a social glue which turns a people into a 
nation.63 Put differently, a nation is as a large group of people with sufficient similarities 
to provide them with a common national identity.64 However, there are debates regarding 
the primary factors that create this national identity, most commonly between proponents 
of ethnic nationalism, cultural nationalism and civic nationalism.  
In ethnic nationalism, membership in a nation is determined by ethnic descent or 
blood ties. Solidarity among members of the nation is taken to be a natural condition, just 
like the way family ties are based on blood relations.65 Ethnic nationalism has some 
cultural dimensions, such as commonalities in traditions, language, geographic proximity 
and idiosyncrasies. Clifford Geertz, for instance, argues that sameness in language and 
culture are part of the ethnic factors that build a nation.66 These cultural dimensions can 
evolve with time but nevertheless have identifiable characteristics for the members of the 
groups as well as their social others.67 
In comparison, theories of cultural nationalism argue that nationalist sentiments 
are born out of cultural identification among the people, as well as between the people 
and the state.68 It relies on commonalities in culture, language, or ethnicity to create a 
sense of belonging among the community, which in turn translates into their loyalty to 
the state. In turn, people use cultural expressions, including clothing, to express their 
sense of belonging.69 Nations are thus a product of a distinctive course of history with a 
particular culture and geographic condition. John Hutchinson argues that cultural 
nationalism requires the existence of a migration story, a founding myth, a golden age, a 
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period of decay and a promise to re-establish the aforementioned golden age.70 Thus, 
cultural nationalism has some overlaps with ethnic nationalism in highlighting ethnic and 
cultural features as the primary factors which make a nation stand out from other 
nations.71  
By contrast, according to civic nationalism, members of the nation share the 
common values embedded in the legal foundations of the state.72 Civic nationalism 
stresses the need for a ‘civic polity’ made of educated citizens who abide by the same 
rules and values, seeking a supposedly universal humanity which can transcend 
particularities.73 This civic understanding of nationalism is particularly important for 
culturally plural states, as it enables national membership without ethnic or cultural 
homogeneity.74 However, the civic values of a state are typically the product of a 
particular culture in itself, thus limiting its claim to universality. 
While the distinction between ethnic, cultural and civic nationalism is useful for 
academic discourse, the distinction is not clear-cut.75 For instance, civic nationalism 
appeals to a sense of common history and purpose among the people, similar to the claims 
of cultural nationalism to a common past and destiny.76 Anthony D. Smith acknowledges 
that both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism can be found in most states.77 For 
example, politicians can campaign on civic values while appealing to particular ethnic 
groups.78 In order to thrive and reaffirm their legitimacy, political nationalists adopt 
‘ethnic-historical identities’ to promote people’s identification with the state.79 A nation 
thus possesses a set of civic ideas and values, and at the same time can utilise its ethnic 
or cultural uniqueness to evoke a sense of national identity, where the state assumes the 
role of the ‘guardian of the [nation’s] culture’, as is the case in Indonesia.80  
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Nationalism also has a contestable relationship with religion. On the one hand, 
nationalism has been described as a logical outgrowth of the Enlightenment, as a secular 
alternative to religion which shifted authority and meaning from religions towards 
polities.81 The concept of nationalism as a secular take on group identity which replaces 
religion is, among others, supported by Elie Kedourie.82 On the other hand, scholars such 
as Craig Calhoun argue that religion and religious rhetoric continue to be intertwined 
with politics, and thus with the formation and maintenance of nations.83 Religious 
identity has indeed been a strong source of motivation for political movements 
throughout history, including nationalist ones.84 In addition, many modern-day states 
adopt religious values as national values, such as the case of Malaysia or Brunei 
Darussalam.85 Hence, religion continues to be a relevant dimension in studying 
nationalism, as a source of identity on its own accord and a powerful motivation for 
nationalist movements. 
Meanwhile, the nation-state is ‘the forum or shell within which national identity 
can be articulated, represented and legitimated.’86 While the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ 
are sometimes used interchangeably, the two refer to different things. Conceptually 
speaking, the ‘state’ refers to the formal apparatus performing governance over a people 
or a ‘nation’. For instance, states can act as protectors and providers of convergent goods 
such as infrastructure and education for the nation.87 The interchangeability of the terms 
of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ in their common usage implies a widespread assumption of a 
congruity between the state and the nation.  
The concept of the nation-state can be traced back at least to the era of the French 
revolution and ideas of the people’s right to self-determination.88 The nation-state is thus 
a relatively recent social invention.89 The concept of the nation-state then spread from 
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Western Europe to North America and to other parts of the world.90 Partha Chatterjee 
argues that the present ubiquity of the nation is a result of long-lasting effects of 
colonialism, which cause post-colonial nations to continue operating under the influence 
of past colonisers while rebelling against them.91 This influence causes post-colonial 
nations to adhere to borders drawn by colonial powers despite their disregard of 
traditional local cultural or ethnic boundaries, in turn creating a fertile ground for future 
conflicts. Post-colonial states also tend to adopt the model of governance previously 
imposed by colonial powers,92 as leaders of nationalist movements in post-colonial states 
tend to operate within the framework of nationalism socialised from Western Europe.93 
In this regard, Liah Greenfeld distinguishes between pristine and secondary nations. The 
pristine nations were the first wave of nations to establish themselves, while secondary 
nations followed later on. Secondary nations are thus imitations of the former, such as 
post-colonial nations which adopt the Western model of the nation-state as displayed by 
their colonisers.94 
The continued appeal of the concept of the ideal homogeneous nation-state can 
be observed in the continued existence of various separatist and nationalist movements.95 
However, the spread of nationalism and the concept of the nation-state across the world, 
particularly in post-colonial nations, are also problematic for several reasons. For 
example, nationalism can be a liberating movement towards anti-colonialism and 
political independence. Srirupa Roy describes nationalism as a way to mobilise 
previously relatively divided groups of people into one nation as a means to overthrow 
colonial power.96 At the same time, the spread of nationalism among post-colonial 
countries constitutes an imposition of the model of the nation-state as displayed by 
colonial powers. In turn, the supposedly liberating quest of political elites to establish 
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their own state have led to new orders of power and suppression, as elites seek to 
homogenise the population within their territory to emulate the Western model of the 
homogeneous nation-state. 
 Furthermore, the concept of the homogeneous nation-state is theoretically 
problematic because it contradicts the inherent diversity within social groups. Because 
of this inherent diversity, nationalism is more of a top-down nation-building process 
seeking to create homogeneity and cohesion among a population, as opposed to the 
awakening of a dormant pre-existing national identity. Walker Connor has pointed out 
that there are only a small number of states which can really claim to really be nation-
states. In a survey in 1971, Connor identified only 12 out of 132 states as nation-states.97 
Despite the emergence of post-colonial states and separatist movements around the 
twentieth century, with the increasing mobility of people in the present day, this number 
might have decreased further.  
Effectively, the nation-state is an idealised concept claimed by elites to justify 
their political motives. For example, Johnathan Hearn describes nationalism as a top-
down ‘making of combined claims, on behalf of a population, to the jurisdiction over a 
common identity within a distinct territory’.98 Eric Hobsbawm similarly views 
nationalism as a process in which traditions are invented in a top-down manner, with 
repeated performances of public ceremonies and the production of public monuments.99 
In this regard, Ernest Gellner provides a simple, if narrow definition for nationalism: as 
a search for congruency between the cultural group and the political unit.100 Gellner’s 
modernist approach to nationalism is also a constructivist one, which depicts present-day 
nations not as naturally occurring, but as intentionally constructed social units, moulded 
by processes in the organization of polities as well as economic activities which have 
evolved over time.101 Typically, the borders of the cultural unit is made to fit those of the 
political unit to ensure effective interactions within society. 
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101 Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, 72. 
58 
 
Nevertheless, cultural homogeneity has to be complemented by a self-awareness 
through which people declare their belonging to a nation.102 Walker Connor argues that 
a nation is ‘self-defined’, suggesting that cultural homogeneity is not always necessary 
if there is a shared sense of belonging among its members.103 This understanding of the 
nation enables the existence of culturally plural nations, provided that the members of 
the nation recognise themselves as such, effectively creating a narrative of a shared sense 
of belonging. 
The modernist approach to nationalism does not dismiss the idea that the sense 
of belonging to groups within a common territory have existed much longer than the 
modern nation-state; however, this sense of belonging is not similar to ‘nationalist 
sentiments’.104 Furthermore, such past groups would be largely different to present-day 
nations in terms of size, spatial distribution, or intragroup interactions. Jonathan Hearn 
argues that the assumption that members of present-day nations feel attached to each 
other as they would in a smaller social group overestimates the human capacity of 
empathy. Hearn particularly highlights that people do not act towards strangers the same 
way they would towards family and close friends.105 Similarly, Hopf argues that social 
groups in the past would have developed and construed themselves according to their 
own context, unlike the prevalent understanding of nations and states existing in the 
present.106  
The modernist approach to nationalism has, however, received some criticism for 
being too utilitarian and for failing to explain ‘the passions generated by nationalism’.107 
For example, Gellner argues that nations are born out of the necessities of social 
organization in response to the demands of modernity, such as for the enhancement of 
industrial productivity.108 While Gellner’s argument is not entirely incorrect, it does not 
address the historical significance of ethnic ties and their influence on the present.109  
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107 Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, 194. 
108 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 54-55. 
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The ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism creates a bridge between the ethnic 
groups of the past and modern-day nations. Proponents of this approach argue that past 
ethnic groups can be predecessors to nations; however, nations are still a modern-day 
phenomenon. Under this assumption, national identity stems from a combination of the 
recognition of shared commonalities and a sense of belonging between members of the 
same group.110 Therefore, nations are shaped by long-standing, relatively unaltered social 
groupings even if the structure of those groups have evolved over time.111 Smith argues 
that the combination of a shared heritage of homeland, history and culture in a nation in 
the modernist sense can create a sense of solidarity among its members.112 In other words, 
the emotional bond between individuals and the nation is constructed based on a pre-
existing heritage.  
The nation and the national identity thus posses an inter-subjectivity which 
requires the same narrative of the nation to be spread widely and effectively among a 
large number of people most of whom never actually interact or meet with each other. In 
this regard, Benedict Anderson argues that the existence of print media has propelled the 
dissemination of the national identity, allowing people across large geographical areas to 
share common information and thus common understandings of the social world.113 This 
process of constructing a national identity is called ‘imagining’ by Anderson, who thus 
describes nations as ‘imagined political communities’.114  
The role of mass communication in disseminating national identity implies the 
necessity of a shared language within the population. Thus, the existence of mass media 
has to be complemented by the spread of a national language, for instance, through a 
state-wide education system.115 However, a common language is not only a means for 
communication, but also a way of expressing people’s identity and a marker of ‘cultural 
membership’.116 People who use a national language are thus, in effect, declaring their 
cultural membership to the nation. Johann G. Herder views language as the means for 
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shaping human consciousness and transmitting cultural values.117 Taylor similarly argues 
that the transfer of language abilities takes place together with the transfer of implicit 
values.118 Meanwhile, Tajfel views ‘linguistic distinctiveness’ as one of the most 
important factors in creating a national identity.119  
 The dissemination of national identity through mass media and the education 
system in conjunction with a standardised national language imply a top-down approach 
to nation-building, with elites defining the ideal national identity. However, in the elite’s 
attempt to define national identity, the plurality within the population can become 
neglected.120 There may be discrepancies between the vision of elites and the complexity 
of identities among the people. Hopf argues that a bottom-up approach to nation-building 
is better because national identity is found at the ‘level of domestic society’.121 Smith 
similarly describes the bottom-up approach to nation-building as a process of rediscovery 
and repossession of a people’s communal history.122 Fanon argues that nationalism takes 
place when a previously colonised people collectively rejects the suggestion of their 
inferiority and pushes back against their colonisers.123 Karl Deutsch views nationalism 
as the alignment of the people towards ‘regional centres’ and ‘leading social groups’ 
through communication and economic interaction.124 The Marxist approach to 
nationalism views the civil society, particularly the middle class, as key agents who 
utilise nationalism to achieve social cohesion in facing uneven development.125 Michael 
Hechter, meanwhile, argues that nationalism is in essence a separatist movement; a 
response of minority groups to economic disparities or injustice inflicted upon them by 
a majority group.126 Thus, nationalism can also manifest as separatism.  
These conflicting views show that nationalism involves both top-down and 
bottom-up processes. For example, Tom Nairn argues that nationalism is a means for 
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underdeveloped peripheries to motivate mass mobilisation; at the same time, nationalism 
serves as a means for the political centre to subordinate peripheries.127 As such, 
nationalism is not a static phenomenon, and its manifestation depends on the particular 
context of each state.  
In the context of culturally plural states, the process of nation-building faces the 
challenges of diversity in defining their national identity.128 Culturally plural states are 
therefore more likely to undergo a top-down nation-building process, under the direction 
of elites who have a concrete vision for the state and its narrative. However, the 
centralistic approach to diversity tends to sweep difference under the rug and discount 
the salience of identities. In turn, this situation can lead to the repression of identities and 
breed discontent among groups in the population whose identities are not recognised or 
accommodated.129 By contrast, a democratic environment can be more conducive for the 
accommodation of diverse identities, as diverse groups are allowed to express their 
aspirations. However, opinions are divided over the relationship between democracy and 
diversity. For instance, the room provided by democracy for dissent and political 
contestations enables potential conflict and disintegration within the nation, as particular 
identities strive for their own ‘nation-state’. Democracy can also provide a platform for 
undemocratic groups to gather popular support, which in turn may constitute a threat to 
the expression of diverse identities.130 John Gerring et al. argue that different types of 
diversity have different effects on democracy, suggesting that religious diversity 
constitutes a greater challenge to democracy compared to ethnic diversity.131 Therefore, 
states should tailor their approach to diversity according to the specific situation at hand. 
While nationalist movements in post-colonial states have been somewhat 
problematic, there are benefits to having a stable national identity within internally 
diverse countries. For instance, an established nation allows political stability, which in 
turn supports, among other things, industrial productivity and economic development.132 
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By contrast, continued nationalist/secessionist movements may cause violent conflicts 
which impede on people’s welfare. Therefore, it is important for existing states to 
establish an adequate balance between the maintenance of a stable national identity and 
the accommodation of various identities within the state.   
 
2.3 Multiculturalism 
The recognition and accommodation of various identities within the state are issues 
central to multiculturalism. In essence, multiculturalism deals with ‘culturally derived 
differences’ that stem from communal religious and/or ethnic identities, as well as the 
implication of the value connotations attached to those differences.133 While ‘cultural 
plurality’ or ‘cultural diversity’ are descriptive words for the given condition within a 
population, ‘multiculturalism’ itself holds a normative position. A state can be culturally 
plural but not multiculturalist depending on the extent to which it provides collective 
rights for its various national minorities or ethnic groups. An internally diverse state may 
well have an assimilationist as opposed to a multicultural approach to its national identity.  
Multiculturalism can thus be understood in two ways. First, multiculturalism is 
the normative view that societies benefit from the recognition and accommodation of 
cultural diversity and the ‘proper terms of relationship between different cultural 
communities.134 Second, multiculturalism refers to the varying policies made by states in 
recognising their internal cultural diversity. In this regard, multiculturalism shifts away 
from the traditional assumptions of homogeneity within nations and states. Instead, it 
supports ways of ‘pluralising the state without undermining its unity and the ability to 
act decisively in the collective interest’.135 In summary, multiculturalism supports the 
recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity within states, believing that 
diversity does not threaten the integrity of the state and has beneficial effects on the state. 
It has already been established that all social groups, including states, experience 
varying degrees of internal diversity. Despite this inherent diversity, states still require 
their population to have a national identity which constitutes the emotive bond required 
between the two.136 Therefore, culturally diverse states are tasked with creating a 
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coherent narrative for their population which enables a shared national identity in spite 
of the present diversity. These states are also tasked with managing the collective rights 
of all their citizens, with potentially conflicting demands from different cultural groups, 
in a ‘stable and morally defensible’ way.137 
A state’s interpretation of its national identity and the implementation of identity-
related policies can shed light on its stance towards cultural diversity. Ideally, the 
provision of collective rights pertaining to ethnic, cultural or religious identities should 
be the result of the state’s recognition of the salience of these identities for the population. 
In this case, the primary goal of multiculturalist policies is the recognition of identities. 
However, states may also choose to provide different collective rights to their various 
cultural groups to further the states’ own agenda, such as the maintenance of the states’ 
own integrity by ensuring the allegiance of various cultural groups. In practise, there can 
be a synthesis between these two positions, as states provide recognition and 
accommodation towards selected cultural groups which are considered to be particularly 
important for the states’ narrative of national identity. 
Differing philosophical approaches also result in different kinds of 
multiculturalism. For instance, one liberal approach to multiculturalism considers 
differences between individuals as the primary basis for diversity. This approach 
emphasises the ‘de-politicisation’ of differences and toleration of diversity.138 This 
approach to multiculturalism further emphasises the agency of the individual in making 
identity-related choices; cultural groups exist but they are not particularly salient. This 
approach views that states should not facilitate the limitations imposed upon individuals 
by cultural groups; instead, states should enable the people’s emancipation from their 
cultural constraints.139 This approach to multiculturalism, however, tends to hold an 
implicit moral monism, claiming that its values are universally applicable to all citizens 
of a state and endorsing one particular ‘good’ way of life which is usually that of the 
majority cultural group.140 This universalist assumption leads towards the granting of 
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similar rights to all people, irrespective of cultural diversity.141 However, the attempt to 
impose one value system upon everyone, albeit a liberal one, tends to neglect the rights 
of minority cultural groups, and in so doing can be intolerant and oppressive.142 For 
example, strict secularism in France does not allow the display of religion within state 
schools. This regulation creates a challenge for Muslim girls who consider it important 
to wear a headscarf.143 This liberal approach to multiculturalism, which prescribes for 
minority cultural groups to conform to the majority, does not consider this prescription 
as a significant deprivation of rights. Hence, this approach is also more ‘likely to provoke 
resistance’, particularly on the part of minority groups who feel deprived of their salient 
cultural practices.144 
Meanwhile, the multicultural approach views cultural groups as the most salient 
source of identity; people’s identities are rooted in cultural groups. Cultural membership 
is seen as something inherent in a person, and hence cannot be taken away from a person 
without causing significant discontent.145 Within this perspective, cultural groups have 
to be allowed to exercise their cultural traditions, and states are expected to recognise 
and accommodate group differences.146 This approach argues that different cultural 
groups can coexist in a functioning state while maintaining salient aspects of their 
particular identities; these groups only need to share the fundamental tenets of the state.147 
Furthermore, minority groups are supposed to be given affirmative action to provide 
them with equal opportunities with the majority. Minority groups can be given protection 
from the ‘economic or political decisions of the majority’ through adequate political 
representation or the ability to veto decisions which may discriminate against them.148 
Differential treatment, as opposed to identical treatment, is necessary to avoid 
superfluous discrimination or privilege between cultural groups.149  
While the equal recognition and accommodation of identities for all cultural 
groups is ideal in theory, in practice, multiculturalism faces challenges in trying to be 
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thoroughly equitable. It is challenging to reconcile different value systems within one 
coherent overarching system, especially when some value systems fundamentally 
contradict each other, such as faith-based ideologies and strictly secular ones. The full 
accommodation of both value systems can lead to a dysfunctional state where cultural 
groups exist parallel to, but separate from, each other. 
In this regard, multiculturalism faces some criticism, such as for allegedly being 
incompatible with principles of liberalism and democracy, because it constrains 
individual liberties within group norms and encourages disparities and conflict between 
groups.150 However, Will Kymlicka argues that it is possible to reconcile the 
accommodation of group rights with the maintainance of an overall national cohesion 
under the tenets of liberalism.151 Furthermore, multiculturalism is possible when the 
people’s attachment to particular cultures do not become so overbearing that it impedes 
their attachment to the state.152 
Multiculturalism is also accused of undermining women’s rights, as it enables 
cultural practices that can be considered detrimental towards women, such as traditions 
of veiling or conventional gender expectations that restrict women’s activities.153 
Multicultural is thus said to enable varying gender expectations, some of which include 
oppressive gender and sexual norms.154 However, this criticism has in turn been accused 
of harbouring a sense of cultural superiority and racist sentiments against minority 
cultures without having any real concern for women’s rights.155  
In consideration of the expectations and limitations of multiculturalism, balance 
is required between the quest for a coherent state and society and the quest for the 
accommodation of various cultural groups. The central challenge for a culturally diverse 
and multicultural state is thus the establishment of a composite common culture aiming 
for the equitable treatment of all cultural groups.156 This challenge entails reflections on 
unconscious cultural bias, as policies contain implicit unequal power relations between 
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majority and minority groups which could be exacerbated if minority groups do not have 
equal access to the law-making process within the state. Policies and legislations are more 
likely to contain the biases and prejudice of the elites and/or the majority, which in turn 
can cause significant discontent among minority cultural groups. Therefore, the 
culturally plural state has to be considerate of various cultural groups within it.  
At the same time, various ethnic and cultural groups co-exist and compromise 
within the structure of a state ‘in favour of superficial cohesion and networking 
processes’.157 To establish a coherent governance, the state has to set limits to the values 
that can be accepted and tolerated within it.158 Here, toleration is defined as ‘a deliberate 
choice not to interfere with conduct of which one disapproves’.159 In the case of 
toleration, the state acknowledges the existence of some cultural groups and value 
systems, but do not provide complete accommodation for them. Toleration can be 
limited, particularly when discrepancies between value systems become too disruptive 
for the coherence of the state and society.160 As an implication of the limitations of 
tolerance, the practices of particular cultural groups and value systems are formally 
restricted to better enable more acceptable ones. 
Multiculturalism is thus a balancing act between laying out the foundations of the 
state and the day-to-day implementation of multiculturalist policies. In other words, 
multiculturalist states seek to transcend communal differences within its population 
without imposing uniformity, while recognising the need for coherence. Parekh argues 
that the first step towards this transcendence is the attainment of ‘emotional sympathy’ 
among different cultural groups through a consciousness of history.161 In other words, 
there needs to be a common narrative which enables the relationship among cultural 
groups, as well as the relationship between various cultural groups and the state. A 
narrative which emphasises similarities among a diverse population is conducive for a 
multicultural state, particularly when diversity is presented as a strength. This narrative 
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may appeal to abstract civic values which can be shared more easily among various 
cultural groups. The narrative of a diverse but united nation can be spread among the 
population through the contents of mass media as well as the education system. For 
example, school subjects such as citizenship and history show the worldview that 
students are expected to have. These subjects further disseminate the state’s desired 
understanding of national identity and narrative of diversity. Furthermore, the state can 
disseminate its narrative of national unity through the dissemination of a national 
language which ensures effective communication among the population.162 
The state’s chosen narrative further determines the nature of the relationship 
between majority and minority cultural groups. Different types of minority groups can 
be given different types of treatment by the state, depending on how they are perceived 
within the state. In this regard, Kymlicka differentiates between what he calls multi-
national and poly-ethnic states.163 Multi-national states are defined as states in which 
smaller cultural groups become ‘national minorities’. Multi-national states can be the 
result of invasions, where a cultural group’s homeland is, for instance, colonised by 
settlers. Multi-national states can also be the result of the mutual agreement between 
different cultural groups to live together within one state.164 Meanwhile, poly-ethnic 
states are defined as those with a number of ‘ethnic’ or cultural groups which have 
immigrated into them without any particular delineated territory for themselves.165 As an 
example, the United States of America is both multi-national (due to the existence of 
Native-Americans and pre-independence settlers) and poly-ethnic (due to various post-
independence immigrant ethnic communities).166  
The distinction between ‘national minorities’ and ‘ethnic groups’ is useful, but is 
not always applicable in practice. For instance, historically, Indonesia better befits the 
description of Kymlicka’s multi-national state, as various cultural groups declared 
themselves as part of the same nation. However, in the Indonesian context, the term 
‘ethnic group’ is more commonly used for all types of cultural groups, including the 
majority cultural groups. Furthermore, the majority ethno-regional group in Indonesia, 
the Javanese, are not settlers, as is the case in Kymlicka’s example of settlers in the USA. 
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Kymlicka’s use of ‘national minorities’ fits better in describing what are known as 
‘traditional societies’ or ‘indigenous peoples’ in Indonesia, which are smaller ethno-
cultural groups that continue to live traditionally. Meanwhile, Kymlicka’s term of ‘ethnic 
groups’ is more suitable for cultural groups such as Chinese-Indonesians which have 
settled prior to Indonesia’s political independence, yet are regarded as newcomers and 
have no particular territory in which they constitute the local majority. Despite this 
prevalent narrative of Chinese-Indonesians as ‘foreign’, in the Indonesian context, they 
are also often described with the term ‘suku bangsa’ (sub-nation) just as any other ethno-
regional groups in the country. 
The distinction between different types of cultural groups within states implies 
different approaches to the accommodation of their cultural rights. The understanding of 
the roles of various cultural groups is part of the narrative of a state and nation. For 
example, multi-national states are more likely to grant ‘self-government rights’ to distinct 
cultural groups within delineated territories, which among other things, can be achieved 
by federalism or regional autonomy. A multi-national state can also utilise ‘intermediate 
levels of government’ on the ‘principle of subsidiarity’.167 Kymlicka provides Quebec as 
an example for a federate state with extensive cultural rights in Canada which 
predominantly uses French as its official language, with both English and French having 
official federal status throughout the country.168 Meanwhile, poly-ethnic states can 
accommodate the cultural rights of their ethnic minorities by providing the latter with 
exemptions from regulations that can disadvantage them, for example by allowing Sikh 
men in Canada to wear their turban in place of other head coverings, such as hats which 
are part of the local police uniform.169 Multi-national and poly-ethnic states can similarly 
accommodate the rights of minorities by providing them with rights to political 
representation, even though these rights are rarely extended to recent immigrants.170  
In consideration of the varying approaches to multiculturalism, I am proposing 
three dimensions of multiculturalism that can be examined within a state. Firstly, 
multiculturalism can be measured based on its historical context, particularly the spirit in 
which elites have laid out the foundations for multiculturalism. There is always a political 
dimension to culture and cultural change, and the re-invention of traditions and ideals by 
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elites reflect the interest and significance attached to such traditions.171 Hence, the 
intentions of elites in designing the framework for multiculturalism must be taken into 
account. For example, a multi-national state can be multiculturalist if, from the outset, 
this state has the intention of creating differentiated rights for national minorities. In 
contrast, multiculturalist policies can be seen as an afterthought, as a way of dealing with 
later additions to the population or sporadically managing challenges of diversity as they 
come. It is also possible that elites allow the recognition of minority rights to create a 
narrative that serves their own interests in building or maintaining existing power 
structures.172 By analysing the context of a culturally plural nation, one can examine 
whether the accommodation of particular group rights are established in the spirit of 
celebrating diversity or as concessions to inhibit or minimise discontent on the part of 
minorities.  
Secondly, multiculturalism can be examined through the extent of legal pluralism 
in a state. Ideally, legal pluralism should allow all cultural groups, including minorities, 
to define and pursue their conception of the good life.173 For example, countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia accommodate the practices of multiple religions 
through the celebration of their holidays as national public holidays.174 To begin with, 
legal pluralism can be examined through the range of policies and legislation which 
actually involve the recognition of particular group rights. One can further examine 
whether differentiated group rights only constitutes a jargon or are actually implemented 
through tangible laws and regulations. Then, one can examine whether legal pluralism is 
present in a wide range of sectors, including sectors that are not directly associated with 
identity, such as the relationship between laws on forestry and indigenous rights. In 
addition, one can examine to what extent a state’s policies and institutions address the 
issue of diversity and multiculturalism. For example, policies dealing with diversity may 
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provide tokenistic rights to minority groups without addressing deeper social problems 
that can be the result of longstanding discrimination towards minorities. 
Legal pluralism can be further examined through the range of particular groups 
who get to experience the recognition and accommodation of their group rights, such as 
which cultural groups have their particular identities recognised and accommodated. 
Some states only recognise and accommodate cultural groups that are large enough or 
have significant political leverage, but not smaller minority groups.175 A state can be 
considered more multiculturalist when smaller groups in the population that have little 
political leverage are provided with adequate group rights. Then, legal pluralism can be 
examined through how it enables interaction between different cultural groups. A state 
can, for example, establish differentiated rights for different cultural groups in its 
population but practice segregationist policies or establish ranks between different 
cultural groups to the disadvantage of those with lesser political leverage.176 Along 
similar lines, legal pluralism can be examined through the extent of its facilitation of the 
perpetuation of group differences and the hardening of identities. 
Thirdly, multiculturalism can be examined through the way cultural groups 
perceive themselves and each other within a state’s population or, indeed, within a nation. 
Certain cultural groups may view themselves as more valuable than others, producing an 
implicit hierarchy between different cultural groups. Furthermore, there can be residues 
of past conflicts and grievances that must be overcome in order to establish trust between 
groups. While various cultural groups can co-exist within a state with minimum 
interaction and trust among themselves, a state is more multiculturalist when there are 
sustained meaningful and positive interactions between its various cultural groups. These 
interactions between cultural groups can be governed by existing laws and regulations of 
the state, but they also have a private aspect to them. In turn, the established practices in 
the interactions between various cultural groups can become the source of public 
regulations.177  
The ways through which multiculturalism can be measured provide an insight 
into the limitations of multiculturalism. For instance, it is challenging to create inclusive 
foundations for a state and to determine which core values should be adopted. It is equally 
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challenging to define which groups of people make up national minorities or ethnic 
groups, and even more challenging to determine whether significant internal variations 
within those groups should be accorded their own group status. Furthermore, there is the 
challenge to determine which particular norms and values are salient enough to warrant 
their legal recognition and accommodation by the state. All these decisions involve 
judgement on which values are considered good and salient; in most cases, a group of 
elites makes these decisions, with the possibility that the perceptions and concerns of 
minority groups are not sufficiently taken into consideration. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
If the nation is broadly understood as a large group of people with sufficient similarities 
to provide them with a common identity who vie for their own state, while 
multiculturalism is understood as a quest for the recognition of particular cultural groups 
within a heterogeneous society, a ‘multicultural nation’ can be an oxymoron. At the same 
time, theories of identity indicate that there is always internal diversity or variations 
within social groups, including nations and states. The vast majority of present-day states 
do not constitute traditional ‘nation-states’; instead, states are internally diverse to 
varying degrees and face the challenge of maintaining their unity and salient 
commonalities among their citizens.  
Some states like Indonesia are more diverse than others, which makes the 
balancing between unity and diversity more challenging. The recognition and 
accommodation of particular identities should prevent discontent associated with the 
misrecognition of identities. The recognition and accommodation of identities in the 
public discourse can reaffirm the membership of particular groups in the nation and 
ensure their continued loyalty to it. However, to have a coherent state, all citizens must 
also share some common values. In addition, the culturally plural state has to build a 
narrative in which its various cultural groups can find themselves represented adequately.  
One possibility would be for states to promote a narrative on national identity 
with a strong emphasis on civic elements of identity, which can be shared more easily 
among people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. According to theories of 
civic nationalism, people can ‘shed’ particular identities related to ethnicity and religion 
and instead adopt a civic identity. However, since people are socially embedded, a 
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complete shedding of cultural identity would be difficult, if not impossible. The extent 
to which people can ‘shed’ particular aspects of their identity would depend on how 
salient those aspects are to them. The way particular aspects of identity are socialised, 
understood and experienced by the people affect the former’s centrality for the people. 
Therefore, a narrative which solely promotes civic elements of identity but 
ignores the salience of cultural and ethnic elements of identities is more likely to 
encounter resistance. In contrast, particular cultural identities that are considered less 
salient could be left out of the narrative of national identity with less consequence. A 
simplified narrative of national identity could aid its promotion among the population, 
but such simplification often takes place to the detriment of minority groups left out of 
the narrative. Instead, in the face of a high internal diversity, the perceived threat from a 
common other can be easier to construct in the narrative of national identity in order to 
boost internal cohesion within the nation and state. For example, a shared history of 
colonialism can be a cultural dimension shared by an otherwise diverse population, 
creating both a common enemy and a common purpose of joint self-determination. 
Once political elites have decided upon a narrative for their country’s national 
identity, they may still have to adjust the narrative according to the country’s dynamic 
internal and external conditions. Adjustments to the narrative of national identity may be 
necessary to ensure its preservation in the long run. Hence, alterations to previously 
established narratives are possible. The nation and its national identity, particularly in 
culturally diverse ones, need to be actively reasserted and reproduced over time. Elites 
play an important role in this reproduction of identity, having the resources and 
opportunity to set the public agenda and influence public opinion. Elites affect the 
reproduction and dissemination of nationalist symbols and actions among the wider 
population. The choice of the kind of identity to be portrayed, ultimately, may hold the 
deciding role in ensuring the unity and durability of a culturally plural nation. 
Furthermore, across different periods, elites may choose to employ varying degrees of 
multiculturalism; in a country’s history, there may be periods when the state takes on a 
more assimilationist stance on diversity and periods when the state is more 
multiculturalist. 
In the end, the management of a culturally plural society is a balancing act 
between national unity and uniformity and the celebration of particular identities. I 
propose three dimensions through which a state’s multiculturalism can be measured: the 
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historical context of the state’s foundations for multiculturalism; the extent of legal 
pluralism in the state; and the way cultural groups relate to each other. Bearing in mind 
the uniqueness of each state in terms of history and demographic makeup, there is no 
single solution to determine how a balance between unity and diversity can be achieved. 
Instead, one has to look into the factors that are of particular salience for each state and 
develop a distinct approach. For any particular state, the emphasis may be on the civic, 
ethnic or cultural dimension of identity, or a combination of them. In order to identify 
which dimensions of identity are of particular salience, one has to examine the historical 
and constitutional framework of the state, as well as the perception and understanding of 
identity on the part of the country’s population.
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3 The Challenge of Identity Making, Nation Building and  
Cultural Pluralism in Indonesia 
This chapter introduces significant periods in Indonesia’s history through existing 
literature on identity making, nation-building and multiculturalism in the country: the 
period of National Awakening, the years around Indonesia’s declaration of 
independence, and the New Order period. This chapter thus serves as the historical 
framework for this research. By highlighting the distinguishing features of the chosen 
historical periods, this chapter argues that nation-building in Indonesia has been a 
predominantly top-down process, as elites faced the challenges of diversity in realising 
their vision of Indonesia’s national identity. Furthermore, while elites have adopted 
varying approaches to cultural diversity and national identity, the narrative of Unity in 
Diversity and the Pancasila have persisted throughout different periods with varying 
interpretations of it. 
Section one examines the period known as Kebangkitan Nasional (national 
awakening) in the early 20th century. In this period, youth groups started to organise 
themselves around the idea of an Indonesian nation which was shaped both against and 
by colonialism. Elites leading the nationalist movement construed colonising powers as 
a common other to be overcome together; at the same time, elites’ understanding of 
identity and nationalism was significantly influenced by Western political thinking. 
Furthermore, the organisation of political organisations along ethno-regional and 
religious lines laid out the framework for Indonesia’s cultural diversity. 
Section two discusses the period around the inception of the Indonesian state in 
1945, including the early years of Soekarno’s1 presidency up to the early 1950s. This 
period is known for debates between secular nationalist leaders and political Islamists as 
well as Soekarno’s syncretic approach to national identity. This period displayed the 
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range of possibilities available for identity making and managing a culturally plural state 
in its embryonic stage through Soekarno’s attempt to reconcile the interests of various 
political and social movements across the archipelago.  
Section three examines President Suharto’s2 authoritarian and assimilationist 
approach towards nation-building the New Order era (1966-1998). In this period, 
Indonesia’s cultural diversity was treated as a national asset; however, the government 
was heavily centralised, leaving little room for the expression of ethno-regional 
identities. Furthermore, Suharto repressed political competition with his regime, 
including that of political Islam. At the same time, colonialism continued to shape 
Indonesia’s nation-building, as the government aspired to cement the image of a modern 
nation on a par with developed Western nations. This focus on urbanisation and 
modernising the nation put the expression of ethno-regional identities in the backseat of 
Indonesia’s cultural diversity as they were associated with backwardness.  
Section four provides a brief introduction to the post-1998 era of reform and 
democratisation in Indonesia, particularly highlighting the transition from the New Order 
and the succession of presidencies since 1998. It sets the stage for Chapter Four, which 
examines in more detail Indonesia’s current framework for diversity.  
 
3.1 The ‘National Awakening’ 
In the 1920s, ‘Indonesia’ used to be known as the Dutch East Indies, a cluster of more 
than thirteen thousand islands spanning the territory of present-day Indonesia. The word 
‘Indonesia’ itself was originally coined by an English naturalist to ‘classify the distinctive 
ethnic and geographical identity of the archipelago’.3 Its first usage in the political sense 
was found in a journal called Hindia Poetra (Sons of the Indies) in April 1917 in the 
Netherlands.4 In its political organisation, the Dutch East Indies was a hybrid of a private 
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company, colony, and local governance.5 There was a network laid down by the 
Vereenigte Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East Indies Company/VOC) which 
enabled regular interaction between the different islands across the archipelago. Parts of 
the Dutch East Indies’ territory were overseen by the Dutch Crown. Meanwhile, 
governance on the local scale was overseen by a Dutch governor-general, with regents 
and middle- to low-ranking officials who were typically appointed from local aristocratic 
families.6  
The 1920s is known as the era of Kebangkitan Nasional (National Awakening), 
marked by ‘the emergence of novel ideas of organisation and […] more sophisticated 
definitions of identity’ related to developments in the ‘religious, social, political and 
economic environment’ of Indonesia.7 Literature on this period in Indonesia’s history 
commonly focuses on the existence of a common enemy which served as a force of 
cohesion for various ethno-regional groups in the Dutch East Indies. For instance, R.E. 
Elson argues that during the Indonesian struggle for independence, various ethnic groups 
were willing to subjugate their regional identity for a newly created Indonesian nation to 
overcome a common enemy.8 Benedict Anderson similarly argues that the common 
plight of colonialism shaped the Indonesian national identity for people who were 
otherwise scattered across thousands of islands.9 The subordination of ethno-regional 
identities to the Indonesian national identity was considered a necessity to have enough 
combined leverage against colonial powers. At the same time, the common denominator 
of ‘the Dutch East Indies’ helped develop the idea of the archipelago as one single entity. 
The Indonesian national awakening culminated in two Youth Congresses in 1926 
and 1928 which were attended by various youth groups organising along ethno-regional 
or religious lines. The 1928 Youth Congress resulted in the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth 
Pledge)10 which contained a joint declaration of a common homeland, nation and 
language. The most well-known and most recited part of the Youth Pledge consists of 
the following three sentences: 
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Firstly, we, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one 
homeland: the homeland of Indonesia. Secondly, we, the sons and daughters 
of Indonesia, acknowledge one nation: the nation of Indonesia. Thirdly, we, 
the sons and daughters of Indonesia, uphold the language of unity: Bahasa 
Indonesia.11 
The notion of homeland and nation, in combination with the term ‘sons and 
daughters’, indicates the construction of an ethnic attachment in the Youth Pledge. The 
adoption of a ‘language of unity’ indicated a cultural element within the commonly civic 
modernist approach to nationalism. 12 In addition, the 1928 Youth Congress witnessed 
the first public performance of the song ‘Indonesia Raya’ which would later become 
Indonesia’s national anthem.13 Similar to the Youth Pledge, the lyrics of the song include 
terms such as homeland and nation, as well as references to a figurative mother.14 
Following the Youth Pledge, political leaders notably started to demand the usage of the 
term ‘Indonesian’ instead of the term ‘inlander’ (natives), thus declaring themselves part 
of a larger nation.15 This insistence on being recognised as ‘Indonesians’ showed that 
they considered themselves part of a distinct nation, displaying a self-awareness of their 
membership in the nation as described by scholars of ethno-symbolism such as Walker 
Connor.16  
The message contained in the Youth Pledge appealed to the people to put their 
Indonesian identity ahead of their ethno-regional or religious identities. However, the 
Youth Pledge was not accompanied by a detailed definition of what it meant to be 
Indonesian beyond the common desire for decolonisation. This situation reflects Ernest 
Gellner’s argument that ‘doctrinal elegance’ with a minimum of ‘frills’ works best to 
unite diverse people, as too many details may complicate the attainment of unity.17 
However, the simplicity of the Youth Pledge signalled future challenges in managing the 
cultural diversity of Indonesia.  
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The Youth Congress’s decision to declare a national language was arguably the 
most tangible part of the Youth Pledge. For instance, despite similarities between the 
languages used in present-day Indonesia and Malaysia, Indonesian had started to be 
actively standardised on its own, and intellectuals stopped referring to the language as 
Malay.18 In 1925, there were around two hundred newspapers published in less 
standardised forms of Indonesian. By 1938, there were over four hundred publications in 
the language, and the language was becoming more standardised.19 
The growth of the Indonesian language was a top-down process, aided by the 
government-sponsored printing house Balai Pustaka20 (Office for Literature) which 
published Indonesian literature and also translated Western literature into Indonesian.21 
The usage of printed media in the national language aided the spread of national 
consciousness, serving as Anderson’s ‘national print-languages’ which were ‘of central 
ideological and political importance’ for successful national movements.22 Furthermore, 
this ‘print capitalism’ gave a fixity to the language and created the impression of a long-
standing nation.23 The dissemination of the Indonesian language reflected Gellner’s 
modernist argument that cultural homogeneity, including a standardised language, is 
required to ensure effective interaction within society to form a nation.24 
While the Indonesian language provided a method of communication that was 
distinct from Dutch, significant Dutch influence could be found in various dimensions of 
the development of nationalism in Indonesia. Literature on post-colonialism in Indonesia 
highlights the way colonisation has shaped nationalism in the country. Even though elites 
claimed to build a nation as a move against Western colonialism, their understanding of 
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nations was heavily influenced by Western political thinking, as a large majority of 
Indonesian elites were educated in the fashion of the colonial power.25 Therefore, while 
education was considered as a means towards political emancipation,26 it confined the 
development of political thinking to established practices.27 For example, Soekarno’s 
writings revealed significant influence from the likes of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
Otto Bauer, Karl Kautsky, Jean Jaurès, Pieter Jelles Troelstra and Henriette Roland-
Holst.28 
The influence of education in Indonesia’s nation-building was also apparent in 
the way mass organisations started as student organisations which later developed into 
political ones. For example, a student organisation called Budi Utomo was established in 
Batavia (present-day Jakarta) on 20 May 1908. Its members were primarily university 
students of various disciplines, as well as students of various teacher-training, agriculture 
and veterinary schools around Batavia. By the end of 1909, Budi Utomo’s membership 
had grown to ten thousand, even though its membership was mostly limited to local elites 
and intellectuals in Java and Madura.29 Other examples include the Indische Vereeniging 
(Indies Association), which was established by students from the Dutch East Indies in 
the Netherlands in 1908, and the Indische Partij (Indies Party), which was founded in 
1911 on the basis of an ‘Indies’ nationalism.  
The main ideologies in the early days of Indonesian politics, nationalism and 
communism, also spread through mass organisations. In 1914, the Indische Sociaal-
Demokratische Vereeniging (Indies Social-Democratic Association/ISDV) was 
established.30 In 1924, the ISDV became Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Communist Party/PKI) with the aim of establishing an independent communist state in 
Indonesia.31 Ideologically, the PKI shared the Marxist view on imperialism which views 
colonialism as the stripping away of the local population’s ownership of their means of 
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production for the benefit of colonisers.32 Meanwhile, nationalist political thought was 
spread by the Indische Vereeniging which changed its name into Indonesian in 1922. The 
organisation decided to call itself Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) as it 
became more active in the proliferation of nationalist ideas.33 In 1927, Perhimpunan 
Indonesia was transformed into Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Party/PNI),34 a nationalist party which aimed for independence by ‘non-cooperative 
methods and mass organisation’ led by Soekarno. While PNI was not explicitly socialist, 
Soekarno’s leftist leanings still influenced its ideology.35  
At the same time, mass organisations developed along ethno-regional lines, 
including the Sarekat Ambon (1920) in Ambon, Jong Java (1918) in Central and East 
Java, Pasundan (1914) in West Java, Sarekat Sumatra (1918) in Sumatra, Jong Minahasa 
(1918) in North Celebes, Timorsch Verbond (1921) in Timor and Kaum Betawi (1923) 
in Batavia. Their members were typically young and educated local elites who either 
studied in the Netherlands or schools fashioned after the Dutch model, which again 
indicated that their political thinking was shaped by a Western-style education.36 The 
development of ethno-regional organisations reflected the continued salience of ethno-
regional identities for the people in Indonesia. 
In contrast to ethno-regional organisations, large religious organisations were 
able to establish networks that spanned larger areas of the archipelago. Muslim 
organisations, in particular, portrayed themselves as a resistance against Christian Dutch 
colonialists. For example, Muhammadiyah was established in 1912, focusing on the 
education and welfare of its members while resisting the Christianising efforts of Western 
missionaries.37 In 1917, Muhammadiyah established Aisyiyah as its women’s chapter, 
thereby explicitly including women into the proliferation of mass organisations. By 1938, 
Muhammadiyah’s membership had grown to over 250,000, indicating its significant 
impression on the local Muslim population.38 This growth showed the salience of religion 
and how religious identity was able to transcend ethno-regional differences among the 
people. Muhammadiyah then became more involved in politics, primarily seeking social 
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justice and the revitalisation of Islam in the archipelago.39 Religious mass organisations 
developed within other religious groups, as demonstrated by the Pakempalan Politik 
Katolik Jawi (Javanese Catholics Political Association), established in 1925.40  
Meanwhile, the development of Sarekat Islam,41 a large Islamic mass 
organisation, shed light on another conflict of identity. The organisation was initially set 
up as a trade cooperative among Muslim batik traders in 1909, called Sarekat Dagang 
Islamiyah (Islamic Commercial Union). It was established as a response to business 
competitions among local and Chinese batik traders across Java which caused sporadic 
outbursts of violence against the Chinese.42 In turn, the differentiation and othering 
between locals and ‘the Chinese’ was a by-product of the 1642 Bataviasche Statuten, a 
Dutch legal code which classified the Dutch East Indies population into Europeans, 
Inlanders (natives) and Vreemde Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), which included 
people of Chinese descent, even though some had settled in Indonesia for generations.43 
The differentiation between ‘native’ Indonesians and Chinese-Indonesians remains 
salient to the present. 
All these mass organisations show that the largest social movements were run on 
the platform of Islam, nationalism or communism. While all movements sought 
independence from colonial powers, they had different visions of the state that was to 
emerge out of the Dutch East Indies. To overcome their ideological differences, in 1926, 
Soekarno published a series of articles in which he argued that Islam, communism and 
nationalism had to unite in the cause of independence. For Soekarno, imperialism was 
the source of the oppression of the Indonesian people, regardless of their particular 
political convictions or class interests.44 To rally support from diverse groups, Soekarno 
portrayed imperialism as both an enemy of socialism as well as Islam.45 An independent 
state was the ultimate requirement for realising any vision of an ideal polity beyond 
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colonialism.46 This syncretic approach was a trademark of Soekarno’s political 
thinking.47  
The reconciliation of different value systems is part of the challenge of cultural 
plurality. Despite Soekarno’s efforts to reconcile different ideologies, debates on the 
relationship between the state and religion, particularly Islam, remained a point of 
contention. For a short time in 1929, PNI, Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo and various other 
organisations, including Chinese and Arabic communities across the archipelago, united 
under the banner of the Permufakatan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan 
Indonesia (Agreement of Indonesian People’s Political Association/PPPKI). Nationalists 
and minority organisations in PPPKI sought the formation of a secular state that was 
more inclusive toward its citizens.48 However, due to the perceived salience of Islam for 
Sarekat Islam, in a matter of months after PPPKI’s inception, Sarekat Islam withdrew 
from the organisation as it became increasingly dissatisfied with the idea of a secular 
country.49 This disagreement over the foundations of the would-be Indonesian state 
persisted through different eras in the country’s history. 
Following this era of National Awakening, the Dutch colonial government 
entered its most repressive phase in retaliation to the nationalist movements. The colonial 
government disbanded nationalist organisations, detained their leaders and sent some into 
exile.50 In 1931, PNI was dissolved by the colonial government. In 1933, Soekarno was 
arrested and exiled from Batavia; many other political leaders of Indonesia met the same 
predicament. The resumption of their political activity would only take place 
significantly after the surrender of the Netherlands’ authority over Indonesia to Japan in 
1942.51 
  
3.2 The Revolutionary Years 
Literature on Indonesia’s so-called revolutionary years typically focuses on Soekarno’s 
syncretic attempts to formulate and propagate ‘Indonesian’ values vis-à-vis the various 
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ideological strands in the country.52 At the same time, events leading up to 1945 were 
influenced by developments of World War II. On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl 
Harbour; the following day, the Dutch Governor General in Indonesia declared war on 
Japan.53 Following this war, in March 1942, Japan drove out the weakening Dutch forces 
from Indonesia.54  
Initially, Japan portrayed itself as the liberators of ‘fellow Asians’; thus, their 
fight against the Dutch forces was aided by the local population who initially welcomed 
the Japanese administration.55 As part of their effort to eliminate Western influence in 
Indonesia, the Japanese forces banned the use of Dutch and English. They renamed 
places and streets, including renaming Batavia as Jakarta, which would later become 
Indonesia’s capital city.56 This situation showed how the perception of a common other 
or enemy can result in the unity of otherwise different groups of people. However, 
resistance against Japan soon built up as its exploitation of local natural resources became 
apparent along with the institution of forced labour and internment camps.57 
In September 1944, as American forces started to capture Japanese bases around 
the Pacific, Japan promised that it would grant political independence to Indonesia. This 
promise was intended to gain favour from Indonesia’s nationalist leaders as well as to 
frustrate the Netherlands, should it decide to re-conquer its former colony. To this end, 
Japan funded speaking tours around Indonesia for Soekarno.58 In so doing, Japan aided 
the spread of the idea of the Indonesian nation across the archipelago in accordance with 
the modernist view that nations require the advancement of communication technology 
to disseminate a sense of belonging. In Indonesia’s pre-independence years, Soekarno’s 
speeches were often aired through the radio and broadcasted through loudspeakers in the 
centre of many villages across Indonesia.59  
In March 1945, Japan established the Investigating Committee for the Preparation 
of Indonesia’s Independence, which was tasked with preparing a constitution and an 
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independent government for Indonesia. The Japanese filled the Committee with members 
they thought would be more cooperative towards Japan, including Soekarno. The 
members of the Committee were predominantly of Javanese descent with varying 
political ideologies. It therefore displayed early signs of Java-centrism in Indonesian 
politics, which would persist to the end of the New Order in 1998, and continues to a 
lesser extent today.60  
Debates within this Committee reflected the challenge of reconciling different 
political and religious value systems in culturally plural societies, which in this case 
remained significant despite the existence of a common enemy. This situation suggests 
that a common other only functions as a unifying factor when it is more salient than the 
differences between the concerned social groups. In this case, various political factions 
in Indonesia still faced the common enemy of colonialism; however, their ideological 
political and religious differences could not be put aside entirely. Within the Committee, 
true to his secular nationalist background, Soekarno pushed for a religiously neutral 
Indonesian state by employing countries such as Egypt and Turkey as examples where 
‘religion and the state were being separated in the name of modernity’.61 However, 
political Islamists continued to vie for a state based on Islamic law or, at least, a state 
with Islamic law in effect for the Muslim population.62 
Soekarno utilised civic values in his effort to reconcile various identities and 
political ideologies under the Pancasila (Five Pillars). On 1 June 1945, Soekarno 
delivered a speech to the Committee, proposing the Pancasila to be included in the 
constitution as the founding principles of Indonesia. The five principles consisted of 
nationalism, humanitarianism, social welfare, consensus through a representative 
government and belief in God.63 Soekarno explained his interpretation of the principles 
in inclusive and syncretic terms. For example, Soekarno linked traditions of consensus 
within Islam with local traditions of consensus in Indonesia. He further linked traditions 
of consensus with the idea of a representative democracy and an electoral system. He 
introduced the principle of ‘belief in God’ to portray the Indonesian people as a religious 
people regardless of their individual religion. In addition to the Pancasila, Soekarno 
promoted the concept of gotong-royong (mutual cooperation) as a prerequisite towards 
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successfully creating an independent Indonesian state, calling for cooperation ‘between 
the rich and the poor, between the Muslim and the Christian, between non-Indonesians 
and those of foreign descent who became Indonesians’.64 Hence, Soekarno tried to 
construct a common civic identity which transcended religious and ethnic differences 
and accommodated a remarkably diverse in-group.65  
Despite Soekarno’s efforts, Islamist leaders still demanded a more fundamental 
role for Islam in Indonesia, as they considered religion to permeate every aspect of life, 
including statesmanship and law. Theories on multiculturalism suggest that values which 
are particularly salient for a significant part of the population should not be left without 
adequate recognition; thus, a reconciliation was needed to bridge the demands of 
Islamism and secular nationalism. A compromise was reached through the Jakarta 
Charter on 22 June 1945. This charter amended the Pancasila and stated that the 
Indonesian state would be based upon ‘belief in God, with the obligation for adherents 
of Islam to carry out Islamic law’.66 In addition, the principle of ‘belief in God’ was 
promoted from the last to the first place in the version of Pancasila that is adopted into 
Indonesia’s constitution.67 Political Islamists initially sought to add the stipulation that 
the President of Indonesia had to be a Muslim, but this stipulation did not make it into 
the constitution, as nationalist leaders feared that this stipulation would disenfranchise 
the Christian-majority eastern part of Indonesia.68 These significant concessions showed 
how Islam had significantly more political sway in comparison to other religious groups 
in Indonesia. The concessions set a precedence for further privileges for Islam that would 
be given by the government throughout various periods of administration.  
While the Pancasila was promoted as embodying uniquely Indonesian values, 
Soekarno’s ideas of nationalism were significantly influenced by Western political 
thought, which in turn contributed to the construction of the Indonesian national identity. 
For example, Soekarno quoted Ernest Renan in one of his speeches, saying that the 
‘requirement for a nation is the desire to be united’.69 Soekarno also quoted Otto Bauer 
in saying that a nation is a ‘community of character which has grown out of a community 
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of shared experience’.70 Soekarno’s claims of unearthing principles which were authentic 
and native to Indonesia implied his narrative of Indonesia being a long-existing nation 
with a shared history. Hence, Soekarno appealed to a sense of cultural nationalism among 
the people in conjunction with the civic nationalism instilled through the Pancasila. 
Developments in World War II further propelled Indonesia’s move towards 
political independence. On 6 and 7 August 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on 
Japan and invaded Manchuria, which at that point was under Japanese occupation. 
Following this development, Japan transformed the aforementioned Investigatory 
Committee into a Preparatory Committee for the Indonesian Independence to expedite 
its work. This time, the members of the Committee included more representatives from 
outside Java, signalling an effort to be more inclusive and reflecting the success of 
Soekarno’s campaign for support from across Indonesia. The Japanese administration 
gave a promise to grant Indonesia its independence in due course; however, there were 
no signs of a transfer of authority by the time Japan capitulated on 15 August 1945. 
Facing this uncertain situation, youth groups who were dissatisfied with waiting for the 
formal transfer of authority from Japan pressured Soekarno into unilaterally declaring 
independence before the Allied Forces could arrive in Indonesia.71 Soekarno proceeded 
with the declaration of independence after receiving a guarantee from the Japanese 
administration that they would not object to it.72  
On 17 August 1945, Soekarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia in front 
of a small audience in Jakarta.73 This proclamation of independence was broadcast 
through the radio across the archipelago, showing how technology and modern 
communication help in creating and maintaining a nation by spreading messages to a 
large number of people over a vast territory. Soekarno was set to be Indonesia’s first 
president.74 The territory of Indonesia was the entirety of the Dutch East Indies, spanning 
from the western tip of Sumatra to West Papua (then called Irian). The Preparatory 
Committee which set up the Indonesian government decided to remove the words ‘with 
the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law’ in the Jakarta Charter from 
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the Pancasila.75 Soekarno convinced Islamists that this was a necessary ‘temporary 
measure’ which could be altered after independence if the Indonesian people wanted 
Islam to have a more fundamental role in the country through democratic process.76 This 
compromise helped retain the support of Christian-majority areas in the archipelago for 
the Indonesian state. At the same time, this reversal from the Jakarta Charter was 
interpreted as a betrayal by Islamists and caused a rift between secular nationalists and 
them. 
Another challenge surrounding Indonesia’s declaration of independence was that 
news of it did not reach some remote areas of Indonesia until late in 1945.77 
Consequently, the local population of these remote areas were not aware of their 
‘independence’, and they were possibly foreign to the idea of ‘Indonesia’. This uneven 
spread in the awareness of nationhood across Indonesia recalls modernist theories which 
stipulate that technology, whether printed or electronic media, is a prerequisite for 
spreading the idea of nationhood among large numbers of people. This situation further 
demonstrated that the formation of the Indonesian nation was largely an elite-driven top-
down process; the idea of the nation and the subsequent state that would become its vessel 
was discussed and agreed upon by a relatively small number of people.  
Following the declaration of independence, Soekarno’s government, also known 
as ‘the Republican government’, still had to secure recognition from the international 
community, particularly the Dutch, whose armed forces were trying to reinstall colonial 
government in the archipelago. In this phase between 1945 and 1949, Soekarno’s 
government had to concede to some terms of settlement that were required by the 
Netherlands. For example, on 14 November 1945, Soekarno, who the Dutch did not trust, 
had to rescind his authority over Indonesia’s cabinet as President; this authority was 
transferred to the newly installed Prime Minister Sjahrir as part of Indonesia’s agreement 
with the Dutch government.78 Within this setting, Indonesia entered into negotiations 
with the Dutch. It was agreed on 12 November 1946 through the Treaty of Linggarjati 
that Indonesia’s sovereignty would be recognised in Java, Madura and Sumatra under a 
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federal government, in lieu of a centralised government; meanwhile, the authority over 
the eastern part of Indonesia remained with the Netherlands.79  
As these negotiations took place, some regions within Indonesia’s supposed 
territory declared their own independent states, which called into question Soekarno’s 
influence throughout the archipelago, particularly beyond Java and Sumatra. The eastern 
parts of Indonesia, for example, created a federal state called Negara Indonesia Timur 
(State of East Indonesia) in June 1946 under the auspices of the Netherlands.80 Another 
state declared itself in West Borneo. The Republican government opposed the declaration 
of both states; in the narrative of the Republican government, they were puppet states of 
the colonial forces and were meant to sow conflict between regions in Indonesia.81 These 
declarations of ‘new’ states recalled the salience of ethno-regional identity and the 
wariness of some regions of the tendency towards Java-centrism in Soekarno’s 
government. They also reinforced the long-standing fears of the ‘divide et impera’ 
policies of Dutch colonialism, reflected in Soekarno’s rhetorics that a divided Indonesia 
would not be able to survive.82  
While ethno-regional differences became a platform for dissidence in various 
parts of Indonesia, the Netherlands’ pressure on the Republican government inspired 
some Islamist leaders in Indonesia to work closely with secular nationalists, reflecting 
the theory of the unifying effect of a salient common other on a diverse social group.83 
However, Islamist leaders did not show universal support for Soekarno. In this regard, 
Clifford Geertz argues that Islam in Indonesia (particularly in Java) can be largely 
divided into two streams: santri and abangan.84 Santri Muslims have a more conservative 
perspective on religion, often adopting Arabic clothing to express their religious identity. 
Abangan Muslims, by contrast, have a more syncretic approach to religion, allowing 
Islam to add another layer of religious practices on top of the influences of local faiths 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 224. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 224-25. 
82 Anthony Reid, “Remembering and Forgetting War and Revolution,” in Beginning to 
Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present, ed. Mary S. Zurbuchen (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2005), 173-74. 
83 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300, 217. 
84 Clifford Geertz, “Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: 




and other world religions.85 Santri leaders particularly insisted on the establishment of 
an Islamic state in Indonesia. In May 1948, Kartosuwirjo, an Islamist leader from West 
Java, proclaimed himself as the leader of the so-called Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic 
State of Indonesia/NII), more commonly known as Darul Islam.86 NII was never 
recognised by Soekarno, and Kartosuwirjo was eventually captured and executed in 
1962.87  
Communist leaders posed their own challenge to Soekarno’s Republican 
government. Musso, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, led a rebellion 
against Soekarno in September 1948 and announced the establishment of a National 
Front Government.88 The rebellion seized government offices and other strategic points 
in Madiun, while Musso encouraged farmers and peasants to seize their landlords’ 
fields.89 Allegedly, Musso acted under instructions from Moscow to align Indonesia with 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War.90 On 19 September 1948, Soekarno publicly 
denounced the rebellion and suppressed it through military combat. Musso was killed on 
31 October 1948 while trying to avoid capture, and several other leaders of the party 
escaped to China and Vietnam.91 
Throughout the various uprisings across Indonesia and ongoing tension with the 
Dutch forces, military and diplomatic efforts were pursued by the Republican 
government to attain international recognition of Indonesia’s independence.92 It took an 
intervention by the United Nations (UN) for Indonesia and the Netherlands to reach a 
truce through the Renville Agreement in January 1948.93 Following the Renville 
Agreement, Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of United States of Indonesia/RIS) was 
formally founded on 1 January 1949 as a federal state under Dutch control with Soekarno 
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as President.94 The formal transfer of authority from Dutch powers to RIS took place on 
27 December 1949 in The Hague.95  
The structure of RIS did not correspond with Soekarno’s ideas of nationhood and 
sovereignty. Firstly, Soekarno considered RIS’ federal structure to be fragile and prone 
to disintegration. Secondly, RIS was under significant Dutch control and hence not as 
independent as envisioned by Soekarno. The continued presence of the Dutch as a 
common other compelled federal members of RIS to dissolve themselves into Soekarno’s 
central government as early as January 1950.96 According to H.S. Nordholt, this 
unification, which he considered a landmark for Indonesian nationalism, was propelled 
by the proliferation of Indonesian through educational institutions and the media, as well 
as new revolutionary songs that inspired nationalist sentiments.97 As such, the modernist 
take on the spread of nationalism can be observed once more. As a culmination of the 
absorption of federal states into a centralised government, on 17 August 1950, Soekarno 
formally dissolved RIS and declared the establishment of Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia (Unitary Republic of Indonesia/NKRI).98  
However, challenges to Soekarno’s vision for Indonesia did not end with the 
establishment of NKRI, as ethno-regional and religious differences again became salient 
in separatist movements. In the eastern parts of Indonesia, separatist movements were 
inspired by the opinion that Soekarno’s government was too dominated by the Javanese 
and Muslims, again indicating the salience of both ethno-regional and religious identity. 
Soekarno responded by installing more centralistic governance, using military force to 
assert authority and reinforcing the narrative of common others.Yet, challenges to 
Soekarno’s authority continued to question the success of oppressive approaches to 
diversity.  
As an illustration of discontentment with Soekarno’s regime, the Maluku Islands 
were a Christian-majority area with local customs distinct from the Javanese where 
separatist leaders declared the independence of the so-called Republik Maluku Selatan 
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(Republic of South Maluku/RMS) on 25 April 1950.99 In a 1950 publication, the RMS 
argued that people in Maluku differed in terms of culture, origin, development and 
religion from the rest of Indonesia. In addition, the RMS considered itself distinct from 
‘Indonesia’ as it remained under the Netherlands’ control during the period of Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia in 1942-1945. In fact, plenty of RMS followers considered 
themselves to be ‘pro-Netherlands members of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army’.100  
The RMS further reasoned that because the Japanese occupation did not reach as far as 
Maluku, Indonesia’s proclamation of independence following Japanese capitulation in 
1945 did not include Maluku.101  
In facing various uprisings, Soekarno proclaimed martial law on 14 March 1957 
to ensure his influence over the military and display his political power over the 
population. This political move set the precedence for the involvement of the military in 
Indonesian politics. To further strengthen his hold on the political system, on 5 July 1959 
Soekarno established the so-called Guided Democracy, which he promoted as a 
‘modernised, authentically Indonesian method of governance’ and gave himself the role 
of life-long president who had ultimate authority over the country.102 Similar to the time 
he introduced the Pancasila, Soekarno claimed to have unearthed principles that were 
truly Indonesian in the Guided Democracy, appealing to the imagined perpetuity of the 
Indonesian nation throughout history. In addition, Soekarno continued to use the rhetoric 
of common others. For instance, Soekarno devised confrontational policies towards 
Malaysia, accusing the latter of supporting rebellions against Soekarno’s government in 
West Sumatra and Sulawesi in the 1950s and thereby threatening the integrity of 
Indonesia.103 This so-called policy of Konfrontasi (confrontation) created a relatively 
tangible other against which Indonesia had to be defended.104 The Konfrontasi was 
further declared as a response to the incorporation of Singapore and Northern Borneo 
into Malaysia, which Soekarno considered to be against the spirit of anti-colonialism. 
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The fiery rhetoric used by Soekarno in introducing the Konfrontasi policy was meant to 
stoke nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments in Indonesia itself.105 
Towards the end of Soekarno’s presidency, his policies became more affected by 
developments in the Cold War and focused on the position of Indonesia in the 
international arena. As such, the construction of the Indonesian identity of this time was 
more outward than inward-looking, positioning Indonesia as a nation that was strongly 
anti-colonialist, and, by extension, averse to liberalism. In his policies and rhetoric, 
Soekarno argued that liberalism had enabled imperialism, which in turn had led to the 
exploitation of colonies around the world. Therefore, anti-colonialism should be equally 
opposed to liberalism, so that Soekarno increasingly embraced socialist ideologies in 
addition to his secular nationalist convictions.106 
In 1955, Soekarno launched the Asian-African Movement as a platform for anti-
colonialism, which later on resulted in the 1961 Non-Alignment Movement, distancing 
its members from the conflicting blocs of the Cold War.107 At the same time, Soekarno 
withdrew Indonesia’s membership from the UN and the International Monetary Fund, 
citing dissatisfaction with the institutions as instruments of liberalism. These moves 
increased Soekarno’s implicit preference for the Eastern bloc. In August 1965, Soekarno 
announced an anti-imperialist Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang axis, 
making his preference more explicit.108 Within Indonesia’s domestic politics, there was 
a sentiment that Soekarno’s aversion towards liberalism had caused economic distress in 
the country, as it experienced an extreme inflation with prices rising at an estimated five 
hundred percent annually.109 The severe economic conditions set the stage for the end of 
Soekarno’s presidency in 1966. 
 
3.3 The New Order 
The rise of Suharto in the New Order in 1966 marked another era in the history of 
Indonesia’s nation-building and multiculturalism. Suharto’s New Order employed a 
primarily top-down approach to nation-building in a more systematic manner compared 
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to previous periods in Indonesia’s history. The New Order had a decidedly more 
assimilationist approach to diversity, in tune with Suharto’s authoritarian and centralistic 
style of governance.110  
Suharto repressed rival ideologies to his Pancasila Democracy, particularly 
communism and political Islam.111 The elimination of the political left and its 
demonization in Indonesia under Suharto’s leadership started with events unfolding on 
30 September 1965, when an attempted coup took place against Soekarno. This coup was 
led by a faction of presidential guards who took over the presidential palace and a radio 
station in Jakarta. On the following day, Suharto, then a brigadier general in the army, 
took over the command of the larger part of the military to crush the coup.112 There are 
multiple accounts of the sequence of events surrounding this coup, and opinions differ 
on the motives and perpetrators behind it. Nevertheless, the PKI and communists in 
general were blamed for instigating the coup. Under Suharto’s military command, their 
vilification was done systematically in a top-down manner and reached the grassroots 
level of society.113 This narrative caused a surge of violence against PKI members, left-
wing sympathisers as well as their family members both by the military and parts of the 
general population. Within six months, this violence caused the death of an estimated 
500,000 people, mostly in Central and East Java.114 In addition, around 250,000 people 
were held as political prisoners for their alleged association with the PKI.115  
Suharto was promoted to the Army’s Chief of Staff by Soekarno within two 
weeks of the attempted coup. On March 1966, Suharto was given ‘supreme authority’ 
over the army ‘to restore peace and order’ by Soekarno.116 Using his authority over the 
military, Suharto purged the government and military of PKI members and communist 
sympathisers; some pro-Soekarno figures were removed from office in the process for 
their supposed leftist political leanings. In 1966, the parliament ratified the banning of 
the PKI and outlawed the spread of Marxism and communism in Indonesia, effectively 
eliminating the political left. The parliament then stripped Soekarno of his title as life-
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long President for his leftist tendencies, making Suharto the de-facto leader of the 
government.117 The following year, Suharto was officially inaugurated as President on 
12 March 1967, a position he would hold until 1998. 118  
Suharto called his presidency the New Order, while Soekarno’s presidency was 
to be known as the Old Order.119 Suharto thus distanced himself and his take on the 
Indonesian national identity from Soekarno’s regime. For example, there were significant 
changes in in terms of Indonesia’s attitude towards socialism and communism, as 
Indonesia renewed its membership in the UN and the IMF, and embraced a liberal 
economic position.120 
Despite his reversal of Soekarno’s socialist tendencies, Suharto kept Soekarno’s 
Pancasila as fundamental principles for Indonesia’s nation-building while applying his 
own interpretation to them. Suharto’s continuation of the Pancasila’s narrative as 
authentic Indonesian values signalled its position as the supposed legacy of a long-
existing nation, evoking a sense of both ethnic and cultural nationalism. Suharto referred 
to his government as the Pancasila democracy, thereby connoting that his ways of 
governance reflected authentic Indonesian values. In addition, Suharto portrayed himself 
and the military under his command as protectors of the Pancasila since his rise to power 
after the 1965 coup attempt. This narrative was translated into a monument called the 
Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Monument) which depicted the generals 
killed in the coup as heroic figures in valiant poses, protecting a Garuda Pancasila 
behind them.121 The image of the monument is shown below.   
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Figure 3-1: Monumen Pancasila Sakti 
This monument depicted the juxtaposition of the communist threat and the 
government as protectors of the Pancasila through physical buildings.122 Right across 
from the Sacred Pancasila Monument, the New Order regime built the Museum of PKI’s 
Treachery which contained dioramas and life-sized wax figures depicting the atrocities 
allegedly perpetrated by the members of the PKI. Both the monument and museum were 
built close to Lubang Buaya, the site of the killing of abducted generals in the 1965 coup 
attempt.123 The design of both the monument and the museum supported the narrative of 
communism being a threat to Indonesia and the Pancasila.  
Suharto also adopted an authoritarian approach to national identity, taking on a 
tokenistic and assimilationist approach to diversity. Indonesia’s national motto of 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) was propagated as a centralising slogan, and 
the country’s cultural diversity was celebrated as a rich legacy from a glorious past. 
However, this celebration remained at a perfunctory level. Instead, his government 
systematically sought cultural homogeneity throughout the country as suggested by 
modernist theories on nationalism.124 Education was an important tool in this approach 
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to nationalism. For example, school children were required to memorise a standardised 
version of ethno-regional cultural heritage which included traditional clothing, song and 
dance ascribed to each administrative province of Indonesia, even though the borders of 
these provinces did not always consider cultural boundaries. At the same time, public 
discussions on ethno-regional rights such as regional autonomy were taboo.125 Instead, 
cultural diversity and heritage were used to justify ‘hierarchical relationships of power’ 
presented as a legacy of a glorious past.126 
A particularly illuminating physical legacy of Suharto’s take on the Indonesian 
national identity was the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature 
Park/TMII), which further showed his modernist approach to nationalism. TMII, a 
recreational complex near Jakarta, is part theme-park and part museum and displays 
cultural heritage from all provinces across Indonesia. This park still operates and is open 
to the public in the present day. The idea of TMII was conceived by Suharto’s wife in 
1970; its construction was explicitly backed by Suharto as a means to raise national 
consciousness as well as to promote Indonesia to the international world.127 TMII 
primarily consists of provincial pavilions, each one dedicated to a particular province of 
Indonesia, with each provincial pavilion displaying buildings and cultural artefacts 
associated with a particular province. The park thus reinforces the administrative division 
of regions and superimposes this division on constructed cultural boundaries. For 
instance, the items on display in the pavilions have been chosen arbitrarily, without 
involving the grassroots of society. Michael Hitchcock describes the establishment of the 
TMII as a means of nation-building, consistent with the character of propaganda during 
the New Order era.128 According to Hitchcock, the point of TMII was to underline the 
position of various ethno-regional groups as sub-nations of a greater Indonesian 
nation.129 Similarly, Reimar Schefold argues that the New Order treated ethno-regional 
diversity as sub-parts of a greater nation and primarily as a commodity for tourism.130 
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Suharto wanted Indonesia to be seen as a modern nation. The international 
economic aid received through the IMF sped up urban development, particularly in Java, 
and created a growing middle-class.131 This growing urban and educated middle-class 
was in line with Suharto’s vision of Indonesia as a modern, developing nation, which in 
turn reflects some legacies from the colonial period, where the local population was often 
portrayed as rural, uneducated and ‘backward’.132 Therefore, the desire of Indonesia to 
be seen as modern and educated reflected the wish to be seen as equals of its past 
colonisers.  
The utilisation of public monuments as an effective form of political 
communication which shows the state’s desired narrative of national identity has a long 
tradition in Indonesia.133 Suharto built monuments that signified Indonesia’s direction of 
nation-building and national identity. The most famous example of architecture meant to 
portray Indonesia’s civic national identity is Indonesia’s National Monument in Jakarta. 
The construction of this monument begun during Soekarno’s government in 1961 but 
was only completed in 1976. As shown on the next page, the National Monument is a 
tall, obelisk-like monument in the shape of a torch, surrounded by extensive grounds. 
Underneath the monument is a museum containing dioramas of distinctive periods of 
Indonesia’s history, particularly its fight against colonialism. This continuation of the 
building of dioramas across two different administrations signalled an overall agreement 
on the narrative of Indonesia’s fight against colonialism; the dioramas depict various 
scenes along the canonised history of Indonesia, such as the depiction of a peaceful 
people prior to colonialism, the arrival of colonialists and the people’s resistance against 
them.134 
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Figure 3-2: Indonesia's National Monument 
The promotion of civic elements of national identity was not, however, limited to 
grand monuments and installations. During the New Order, countless entranceways to 
townships and villages were flanked by miniature monuments which were either a replica 
of larger monuments, reliefs of certain episodes in Indonesia’s history, particularly the 
fight against colonialism, or numbers signifying the date of Indonesia’s Independence 
Day of 17 August 1945.135 These ubiquitous reminders of the civic and cultural elements 
of the Indonesian national identity, such as its shared history of fighting against 
colonialism, reflected how much the government sought to invoke nationalist sentiments 
among the general population, including the rural population who were without regular 
access to the grander monuments. 
In addition to using various memorials and monuments for fostering national 
identity, the New Order promoted a primarily civic sense of nationalism through the 
commemoration of numerous national days. The national days included Independence 
Day (17 August), National Awakening Day (20 May), Sacredness of Pancasila Day (1 
October), Armed Forces Day (5 October), Youth Pledge Day (28 October) and Heroes 
Day (10 November). Typically, these national days were celebrated with flag-hoisting 
                                                 
135 Anderson, Language and Power, 177-78. 
99 
 
ceremonies across the country, in government offices, public schools and other sites. On 
Independence Day, flag-hoisting ceremonies were held at the grassroots level, where 
neighbourhoods would congregate for the ceremony. The national holidays and the 
significance attached to them reflected the narratives endorsed by the government, both 
those adopted from previous periods such as the Youth Pledge Day and those especially 
construed by the New Order, such as the Sacredness of Pancasila Day.136 The 
aforementioned national days, for instance, reflected both the salience of Indonesia’s 
struggle against colonialism as well as the role of the military in its fight. The heightened 
importance attached to the military, in turn, elevated Suharto’s standing as a military 
general. On National Awakening Day and Youth Pledge Day, in particular, people were 
asked to reflect on the country’s common historical struggle against colonialism and its 
common destiny, as the cultural dimension of Indonesian nationalism. The appeal to 
history further demonstrated the connection between civic and cultural elements within 
nationalism. 
Reflecting the role of education as an instrument for propagating uniformity 
among the population of a modern state,137 Indonesia’s education system was utilised by 
the New Order as a tool for instilling civic nationalism among the population. Primary 
and secondary education to the ninth grade became compulsory, with a nationally 
standardised curriculum on subjects including history and citizenship studies.138 
Standardised national examinations for entry into high schools and universities further 
exemplified the effort to build ‘national homogeneity’.139 In addition to school children, 
tertiary students and civil servants had to study the New Order’s interpretation of the 
Pancasila ideology.140 The New Order’s take on the Pancasila introduced it in a 
mythicized narrative which painted the Pancasila authentically Indonesian values 
inherited from a long-existing nation.141  
The importance of instilling a sense of shared destiny among the Indonesian 
population was visible in how history was taught. Since the early 1980s, the school 
curriculum in Indonesia contained the subject ‘History of the National Struggle’ spanning 
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the time from colonial occupation towards Indonesia’s independence.142 The subject 
particularly highlighted the unified struggle of the country towards independence with 
an emphasis on physical wars and the role of the military; in contrast, diplomatic efforts 
and the international situation of the past were hardly discussed.143 The emphasis on the 
importance of the military was meant to further solidify Suharto’s leadership position as 
a former army general.144 
Narratives that competed with that of the New Order were systematically weeded 
out. As mentioned previously, communism was now outlawed in Indonesia. In addition, 
students and scholars had to comply with limitations on freedom of speech and critical 
thinking. Student protests and demonstrations against corruption by political elites were 
frequently met with harsh measures including arrests and jail terms.145 The state censored 
publications, television and radio. The strict control on the media reflected how the 
government wanted to secure its own narrative on the country by creating a ‘cultural and 
ideological imprinting’ and suppressing competing or contradictory narratives.146 
Despite continued suppression of political expressions of ethno-regional 
identities, the New Order faced challenges in the form of ethnic conflicts, particularly as 
the country sought to deal with rapid urbanisation in Java. A census in 1971 classified 
17.3 per cent of Indonesia’s population as urban with over 4.5 million people living in 
Jakarta. In the same year, 60.4 per cent of Indonesia’s population lived in Java.147 This 
figure was striking, as the Java Island only made up 7 per cent of Indonesia’s territory. 
To control urbanisation, the government implemented the so-called transmigration policy 
which saw people from Java resettled to other, less populated islands. Transmigration 
was often regarded as the ‘largest voluntary land settlement scheme in the world’ with 
‘reasonably good but uneven success’ and as a positive solution for distribution of the 
population and economic activity in Indonesia.148 The transmigration was also a means 
for assimilating various ethnic groups across the archipelago. It was designed to lessen 
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ethnic cleavages across regions; however, the programme backfired and caused a 
resistance towards a perceived ‘Javanisation’ by the local population of other 
provinces.149 Transmigration was thus perceived by them as an effort to create Javanese 
hegemony across Indonesia, with side-effects that later on sparked interethnic conflicts 
in some areas.150 
One ethnic group in particular was actively construed as a common other by the 
New Order regime: Chinese-Indonesians, who had already endured an othering due to 
their classification as ‘foreign orientals’ in the colonial era.151 Recalling Kymlicka’s 
definition of ‘national minorities’ and ‘ethnic groups’, Chinese-Indonesians are classified 
as the latter; they are considered to have ‘arrived’ in Indonesia after the ‘locals’ and do 
not have a particular territory in which they make up the local majority.152 During the 
New Order, Chinese-Indonesians were subjected to systematic discrimination, 
particularly as they were portrayed as ‘foreigners’ vis-à-vis ethno-regional groups in 
Indonesia that were considered ‘indigenous’.153 They were given the status of Warga 
Negara Keturunan (WNK/Citizens of Foreign Descent) in contrast to ethno-regional 
groups which held the status of Warga Negara Indonesia (WNI/Citizen of Indonesia). In 
December 1966, the New Order attempted to erase Chinese identity in Indonesia through 
a ‘name-changing declaration’ which required Chinese-Indonesians to change their 
Chinese names into Indonesian-sounding ones.154 Public displays of the the Chinese 
language, religion and customs were prohibited. A Presidential Instruction in December 
1967 stated that ‘Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs [in Indonesia] originated in their 
ancestral land and their various manifestations may generate unnatural influence on the 
psychology, mentality, and morality of Indonesian citizens and therefore impede natural 
propensity [for assimilation]’.155 In addition, Chinese-Indonesians were often associated 
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with communism due to their assumed ties with China, further putting them in a 
pejorative position.  
Meanwhile, the continued salience of religious identity, in particular that of 
political Islamism, prompted the New Order to restrict mobilisations along religious 
lines. Military interventions were employed against any instigator of religious violence 
or religious political movements; this approach saw religious violence decline quite 
rapidly as soon as 1967.156 However, Suharto had an ambivalent and fluctuating attitude 
towards Islam. On the one hand, Suharto allowed the wearing of Islamic headscarves in 
public schools and supported the creation of an Islamic banking system.157 On the other 
hand, personnel of the military, police and civilian government institutions were 
discouraged from wearing religious attires such as headscarves at work. Furthermore, 
Islamic organisations with any history of political activity throughout Indonesia were 
required to gather under one single party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United 
Development Party/PPP), which was heavily regulated by the government.158 At the 
same time, Suharto allowed the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
Association, a gesture considered to be favourable to Muslim leaders. However, this 
association was also intended to monitor the activities of Muslim intellectuals in the 
country.159  
Despite Suharto’s uneasy relationship with political Islam, there was an overall 
increase in religious adherence in Indonesia. People declared their adherence and 
displayed a more regular practise of religion partly to avoid being perceived as an atheist, 
which was strongly associated with communism.160 Hence, while religious piety in the 
private sphere was considered virtuous, religious activism particularly in the political 
arena was a taboo. Religious identities thus experienced more toleration instead of 
accommodation.  
The last years of Suharto’s presidency were marked by considerable turmoil. 
Particularly the younger population grew more disenchanted with Suharto’s repressive 
policies and corruption. The wider population were becoming dissatisfied with 
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Indonesia’s economic conditions in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.161 Allegations of 
corruption against Suharto and his cronies further fuelled this discontent. Unrest across 
the country increased while Jakarta was embroiled in large-scale demonstrations that 
demanded Suharto’s resignation. After several students were killed by army snipers 
during a demonstration, the pressure for Suharto to resign became even more intense and 
he resigned his presidency on 21 May 1998.162 
 
3.4 The post-1998 Reform Era 
Following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order, significant changes took place in the 
discourse of national identity and cultural diversity in Indonesia, including various 
amendments to the constitution, such as the introduction of regional autonomy laws. The 
Pancasila was kept as Indonesia’s ideological foundation, with a greater emphasis on its 
fourth principle: democracy. Indonesia’s democratisation saw the proliferation of new 
political parties, with forty-eight parties taking part in the 1999 elections, a huge increase 
from the three acknowledged political parties of the New Order. This large number of 
parties was celebrated as a triumph of democracy, but at the same time it reflected the 
many competing visions people had for the country.163 
 The relationship between democracy and internally diverse states is a contestable 
one.164 In Indonesia, renewed freedoms of expression and association presented a 
challenge to the overall integrity and unity of Indonesia. In 1999, a referendum was held 
in Timor Leste, resulting in its independence and indicating the salience of identity, 
particularly ethno-regional identity. At the same time, the secession of Timor Leste, a 
former Portuguese colony annexed by Indonesia in 1976, highlighted its difference from 
the rest of Indonesia with its common history of Dutch colonialism.165  
While regional autonomy laws accommodate the expression of particular ethno-
regional identities within provinces, in the capital, the Indonesian political landscape 
continues to display a tendency towards Java-centrism. After having had only two 
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presidents between 1945 and 1998, Indonesia has had three different presidents between 
1998 and 2004. Since 2004, the transition between presidencies have become more 
regular and stable, with two presidents elected directly between 2004 and the present. 
Nevertheless, other than President Habibie166 who came from South Sulawesi, all 
Indonesian presidents have been of Javanese descent, indicating the political sway of the 
Javanese as Indonesia’s largest ethno-regional group.167 
Political Islamists who were suppressed during the New Order also resumed their 
activism in varying manners, including by forming political parties. Pluralist Islamist 
parties such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) and Partai 
Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) accepted the Pancasila as Indonesia’s 
ideological foundation; however, other Islamist parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
(Prosperous Justice Party) have been campaigning for more accommodation for Islamic 
laws within the Indonesian state.168 Through the election of Islamist parties into 
parliament, since 1998, there have been three unsuccessful attempts to give Islamic law 
a constitutional status within the parliament, respectively in 2000, 2001 and 2002.169 The 
increasing presence of political Islamism, meanwhile, has caused considerable concern 
on the part of minority religious groups.  
Challenges emerging from Indonesia’s democratisation process have shown the 
complexity of accommodating various identities within a nation. The underlying change 
from an authoritarian, top-down approach to nation-building to a democratic one that 
allows the bottom-up expression of identities has further emphasised this challenge. The 
                                                 
166 Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was born in South Celebes to an agriculturist from Gorontalo. He 
studied aviation and aerospace engineering in the Netherlands and Germany towards a doctoral 
degree. Habibie worked for several German companies before returning to Indonesia in 1974 on 
Suharto’s request. In 1976 he became the Chief Executive Officer of the new state-owned 
aerospace engineering company. Habibie was appointed Vice-President in March 1998, only 
months prior to the end of Suharto’s regime and ascended to the presidency upon Suharto’s 
resignation. Sulfikar Amir, “Symbolic Power in a Technocratic Regime : The Reign of B. J. 
Habibie in New Order Indonesia,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 
(2007). 
167 “Statistik Politik 2016,” ed. Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesia: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2017), 
167. 
168 Julie Chernov Hwang, “Patterns of Normalisation: Islamist Parties in Indonesia,” in Islamist 
Parties and Political Normalisation in the Muslim World, ed. Quinn Mecham and Julie 
Chernov Hwang (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 60-63. 
169Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 87-88. 
105 
 
Indonesian state thus has to find a better balance between accommodating diverse 
identities and maintaining its overarching national unity. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Indonesian national identity has been contestable since its very inception. While 
elites were initially united under the banner of anti-colonialism, salient group identities, 
particularly ethno-regional and religious identities, have continued to shape the discourse 
of national identity in Indonesia. In particular, debates on the ideal relationship between 
the state and religion have remained significant to the present day. Another common 
thread across the different historical periods was the combination of the civic and cultural 
understandings of the Indonesian national identity, including its narrative of a common 
history of colonisation and of the Pancasila as inherent Indonesian values.  
In the past, elites tended to adopt a predominantly top-down approach to nation-
building, including intellectuals during the National Awakening, Soekarno’s Guided 
Democracy and Suharto’s New Order. This top-down approach has ensured the effective 
spread of their narrative of the Indonesian nation throughout the archipelago. There have 
been some uprisings and attempts of separatism, but they were typically quelled swiftly 
by force. The expressions of ethno-regional and religious identities were thus limited to 
the channels allowed by the state. 
By contrast, post-1998 institutional changes have allowed more bottom-up and 
democratic expressions of group identities, including ethno-regional and religious 
identities. However, Indonesia’s democratisation process has brought its own challenges, 
as the state tries to preserve its overall identity and unity while accommodating the 
expression of various identities. This process has resulted in a particular framework for 
national identity and cultural pluralism that is examined in detail in the following chapter. 
The comparison between different periods of nation-building in Indonesia has 
shown that a top-down approach to nation-building tends to be more straightforward and 
decisive; however, it is also more exclusive and repressive, as shown particularly in the 
New Order period. In the long run, the top-down approach is thus more likely to cause 
discontent and dissent. Meanwhile, the bottom-up approach to nation-building tends to 
be more sporadic, but it is also more inclusive, as shown particularly in the Reform Era. 
Considering the importance of the correct recognition and accommodation of identities, 
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the bottom-up approach to nation-building is more sustainable for an internally diverse 
society. 
Having analysed the relevant periods in Indonesia’s history, this chapter 
contributes to the literature on nationalism and nation-building by showing that present-
day ‘nations’ are the socially constructed product of nation-building processes. As such, 
their form is dependent on the understanding and perceptions of elites. The Indonesian 
nation is hence a socially constructed entity, as shown by its founding history as well as 
the reinterpretation of Indonesia’s motto of Unity in Diversity and the Pancasila 




4 Multiculturalism in post-1998 Indonesia 
This chapter examines Indonesia’s present framework for diversity and argues that this 
framework is intended, above all, to preserve the integrity of the state. To this end, 
Indonesia’s framework for diversity extends varying degrees of recognition and 
accommodation towards different socio-cultural groups. Yet, there are also 
discriminatory measures which put into question Indonesia’s commitment to diversity. 
Section one examines Indonesia’s constitution and the way it highlights ethno-regional 
and religious identities. Section two further examines laws and regulations related to 
ethno-regional diversity, while section three focuses on religious diversity. These 
sections show that ethno-regional diversity and religious diversity are treated differently. 
The expression of ethno-regional identities is accommodated more equitably while 
religious minorities do not enjoy the same degree of accommodation as Indonesia’s 
Muslim majority. In addition, Indonesia’s marriage laws encourage the perpetuation of 
religious cleavages within society. Indonesia thus uses multiculturalism as a means 
towards maintaining overall national identity and unity, balancing between celebrating 
the narrative of Indonesia as a culturally plural nation and mollifying demands from 
Islamist political movements.  
 The analysis on laws pertaining to identity and diversity in Indonesia shows that 
ethno-regional and religious identities, while often portrayed as separate aspects of 
identity, are interrelated. For instance, there is a majority religious group within each 
ethno-regional group, showing that the two often go hand-in-hand. There are also 
combinations of ethno-regional and religious identities which allow a person to part of 
the majority or minority in different situations; for instance, a person from a minority 
ethno-regional group can belong to the Muslim majority, and a Muslim person can be 
part of an ethno-regional minority. This intersection between ethno-regional and 
religious identity, as shown in this thesis, means that a discussion on either aspect identity 
cannot be completely separated from the other.  
The condition of multiculturalism in Indonesia, with its push and pull on the 
accommodations and restrictions on expressions of particular identities, reflects the 
challenges of reconciling different value systems within culturally plural societies. Value 
systems consistent with that of the state are more likely to be recognised and 
accommodated, while other value systems are merely tolerated, or even left out of the 
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narrative of the state. In Indonesia’s case, the state has adopted a particular understanding 
of cultural diversity which limits its toleration of identities which endangers the overall 
integrity of the state: overall cultural diversity is protected by limiting the expressions of 
diverse identities. 
 
4.1 Multiculturalism in Indonesia’s Constitution 
All government policies reflect the value system adopted by the state.1 Hence, all 
regulations relating to culture, such as language and public holidays, reflect the state’s 
position towards the cultural groups within it.2 In turn, in Indonesia, laws and regulations 
are based on the constitution. Indonesia’s present constitution is an amended version of 
the country’s original 1945 Constitution. Despite the amendments, the name ‘1945 
Constitution’ is retained, communicating that the state’s narrative of national identity is 
in line with the vision of Indonesia’s founding fathers.3 The current version of the 1945 
Constitution cements Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as Indonesia’s national motto, as stated in 
Article 36A: 
The National Coat of Arms is the Garuda Pancasila with the motto Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika.4 
The Garuda Pancasila, as shown below, is a mythical bird not unlike eagles 
found in Western-style heraldry, with a shield on its chest decorated with symbols 
representing the Pancasila, the five pillars of the Indonesian state as developed by 
Soekarno. In its talons, the Garuda holds a banner inscribed with the words ‘Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika’, which is commonly translated into English as ‘Unity in Diversity’. This 
national motto, written in Ancient Sankrit, implies the existence of a nation predating the 
colonial era, as Sankrit was the predominant language used by the Srivijaya and 
Majapahit empires which spanned most of the archipelago in the twelfth century.5 
                                                 
1 Taylor, “Atomism,” 187-210. 
2 “The Politics of Recognition.” 
3 Denny Indrayana, “Indonesia: In Search for a Democratic Constitution (1945-2008),” in 
Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia, ed. Clauspeter Hill and Jorg Menzel (Singapore: Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 2008), 95. 
4“Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia,” ed. Government of Indonesia 
(1945). My translation. 





Figure 4-1: Garuda Pancasila 
The Garuda Pancasila contains references to the civic elements of the Indonesian 
national identity: the number of its feathers represents the date of Indonesia’s declaration 
of independence, 17 August 1945 (17 feathers on each wing; eight tail feathers; and 45 
feathers on the torso). The shield on the bird’s chest carries five symbols, each one 
representing a principle of the Pancasila: the star represents belief in God; the ring of 
chains represents humanity; the banyan tree represents national unity; the buffalo head 
represents democracy; and the sprigs of rice and cotton represent social justice. The 
national coat of arms thus represents the unifying civic values of Indonesia, while the 
national motto emphasises the narrative of Indonesia being a culturally plural but united 
country. 
The constitution highlights two types of identities, the first of which is ethno-
regional identity. Ethno-regional identity is recognised through the provision of regional 
autonomy which explicitly recognises the ‘particularities’ of regions, as stated in Chapter 
VI on Regional Government, Article 18A (1): 
The formal relations between the central government and the regional 
authorities of provinces, regencies and municipalities, or between 
provinces, regencies and municipalities, shall be regulated by law with 
regard to the regional particularities and diversity of each region.6 
And further in Articles 18B (1) and (2), it is stated that 
(1) The state shall recognise and respect the units of regional authorities 
that are special and distinct as regulated by law. 
                                                 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, my translation. 
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(2) The state shall recognise and respect traditional communities including 
their traditional customary rights, providing they remain in existence and 
are in conformity with societal development as well as with the principles 
of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as regulated by law.7 
These articles were introduced at the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution in 
2000.8 This amendment followed the post-1998 spirit of political reform and the 
subsequent renewal of the freedom of expression. These articles indicate a significant 
shift from past laws on the devolution of power which only gave regional governments 
the responsibility to carry out decisions that had been made by the central government.9  
The second type of identity highlighted by Indonesia’s constitution is religious 
identity, as stipulated in Article 29 on Religion: 
(1) The state is based on Belief in God. 
(2) The State shall guarantee all persons the freedom of worship, each 
according to their own religion or faith.10 
This recognition is further implied by the existence of a religious court as stipulated in 
Chapter IX on Judiciary Authority, Article 24 (2) as follows: 
The judiciary authority is held by a Supreme Court and other judicial 
bodies beneath it in the form of public courts, religious affairs courts, 
military courts, state administrative courts and the Constitutional Court.11 
Thus, the state recognises value systems other than a secular nationalist one. However, 
the religious affairs court, which allows Indonesia’s Muslim population to settle matters 
such as marriage, divorce and inheritance in accordance with Islamic traditions, does not 
exist for religions other than Islam. Hence, the court’s existence signifies Islam’s 
considerable traction in Indonesia’s politics, which at the same time indicates that other 
world religions in Indonesia are not on an equal footing with Islam.  
 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Denny Indrayana, “In Search for a Democratic Constitution: Indonesian Constitutional 
Reform 1999 - 2002,” Jurnal Media Hukum 17, no. 1 (2015): 119-21. 
9 Mark Turner et al., Decentralisation in Indonesia: Redesigning the State (Canberra: Asia 
Pacific Press, 2003), 2. 




4.2 Framework for Ethno-Regional Diversity in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s framework for ethno-regional diversity mainly addresses regional autonomy 
as a means to express unique ethno-regional identities. In the Indonesian language, these 
ethno-regional groups are known as suku bangsa, literally meaning sub-nation: the 
smaller groups that make up the larger Indonesian nation.  
The law stipulates that new regions could be formed on the basis of ‘economic 
capacity, regional potentials, socio-political conditions, the size of population, the area 
of the region concerned and other considerations’.12 In practise, the formation of new 
administrative provinces have primarily emerged from ethno-regional movements. Thus, 
administrative provinces in Indonesia can better reflect cultural or ethnic fault lines 
within the country. In Indonesia, only insular provinces like Bali have natural boundaries 
in the form of the sea, and such provinces are more the exception than the rule. After the 
instalment of regional autonomy laws, many regions experienced a bottom-up demand 
to restore older boundaries.13 Interestingly, the establishment of new administrative 
provinces is called ‘pemekaran daerah’ in Indonesian, which translates into ‘regional 
blossoming’ as if implying a dormant identity bursting into bloom.  
Since 1998, eight new provinces have been established largely on the basis of 
ethno-regional identity. Even though there is also a religious dimension to ethno-regional 
identity, the proliferation of new provinces have not been framed as a religious 
movement. These provinces are Banten, Gorontalo, North Kalimantan, Bangka Belitung 
Islands, Riau Islands, North Maluku, West Papua and West Sulawesi. To give an 
illustration, the Gorontalo province was established on 22 December 2000.14 The people 
of Gorontalo (predominantly Muslim) used to be a minority in the Minahasa-majority 
province of North Sulawesi (predominantly Christian). In addition to differences in 
ethnicity and religion, the people of Gorontalo claim their regional history to be unique 
from that of North Sulawesi, including a more fervent resistance against colonial forces 
in the past.15  
                                                 
12 Turner et al., Decentralisation in Indonesia, 16. 
13 Ehito Kimura, Political Change and Territoriality in Indonesia: Provincial Proliferation, 
Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 45. 
14Ibid., 66-67. 
15 Ibid., 73-74. 
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Despite Gorontalo’s ‘secession’ from North Sulawesi, there are no conflicts 
between Gorontalo and the Indonesian state, as Gorontalo’s regional narrative situates it 
as a part of the Indonesian nation. For instance, Gorontalo celebrates Patriot Day to 
commemorate declaring freedom from colonialism on 23 January 1942, prior to 
Indonesia’s declaration of independence itself. Yet Patriot Day is traditionally celebrated 
with Indonesia’s national symbols such as the national flag and the national anthem, 
hence aligning regional sentiments with national ones.16 
Political decentralisation in Indonesia has also enabled the revival of ethno-
regional identity through a reversal towards traditional forms of local governance.17 For 
example, the West Sumatra provincial government has reorganised its regional 
governance into a more traditional system.18 In the New Order era, West Sumatra was 
divided into small administrative units called desa (village) which were modelled after a 
Javanese tradition. However, pre-colonial West Sumatra used to be divided into much 
larger units called nagari with sub-units called jorong.19 Thus, the reinstatement of the 
nagari in 1999 was a move towards traditional revitalisation in West Sumatra.20 The 
resurgence of local traditions in regional governance can also be observed in Tana Toraja 
of South Sulawesi.21  
In addition, regional autonomy has enabled local direct elections for governors, 
regents and mayors which have shown the salience of ethno-regional identity through the 
people’s preference for local leadership. For example, long-lasting allegiances to 
traditional royal houses became apparent as their descendants successfully ran for office 
in local elections.22 Thus, the impact of regional autonomy has revealed the people’s 
allegiance to traditional royal houses beyond provinces like Yogyakarta which has long 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 66-67. 
17 Drakeley, The History of Indonesia, 169. 
18 Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckman, “Recentralisation and 
Decentralisation in West Sumatra,” in Decentralisation and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: 
Implementation and Challenges, ed. Coen J.G. Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 293. 
19 Ibid., 301-06. 
20 Ibid., 321. 
21 Edwin de Jong, “Reshaping Tana Toraja: A Century of Decentralisation and Power Politics 
in the Highlands of South Sulawesi,” in Decentralisation and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, 
ed. Coen J.G. Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 256. 
22 Tod Jones, “Indonesian Cultural Policy in the Reform Era,” Indonesia 93 (2012): 166. 
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enjoyed the status of a ‘special region’ in Indonesia with the local Sultan ruling as 
governor ex officio.23  
Furthermore, the results of the past local direct elections have shown a preference 
for candidates who are considered to be Putra Daerah (Child of the Region).24 The term 
Putra Daerah is typically used for people with ancestral ethnic ties to a certain region. 
The term itself is ethnically neutral and used colloquially across the country by all ethno-
regional groups. A study conducted by the Centre for International and Strategic Studies 
(CSIS) in Jakarta in 2001 showed that 57.9% out of 1092 respondents prefer to have a 
Putra Daerah as their regional leader.25 In the context of local elections, it is often argued 
that a Putra Daerah will have a better understanding of local needs and challenges 
compared to newcomers or migrants.  
In addition, regional autonomy allows regional governments to inject the national 
curriculum with more local content pertaining to ethno-regional identity. For example, 
schools are free to teach local languages, customs and arts. 26 As education is an important 
means towards shaping the national identity of citizens from a young age, the content of 
school curriculums can influence the sense of belonging of students.27 Therefore, 
allowing schools to teach local languages and culture implies confidence on the part of 
the central government that the accommodation of ethno-regional identities in the 
education system does not challenge the Indonesian national identity. However, the 
addition of local content into the local curriculum remains varied from region to region, 
which suggests that the recognition of individual ethno-regional groups within the 
education system was not a priority for all regions in Indonesia.28 The lack of demand 
                                                 
23 Moh Abdul Hakim et al., “Monarchism, National Identity and Social Representations of 
History in Indonesia: Intersections of the Local and National in the Sultanates of Yogyakarta 
and Surakarta,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 18, no. 4 (2015): 261. 
24 ‘Putra’ is the formal Indonesian word for ‘son’, whereas as ‘putri’ translates into ‘daughter’. 
However, the word ‘putra’ can also be used in a gender neutral manner, making it the 
equivalent of ‘child’. The gender-neutral Indonesian word for ‘child’, ‘anak’, is considered less 
formal and so less likely to be used in jargons such as Putra Daerah. 
25 “Kemampuan Politik Lokal Untuk Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah,”  (Jakarta: Centre for 
International and Strategic Studies, 2001), 27. 
26 Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journal 
of East Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 300. 
27 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, 228-29. 
28 Carole Faucher, “Popular Discourse on Identity Politics and Decentralisation in Tanjung 
Pinang Public Schools,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47, no. 2 (2006): 274. 
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for more local content within the education system instead indicates a strong and lasting 
influence from the nationalist narrative.29  
 
4.3 Challenges of Ethno-Regional Diversity in Indonesia 
4.3.1 Separatism 
Indonesia’s framework for ethno-regional diversity has shown an increase in the 
recognition of particular ethno-regional identities which should increase the people’s 
contentment with the state; however, plenty of challenges remain. For instance, Indonesia 
continues to face the challenge of separatism, such as Operasi Papua Merdeka (Free 
Papua Operation/OPM) in West Papua. While there was no opportunity to get first-hand 
accounts of the motivations of OPM, some perspective into separatism was provided by 
former high-ranking members of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement/GAM), 
a now disbanded Acehnese separatist movement.  
 GAM was established in 1976 and disbanded in 2005 following a peace 
agreement with the Indonesian government which grants Aceh special political 
autonomy.30 Bakhtiar Abdullah, a former spokesperson of GAM, explained that GAM’s 
main goal was to attain independence for Aceh from Indonesia to enable governance that 
was more suitable for the Acehnese people and would allow Aceh to manage its own 
natural resources without any exploitation from the Indonesian central government in 
Java.31 Thus, following GAM’s dissolution, regional autonomy has served as a means to 
curb disparities between the capital and the outlying provinces.32  
Saifuddin Bantasyam, a law professor from Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda 
Aceh, confirmed that separatism in Aceh stemmed from the discontent of local leaders 
with the misrecognition of Aceh’s identity and its related cultural rights.33 According to 
Abdullah, Aceh wanted to receive “proper treatment” as a resource-rich region as well 
as for Aceh’s “exceptional” role in the struggle towards the Indonesian independence 
from colonialism. Furthermore, Abdullah expressed clear pride in Aceh’s 
“unquestionable past glory and grandeur” as a historic trading port and the point of entry 
                                                 
29 Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia,” 300. 
30 Schulze, “From Colonial Times to Revolution and Integration,” 77. 
31 Bakhtiar Abdullah, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 13 February 2018. 
32 Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, 185. 
33 Saifuddin Bantasyam, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 2 February 2018. 
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of Islam into Indonesia, which explained Aceh’s demand for the establishment of Sharia 
in the province.34 This role of Islam in Aceh’s history exemplifies the intersection 
between ethno-regional and religious identities. Munawar Liza Zainal, a former high-
ranking member of GAM, similarly stated that GAM’s past demand for independence 
was an ethno-regional movement, triggered by Aceh’s past unfair exploitation by the 
central government in Indonesia, unbefitting to the former’s significant role in 
Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism. Zainal described the Acehnese people as a 
strong and resilient people, again giving an ethno-regional nuance to their movement.35 
Prior to 2005, there was already some degree of special autonomy for Aceh, but 
it was not enough for GAM, as they were not granted significant political rights.36 
Bantasyam explained that the 2005 peace agreement included provisions which have 
allowed Aceh to establish local political parties that are not affiliated with any national 
parties seated in Jakarta, as opposed to most other provinces, as a form of recognition for 
Aceh’s ‘special’ and ‘unique’ position in the country.37 Stipulations in the 2005 peace 
agreement have also allowed Aceh to create more bylaws on the basis of Islamic religious 
texts without bureaucratic barriers from the capital. These bylaws are called Qanun, 
derived from an Arabic word for ‘canon’ or ‘law’.38 This aspect of regional autonomy in 
Aceh again shows the intersection between ethno-regional and religious identities; the 
religious dimension of Aceh’s identity is discussed further in the section on Indonesia’s 
framework for religious diversity. 
 
4.3.2 Discrimination and prejudice 
Persisting prejudices and discrimination between ethno-regional as well as religious 
groups constitute another challenge to ethno-regional diversity in Indonesia. Alamsyah 
Djafar, a senior researcher of the Wahid Foundation39 explained that a 2016 research 
project showed that almost all Indonesians had some sort of dislike for social groups 
different than themselves.40 This research involved 1,520 participants from all 34 
                                                 
34 Abdullah, interview by Sidi. 
35 Munawar Liza Zainal, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 13 February 2018. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Bantasyam, interview by Sidi. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “About Wahid Foundation”.The Wahid Foundation primarily works to promote a pluralistic 
and peaceful stance in Islam, but it is also interested in interethnic relations in Indonesia. 
40 Alamsyah Muhammad Djafar, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 31 January 2018. 
116 
 
provinces of Indonesia who indicated whether they disliked any ethno-regional or 
religious group other than themselves.41 Participants then described how they would feel 
if a person from social groups they disliked were to become their neighbour, or a teacher 
in a public school, or a public official. In the end, only 0.6 percent of participants were 
determined to be completely tolerant, while 43.3 percent of participants were considered 
‘somewhat tolerant’, 7 percent considered ‘somewhat intolerant’, and the largest group 
at 49 percent was considered ‘intolerant’.42  
Similarly, The Habibie Centre43 believes that there are plenty of unresolved issues 
and remaining prejudices to be addressed between different ethno-regional groups. Wirya 
Adiwena, a researcher from the Habibie Centre, stated that describing Indonesia as a 
diverse but tolerant country is not false, yet it oversimplifies the issue at hand 
significantly. Adiwena stated that while statistics often looked at the frequency of cases 
of intolerance or discrimination, they could not capture the deeper concerns within 
society, such as residues of fear and anxiety between ethno-regional groups that can be 
roused to spark future conflicts.44 He said: 
The fact is that even though Indonesia is largely fine, the fact is, there are 
people who are restless, there are people who are angry, there are people 
who are sad, disappointed, be it because of the economy, or history, or old 
wounds that haven’t healed properly.45   
The Habibie Centre has conducted research on identity politics and reported the 
state of violent incidents related to issues of governance, security, identity, vigilantism 
and crime across the country. According to the report, there were 601 separate violent 
incidents relating to differences in identity in 2014. These incidents together resulted in 
117 fatalities, 1179 injuries and 442 cases of damage to property. Identity-related 
incidents made up only 2.2 percent of all violent incidents recorded in the country, the 
bulk of which were made up of crime and vigilantism-related violence.46 However, these 
                                                 
41 “A Measure of the Extent of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism within Muslim 
Society in Indonesia,”  (Jakarta: The Wahid Foundation, 2016), 2. 
42 Ibid., 7. 
43 The Habibie Centre is an independent non-profit and research institution founded in 1999, 
working on issues related to democracy, human rights and as well as science and technology. 
“About the Habibie Center”. 
44 Wirya Adiwena, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 7 May 2018. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Rahimah Abdulrahim et al., “Indeks Intensitas Kekerasan 2015,” (Jakarta: The Habibie 
Foundation, 2015), 12-13. 
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identity-related conflicts also include conflicts pertaining to fights between locals and 
migrants, gender identity, as well as clashes between youth gangs, schools and sports 
teams’ supporters.47 Unfortunately, the raw data of this survey was not accessible at the 
point of interview and it could not be determined how many incidents were particularly 
related to ethno-regional or religious identity. For instance, the province reported to have 
the highest number of identity-related incidents was West Java with 81 cases; however, 
West Java is known for avid hooliganism in the Indonesian football scene, and plenty of 
these identity-related incidents may well have taken place among tribal football fans.48  
Nurina Vidya Hutagalung, another researcher from the Habibie Centre, said that 
the Habibie Centre had established a correlation between increases in identity-related 
conflicts and political events such as regional elections. This correlation again indicates 
the salience of interethnic relations that continue to pose a challenge in the country. 
Hutagalung further stated that the government has a tendency to downplay the residues 
of past grievances, which in turn affects their readiness in facing potential future 
conflicts.49  
The effect of lasting grievances and prejudice is particularly observable among 
Chinese-Indonesians who are often considered foreign despite having lived in Indonesia 
for generations. The term ‘Cina’ (Chinese) has derogatory connotations in Indonesia.50 
Teuku Kemal Pasha, an anthropologist from Universitas Malikussaleh, stated that the 
othering of Chinese-Indonesians is the legacy of the past segregation between ‘natives’ 
and ‘foreign Orientals’ during Indonesia’s Dutch colonial past. This past segregation was 
reinforced during the New Order period through Suharto’s differentiation between 
‘native Indonesians’ and ‘Indonesians of foreign descent’.51 Despite their smaller 
numbers compared to other ethnic groups, Chinese-Indonesians have significant 
economic power in the country. While they make up only 1.2 percent of the Indonesian 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 12-17. 
48 Ibid., 12. 
49 Nurina Vidya Hutagalung, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 7 May 2018. 
50 Charles A. Coppel, “Introduction: Researching the Margins,” in Chinese Indonesians: 
Remembering, Distorting, Forgetting, ed. Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publications, 2005), 1-2. ‘Cina’ can refer to a Chinese person or China (the country) and 
has a condescending connotation. ‘Tiongkok’ or ‘Tionghoa’ is considered as the politically 
correct term to refer to China or Chinese people. 
51 Kemal Pasha, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 9 February 2018. 
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population,52 eight out of ten of Indonesia’s richest persons in 2018 were of Chinese 
descent.53 According to Djafar, this disproportion in wealth distribution was a source of 
social envy and added to the stereotypes that fuelled discrimination against Chinese-
Indonesians.54 
Policies to end the systematic discrimination of Chinese-Indonesians after the 
New Order included an amendment which erased the stipulation that a presidential or 
vice-presidential candidate had to be a ‘native Indonesian’. In the context of the past 
classification of Chinese-Indonesians as ‘Indonesian citizens of foreign descent’, this 
clause barred them from running for the aforementioned offices. In addition, Chinese-
Indonesians are allowed to use Chinese names again.55 However, previous research by 
Chang-Yau Hoon has shown that Chinese-Indonesians still did not feel like full 
Indonesian citizens and have thus refrained from participating in politics.56 Hoon 
indicates that young Chinese-Indonesians require empowerment to be confident in fully 
exercising their citizenship rights and to develop a sense of belonging.57 
There has been more accommodation for Chinese-Indonesians, but there has also 
been some pushback against them. In 1998, the Partai Bhinneka Ika (The Unity in 
Diversity Party) was founded by a Chinese-Indonesian and subsequently participated in 
the 1999 elections. However, two other political parties founded by Chinese-Indonesians 
were dissolved not long after their foundation in 1998 as their leaders thought it was more 
viable to join larger, mixed-ethnicity parties.58 In 2014, Grace Natalie, a Chinese-
Indonesian, led the establishment of the Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (Indonesian 
Solidarity Party), campaigning mostly for the repeal of discriminatory laws. Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama, a Chinese-Indonesian, became the Vice-Governor of Jakarta in 2012 
and became Governor in November 2014, when Joko Widodo, the former Governor, 
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became Indonesia’s President. However, in July 2017, Purnama was forced to resign his 
position due to a controversial blasphemy case in which he was indicted for desecrating 
a verse from the Qur’an.59 His indictment reflected a remaining sense of wariness that an 
excessive display of Chinese identity may backfire and cause a return to discriminatory 
actions against Chinese-Indonesians.60 
 
4.3.3 ‘Indigenous people’  
Another challenge to ethno-regional diversity in Indonesia is the lack of inclusivity for 
smaller, traditional ethno-regional groups. David Maybury-Lewis argues that ‘tribal 
people’ in Southeast Asia, including the indigenous, traditional peoples of Indonesia, are 
seen as outsiders whose way of life does not conform to the national narrative; hence, 
their ways of life are not being accommodated by the state.61 However, Kenji Tokawa 
argues that the recognition of indigenous legal traditions supports the process of nation-
building, because the accommodation of identities makes it easier for different groups to 
develop a sense of belonging to the state.62 Therefore, the Indonesian state needs to better 
accommodate the rights of its indigenous people. 
Rukka Sombolinggi, the Secretary-General of an NGO called the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN/Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), 
indicated the complexities of reconciling numerous cultural groups under one coherent 
legal system.63 The usage of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ in this context does not imply 
that other Indonesian ethno-regional groups do not originate from the archipelago, unlike 
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the juxtaposition of ‘indigenous peoples’ with ‘settlers’.64 Instead, Sombolinggi 
explained that ‘indigenous people’ was the term that AMAN has determined to be most 
suitable for their purpose. Furthermore, in the Indonesian language, ‘masyarakat adat’ 
does not carry the same connotations with the English term ‘indigenous groups’. 
Etymologically, ‘masyakarat adat’ translates into ‘traditional society’ and reflects the 
strength of tradition within these groups, including their relative seclusion from urban 
areas.  
Within Indonesia’s legal system, AMAN campaigns for a comprehensive 
national law in which indigenous groups are acknowledged as an inherent part of the 
Indonesian nation, with their traditional rights ‘recognised, respected and fulfilled’.65 
AMAN has successfully advocated for 20 separate regional laws pertaining to the rights 
of indigenous peoples, with 40 more underway. Nationally, there were 50 politicians 
across Indonesia who had pledged to work with AMAN for the aspirations of the 
indigenous peoples.66 
AMAN wants to see the Indonesian legal system grant a substantial increase in 
recognition and accommodation for traditional ethno-regional laws, particularly within 
the national laws on forestry, agriculture and mining, where pre-existing traditional laws 
of various ethnic groups in the archipelago were often overlooked in the devising of 
national laws. The regional autonomy laws, such as the Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional 
Autonomy recognised some cultural rights through political decentralisation, but it did 
not address traditional rights to natural resources. Instead, natural resources were kept 
largely nationalised, with concessions for extraction of resources granted to public and 
private companies at the expense of the traditional rights of the indigenous inhabitants of 
related areas, such as regulated by the Law No. 5 of 1960 on Agriculture and the Law 
No. 44 of 1999 on Forestry. In addition, some areas inhabited by indigenous peoples had 
been turned into conservation areas which inhibited the indigenous people’s access to 
their traditional livelihood based on small-scale mining or agriculture. Under these laws, 
indigenous groups were usually uprooted and resettled in areas as determined suitable by 
the government.67 Only in 2012 did the Constitutional Court issue the ruling number 
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35/PUU-X/2012 that acknowledged the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral 
territories. This ruling differentiated between what would be known as ‘national forests’ 
and ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous forests’, allowing indigenous groups access to their 
traditional living space.68 However, the forest area in question first has to be legally 
identified as ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous forest’. In this regard, since 1999, AMAN has 
mapped the locations and boundaries of the territories of indigenous peoples across 
Indonesia; the resulting maps are submitted to the government periodically. By 2018, 
AMAN had identified over 10 million hectares of indigenous people’s territories within 
190.5 million hectares of Indonesia’s entire territory, with 2,261 communities consisting 
of circa 15 million people.69 
 
4.3.4 Departicularisation and representation of culture 
The ‘Indonesianisation’ or ‘departicularisation’ of local cultures constitutes another 
challenge to ethno-regional diversity in Indonesia.70  Departicularisation happens when 
cultural arts such as regional ‘dances, music, costumes, handicraft and architecture’ are 
selected and packaged as national commodities for tourism. The line between recognition 
and praise is blurred with the appropriation of local cultures for economic gain.71 At the 
same time, cultural acts are required to conform to and preserve a certain image for an 
extended period.72 In Indonesia, ethno-regional diversity is often presented as a national 
wealth and a valuable commodity, particularly in relation to tourism.73 The preamble of 
the Indonesian Law on Tourism states that ‘ancient relics, historical artefacts, arts and 
culture belonging to the Indonesian nation are the resources and assets for the 
development of tourism for the improvement of the prosperity and welfare of the 
people.’74 In this regard, departicularisation takes place for the sake of a viable 
representation of culture for tourism or promotional purposes. 
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Departicularisation can be physically observed in the Taman Mini Indonesia 
Indah (TMII), the cultural park built by Suharto during the New Order, in which cultural 
elements are moulded to fit into the national narrative, often stretching or distorting local 
cultures to fit into administrative provincial borders.75 Kemal Pasha, the anthropologist 
from Universitas Malikussaleh said when interviewed that the present narrative of 
Indonesian national identity still carries the influence of the New Order, which 
normalised a ‘shallow multiculturalism’ unconcerned with the recognition of the ethno-
cultural rights of Indonesia’s diverse peoples. This approach to diversity only displays 
Indonesia’s cultural heritage as a national wealth with no proper accommodation of 
ethno-regional rights.76  
At the same time, the tendency towards Java-centrism in politics has spilled over 
into cultural representation. Arief Rachman, the chairperson of Komisi Nasional 
Indonesia untuk UNESCO77 (Indonesia’s National Commission for UNESCO/KNIU), 
addressed some of the imbalance of the representation of the diverse cultural groups in 
Indonesia.78 At the time of interview in May 2018, Indonesia had eight items listed on 
the World Heritage list79 and nine on the Intangible Cultural Heritage list.80 Out of the 
total of 17 items, ten originate from or are located in Java, the most densely-populated 
and developed island in Indonesia. Rachman stated that the Committee did not have a 
grand design on which elements it wanted to propose to UNESCO. Instead, interested 
parties that want to be nominated to UNESCO had to come forward to the Committee. 
The nomination process largely depended on the initiative of regional governments and 
community leaders. In turn, this meant that the local communities’ awareness of 
UNESCO and its programmes was crucial for their involvement.81 Therefore, the 
inequity in the nomination of various ethno-regional groups was not only a question of 
representation, but also of equal access to information.  
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Meanwhile, officials from the Ministry of Tourism stated that it is challenging to 
properly capture Indonesia’s ethno-regional diversity into a communicable brand for the 
purposes of promoting tourism. Martini Paham, Director for Marketing Strategy and 
Communication at Indonesia’s Ministry of Tourism said that multiculturalism in 
Indonesia had ‘a very large potential’ as the nation’s ‘wealth’; however, it was hard to 
define the essence of the Indonesian national identity beyond the slogan of ‘diversity’.82 
Paham stated that choosing individual regions to feature on campaigns was a challenge, 
as more developed areas with adequate infrastructure were usually more ready to be 
marketed with pre-existing accessibility, amenities and attractions. Regions wanting to 
be featured had to first further develop their existing tourism facilities. Therefore, it was 
not only a question of representation, but also a question of more equitable development. 
Java-centrist tendencies in Indonesia’s politics thus affect the representation of the 
country in terms of tourism because better developed regions are more likely to be viable 
for tourism promotion. 
 
4.4 Framework for Religious Diversity in Indonesia 
Compared to the legal framework for ethno-regional diversity, the framework for 
religious diversity in Indonesia shows more contradictions and loopholes. Despite being 
a Muslim-majority country, the state seeks to legally accommodate other faiths within 
the country. This attempt is a good step towards multiculturalism, however, there are 
various limitations to the recognition and accommodation of minority religions in 
Indonesia. 
The first principle of the Pancasila, ‘Belief in God’, uses a religiously neutral 
term for ‘God’. Indonesia thus provides room for different faiths and beliefs in the 
country.83 However, there are competing interpretations of the first principle of Pancasila 
which results in a paradox. In Indonesian, ‘Belief in God’ is ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa’. ‘Esa’ is most commonly translated as powerful or omnipotent; however, it has also 
been interpreted as ‘one’ or ‘singular’ due to its similarity to the Sanskrit word for ‘one’: 
‘Eka’. These differing interpretations are particularly problematic for polytheistic 
traditional local beliefs, but also for Hinduism and Buddhism, which are officially 
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recognised by the state but are sometimes interpreted as polytheistic by the people, 
because they do not always give the impression of having the principle of singularity or 
monotheism.84  
Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution further shows this contradiction: 
 (1) The State shall be based upon Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. 
(2) The State shall guarantee all persons the freedom of worship, each 
according to their own religion or faith.85  
The first paragraph sets a pan-religious principle as the foundation of the state. 
Meanwhile, the second paragraph guarantees freedom of worship; however, it is strongly 
implied that religions and beliefs in question have to be in line with the principle 
contained in the first paragraph. Therefore, the freedom of religion is not absolute; the 
religions in question have to fit into the narrative of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. It is 
particularly problematic when this principle is interpreted as monotheism, as the related 
narrative then excludes polytheistic faiths.  
The religions explicitly acknowledged by the state (Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism) are specified in an addendum of 
the Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965. This decree is colloquially known as the law 
against blasphemy, whose main purpose is the prohibition of the defamation of religions 
in Indonesia.86 This law criminalises the interpretation of religions outside their ‘true’ 
teachings as well as acts that mimic an established religion but deviate from its core 
teachings. In addition, this law makes it illegal for people to persuade others to renounce 
their faith towards Indonesia’s acknowledged religions.87 The law states that the state 
does not forbid religions other than the six acknowledged ones to exist in Indonesia, as 
long as they do not perform their religion in public or proselytise. The constitution, in 
combination with the law against blasphemy, shows that the state both accommodates 
and restricts religious practices by setting out which religions are legally acknowledged, 
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and which ones are only tolerated.88 Furthermore, the recognition given to a select few 
religions is a cause for the projection of a negative image on other, non-recognised 
religions and faiths.89 
Meanwhile, the state displays the narrative of interfaith harmony through the 
strategic placement of houses of worship. For example, the Istiqlal Mosque and the 
Jakarta Cathedral are located just across the street from each other in the centre of Jakarta. 
The Immanuel Church, one of the oldest Protestant churches in Indonesia, is only a few 
blocks away, all within walking distance from Indonesia’s National Monument and the 
central train station in Jakarta. Passengers of trains pulling into the Gambir station in 
Jakarta are greeted with the sight of these houses of worship upon arrival. While the 
Cathedral and the Church were built in the colonial era, the Istiqlal Mosque was 
purposely built in the vicinity to display the narrative of interreligious harmony after 
Indonesia’s independence. This display of religious buildings reflects the narrative that 
the government wants to tell: that of a harmonious nation with high religious tolerance. 
The extent to which this display reflects the true conditions of interreligious harmony in 
Indonesia, however, remains contested.90 
There are implications to the strategic positioning of these houses of worship 
around Jakarta. For instance, the Istiqlal Mosque, the Jakarta Cathedral and the Immanuel 
Church represent the three largest religious groups in Indonesia and their significance to 
the state’s narrative by their central positioning. At the same time, the lack of similar 
display in the area for the three other recognised religion (Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Confucianism) is questionable. The most famous Buddhist temple in Indonesia is the 
Borobudur temple complex in Central Java, built in the eighth century.91 While 
Borobudur is still used for religious purposes, presently it is mostly known for tourism. 
The largest Hindu temple in the country is the Prambanan temple complex, located in 
Central Java and built in the ninth and tenth centuries.92 Similar to Borobudur, presently 
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the Prambanan temple complex is known mostly for touristic purposes. The largest 
houses of worship for Buddhists and Hindus in Jakarta, respectively the Dharma Bakti 
Vihara and the Aditya Jaya Temple, are located in less prominent and by far less symbolic 
locations compared to the aforementioned mosque and churches. Their locations are not 
obvious to visitors to Jakarta.  
The varying degrees of recognition extended towards different religions in 
Indonesia are further reflected in the structure of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MORA) which plays an important role in nationally directing, regulating and 
promoting all kinds of religious activities. MORA is often regarded as a channel for the 
aspirations of Islamists within the framework of a multicultural state.93 The 
overwhelming portion of the MORA dedicated to Islam in comparison to other religions 
in Indonesia makes this situation even more obvious. Currently, aside from its General 
Secretariat and Inspectorate, MORA consists of nine directorate-generals, four of which 
are dedicated to the Islamic faith: 
• Directorate-General for Islamic Education (363 staff) 
• Haj and Umrah (pilgrimage) Organising Body (284 staff) 
• Directorate-General for Islamic Community Development (236 staff) 
• Directorate-General for Protestant Community Development (114 staff) 
• Directorate-General for Catholic Community Development (95 staff) 
• Directorate-General for Hindu Community Development (76 staff) 
• Directorate-General for Buddhist Community Development (66 staff) 
• Policy Analysis and Development Agency (390 staff) 
• Halal Produce Assurance Agency (107 staff)94 
In addition, the number of personnel allocated to each directorate general 
indicates a further imbalance between the treatment of Islam vis-à-vis other religions in 
Indonesia, with a total of 990 staff in Islamic-oriented units. In comparison, the units 
dedicated to other religions have a significantly lower number of personnel. In April 
2020, there are 114 staff for Protestantism, 95 staff for Catholicism, 76 staff for Hinduism 
and 66 staff for Buddhism. Altogether, the number of personnel in non-Islamic oriented 
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units makes up a total of 351, or 35.5 percent of the amount of staff in Islamic-oriented 
units. 
The recognition of religious diversity through national holidays again highlights 
the privileges Muslims enjoy in Indonesia. In present-day Indonesia, national holidays 
are announced annually through a joint decree signed by the Minister for Religious 
Affairs, Minister for Manpower and Minister for State Apparatus and Bureaucratic 
Reform. The involvement of the Minister for Religious Affairs further cements the role 
of religion in determining the holidays. In 2019, the observed national holidays were: 
• New Year, 1 January 
• Chinese New Year, 5 February 
• Day of Silence/Hindu New Year, 7 March 
• Ascension of Muhammad, 3 April 
• Good Friday, 19 April 
• Labour Day, 1 May 
• Vesak, 19 May 
• Ascension of Jesus Christ, 30 May 
• Pancasila Day, 1 June 
• Eid al-Fitr, 5-6 June 
• Eid al-Adha, 11 August 
• Independence Day, 17 August 
• Islamic New Year, 1 September 
• Birth of Muhammad, 9 November 
• Christmas Day, 25 December95 
While all six religions have at least one nationally recognised holiday, the most 
holidays are Islamic (five holidays) followed by Christian holidays (three holidays). 
Other religions only have one nationally observed holiday. This discrepancy in the 
number of nationally observed holidays reflects the majority and minority status of the 
religions. This regulation on national holidays at the same time enables and restricts 
religious freedom, as adherents of minority religions who want to celebrate their holidays 
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beyond the nationally recognised ones would need to apply for extra permission to take 
leave from their occupation.96  
The privilege Islam enjoys in Indonesia can furthermore be seen through the 
existence of a religious court which only exists for the Islamic faith, regulating matters 
such as marriage, divorce and inheritance for the Muslim population. While the 
foundations of the state itself remains religiously neutral, a certain degree of unity 
between law and religion is reached through this religious court.97 The lack of 
comparable institutions for minority religions highlights once more the advantages held 
by Islam in Indonesia, indicating the significant political influence of Islam in the 
country.98 This lack of comparable institutions for minority religions can be attributed to 
their teachings not requiring a similar degree of institutionalisation; however, the 
incorporation of Hindu laws into the legal system of India, for example, suggests the 
contrary.99 The comparison between the position of Islam in Indonesia and Hinduism in 
India suggests that the institutionalisation of religious laws by a state indicates the 
political sway held by the religion in question.100   
 
4.5 Challenges of Religious Diversity in Indonesia 
4.5.1 Demands for constitutional status for Islam 
The presence of political Islamism in post-1998 Indonesia constitutes a challenge to 
multiculturalism in Indonesia. Since 1998, there have been three attempts to give Islamic 
law a constitutional status through the parliament, respectively in 2000, 2001 and 
2002.101 While these attempts were unsuccessful, a ‘conservative turn’ among Muslims 
in the country has been observed, through, among other things, an increase in mutual 
othering between Muslims and Christians, marked by increased hostility and mutual 
projection of a negative image. Often, this mutual othering is ascribed to the increasing 
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Christian population in Indonesia, from 7.4 percent in 1971 to ten percent in 2010.102 
This increase in the percentage of the Christian population, in turn, has been used by 
Islamists to peddle the issue of ‘Christianisation’ in the country. 103 Prior to 1998, the 
New Order had practically banned political Islam;104 thus, the re-emergence of political 
Islam and a turn to religious conservatism must also be an outburst of a previously 
repressed identity. 
Arskal Salim has identified four notable constituents in favour of Islamic law in 
post-1998 Indonesia: Islamic political parties, certain Muslim-majority regions such as 
Aceh, Muslim militant groups and sections of the Islamic print media.105 Altogether, the 
combined influence of various Islamic groups gives Islam a considerable leverage in 
Indonesian politics. Jeremy Menchik argues that Islamic organisations in Indonesia 
largely accept diversity and support religious tolerance; however, they reject the 
framework of Western liberalism in varying degrees and prefer to base their approach 
towards tolerance on Islamic teachings.106 Menchik further argues that Islamic 
organisations in Indonesia favour a state in which diverse religious groups enjoy religious 
freedom but do not interfere in ‘the faith matter of others’.107 The implementation of this 
principle, in turn, leads to debates on the definition of ‘faith matter’ and what constitutes 
an interference. Similarly, Julie Hwang argues that political Islamists in Indonesia are 
divided between those who support the Pancasila as Indonesia’s ideological foundation, 
and those who demand constitutional status for Islam.108 Therefore, while political 
Islamists in Indonesia agree that Islamic practices should be accommodated by the state, 
the exact demands differ between schools of thought.109  
The two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia are Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which were both founded prior to Indonesia’s political 
independence. These two organisations adopt a largely moderate position on Islam. 
Muhammadiyah explicitly adopts a neutral and non-partisan stance in politics, and is 
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mostly engaged in social and educational activities through its charities, hospitals and 
educational institutions across the country.110 Meanwhile, NU is known for advocating 
religious tolerance and moderation. Similar to Muhammadiyah, NU has a network of 
charities and educational institutions. Despite NU’s brief period as a political movement 
in the 1950s, presently NU’s leaders refrain from direct political involvement; however, 
they are still ‘important power brokers’ within society and can influence the people’s 
opinion on political issues.111 On the liberal end of the spectrum, Jaringan Islam Liberal 
(Liberal Islamic Network/JIL) promotes a more inclusive and pluralistic view on Islam. 
JIL has received criticism from more conservative groups for its contextual interpretation 
of the Qur’an instead of a literal one.112 
Some more conservative organisations include the Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(Indonesian Council of Ulamas/MUI), one of the most influential Islamic advisory bodies 
in Indonesia. Originally established by the New Order government as a means to manage 
Islamic policies in the country, MUI has since evolved into an independent organisation 
with some consultative power towards the government and has developed a more 
conservative position on Islam.113 To demonstrate MUI’s influence in Indonesia, for 
example, it has been the main authority on halal-certification in the country, working in 
close cooperation with Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs.114 Previous research 
has shown that from 1975 to 2011, MUI issued 137 fatwas (recommendations on the 
interpretation of Islamic law) and 50 decisions in matters pertaining to theology and 
worship, socio-cultural issues, as well as science and technology.115  
Among conservative Islamic organisations is the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic 
Defenders Front/FPI).116 FPI’s leader, Rizieq Syihab, an Indonesian of Hadhrami 
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descent, claims to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.117 Founded under the 
principle of ‘amar ma’ruf nahi munkar’ (Arabic for ‘commanding right and forbidding 
wrong’), FPI’s founders argue that the Indonesian state was run under secular laws with 
considerable Western influence that did not suit its Muslim-majority population.118 Since 
its establishment, FPI has been engaged in various forms of violent discrimination against 
minority religions and groups that it perceives as deviant to its interpretation of Islamic 
teachings. Its members are known to spread hate speech, conduct illegal raids on ‘un-
Islamic establishments’ such as cafes and nightclubs, and forcibly barricade houses of 
worship of minority religions.119 While FPI’s leaders publicly claim to denounce 
violence, little has been done to curb their supposed ‘rogue’ members on multiple 
occasions.120 Mark Woodward et al. argue that the conservative environment enabled by 
MUI’s influence has further encouraged FPI in its activities, partly by issuing 
conservative fatwas which are used as justifications for FPI’s actions.121 
Islamist organisations in Indonesia also express their aspirations by becoming 
political parties. For example, the moderately conservative Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
(the Prosperous Justice Party/PKS) is Indonesia’s largest faith-based political party. 
Since its inception in 1999, PKS has shown the power of Islam for mass mobilisation in 
Indonesia through social activism and dakwah (missionary-like activities).122 In the 1999 
legislative elections, PKS (then called Partai Keadilan/Justice Party) only won 1.36 
percent of votes; in the 2014 legislative elections, PKS won 6.79 percent of votes, and in 
2019 it managed to get 8.21 percent of votes.123  
Despite the re-emergence of political Islam and the contemporary conservative 
turn in Indonesia, the state is prepared to set limits to threats against the overall stability 
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of the state. For example, in 2017, when Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a hard-line 
Islamist movement openly defied Pancasila as the state’s ideology, the government 
decidedly outlawed the movement. HTI is an organisation affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir, 
a pan-Islamic organisation with a vision to establish an Islamic state ruled by a 
caliphate.124 HTI was established in Indonesia in 1982 and really began to express its 
political views in the post-1998 reform era, making use of the easing of political control. 
In 2000, HTI registered as an official civil society organisation at the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in Indonesia.125 Ideologically, this registration posed a paradox, as the HTI 
rejected the notion of the nation-state and the Pancasila. HTI increasingly mobilised 
organised action to demand a constitutional status for Islamic law in Indonesia.126 HTI 
was officially banned by the government in July 2017 for threatening national unity by 
their mobilisation of their members. The Indonesian government received criticism for 
going against the principles of freedom of association and expression in its decision to 
disband the HTI, yet the government maintained that national unity and harmony was its 
priority. Furthermore, the government argued that by disbanding HTI, it protected the 
very foundations of the state which accommodate multiculturalism in Indonesia.127 
Officially, the government denounces political Islamism; Azis Nurwahyudi, Director for 
Public Diplomacy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, repeatedly 
emphasised in his interview that Indonesia was a moderate Muslim country in which 
Islam and democracy are compatible. He stated that radical Islamists are not part of the 
true face of Islam in Indonesia.128 
Yet Islamist elements can also be found among higher echelons of the 
government, despite being much more subtle in their manifestation. Agustini Rahayu, 
Director for Marketing Development and Tourism Marketing in Europe at the Ministry 
of Tourism, was part of a 2016 national taskforce charged with developing Indonesia’s 
tourism promotion campaign. When interviewed, Rahayu said that the President wanted 
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Indonesia to have a ‘single identity’ that would be easily recognisable. To help achieve 
this objective, the taskforce had to develop a logo that represented the national identity 
of Indonesia and could be used by different government agencies. The taskforce settled 
on a logo derived of the Garuda Pancasila, Indonesia’s national coat of arms. The logo 
is the silhouette of a bird in a spread-eagle position, painted in five different colours to 
emulate the diversity of Indonesia, as shown below. The number five itself was 
considered a good reflection of the Pancasila as the five founding principles of 
Indonesia.129  
 
Figure 4-2: the Wonderful Indonesia logo 
Rahayu shared an off-hand remark she heard in a meeting which indicated an 
Islamist presence within the government, as an unnamed individual within the higher 
echelons of the government objected to the logo because it looked like a Christian cross, 
which this person deemed unsuitable for a predominantly Muslim country.130 Since the 
logo was distilled out of the Garuda Pancasila, a bird in a spread-eagle position, it is 
reminiscent of a crucifix to some extent. The fact that someone felt it was necessary to 
say that a logo vaguely reminiscent of a cross would be inappropriate for Indonesia 
indicated a rejection on the part of some Islamic elements in the country towards the 
perceived growing influence of minority religions. This situation again recalled the 
debate on the relation between religion and the state, as well as the privileges for Islam 
as the majority religion in Indonesia. 
 
                                                 




4.5.2 The treatment of minority religions 
Another challenge to religious diversity in Indonesia is the treatment of religious 
minorities. While minority world religions are recognised by the state, they are not on an 
equal footing with Islam as Indonesia’s majority religion. The Bishop of the Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Amboina in Maluku, Monsignor Petrus Canisius Mandagi, 
expressed that it was natural for majority and minority groups to play different parts 
within society. His statement implied that minority religions in Indonesia have resigned 
themselves to their disadvantaged position in society: 
[Differences between majorities and minorities] is the reality, after all. And 
Christians have to admit that. We have to realise that we are a minority. We 
have to realise that we need to be protected by Muslims. And Muslims also 
have to be aware of their responsibility to protect us.131 
A similar resignation was observed in the statements of other leaders of minority 
religions in Indonesia. Johanes Subagio, the parishioner in the Catholic Church of the 
Holy Heart in Banda Aceh, explained that his church enjoyed largely peaceful 
interactions with Aceh’s Muslim-majority environment. At the same time, his statements 
revealed some uneasiness in those very relations.132 The interview reflected how religious 
minorities in Aceh are able to practice their faith as long as they conform to the 
expectations of the religious majority; for instance, they are expected not to display their 
religious identity flagrantly beyond the space of their church. One remark particularly 
revealed that his congregation did not fully enjoy freedom of religion, as Subagio stated 
that they were able to worship and perform other religious duties “as long as they did not 
bother other people”. He said that they had to respect that the majority of the people in 
Aceh wanted to live under the Islamic law.133 Subagio further said: 
Religious tolerance here is good. We are safe in the church grounds. During 
large services, such as the Christmas or Easter services, the police or the 
military would help us guard the church, make sure the services are safe. 
Sometimes the police and military would stand guard even for 24 hours 
during religious holidays. […] It is also easy to arrange such protection, 
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from time to time the police chief himself would come here and discuss the 
dates when he needs to dispatch people.134 
The very need for extra security on religious holidays implies an awareness of the 
potential of conflict. It was, however, impossible to ascertain whether the police and 
military were guarding the church from potential external disruptions or to make sure 
that services were contained to the church grounds.  
Similar sentiments could be detected at the Dharma Bakti Temple, a Buddhist 
temple in Banda Aceh. Information gathered at the temple again showed how religious 
minorities can only express their religious identity within certain restrictions. Hasan, a 
caretaker and a monk of the temple, said that interreligious relations in Aceh are generally 
‘good’: 
I am glad that we are able to run our temple in the middle of Banda Aceh. 
The relations between religious groups in Aceh is good. We have to guard 
this and respect others.135 
Hasan further explained that at the time of interview in February 2018, the temple was 
planning to hold a special service for Chinese New Year, for which there would be 
increased security from the police. However, Hasan could not elaborate on why it was 
necessary to increase security, stating that it simply had always been that way.136 His 
statement echoed that of Subagio on increased security around religious holidays, 
implying the potential of danger or conflict around the public celebration of minority 
religions.  
Meanwhile, smaller Muslim groups which are considered deviant from the 
mainstream in Indonesia face discrimination and persecution. The Ahmadiyahs are a 
religious community, which in Indonesia consists of approximately 300,000 people. 
Ahmadiyahs consider themselves to be Muslims but recognise a new prophet after 
Muhammad and practice religious rituals different from the mainstream Sunni Muslims 
in Indonesia.137 As such, the Ahmadiyahs are considered to defy mainstream Islamic 
teachings which stipulate Muhammad as the last prophet. Historically, they have existed 
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in Indonesia at least since the 1920s. They had faced discrimination before but have 
mostly lived peacefully among the larger population. In 1980, a statement by the Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (MUI) declared Ahmadiyah as a heretic sect.138 Attacks by radical 
Islamic groups against them noticeably increased after 2000.139 In turn, in July 2005, the 
MUI issued a statement declaring the Ahmadiyahs as a heretic sect for the second time.140 
Violence against the Ahmadiyahs increased again following this declaration.141  
Since MUI’s second declaration, pressure from Islamists mounted against the 
government to ban Ahmadiyahs in Indonesia. In 2008, the government yielded to this 
pressure and issued a Joint Ministerial Decree which echoed the MUI’s declaration and 
prohibits the Ahmadiyahs from practicing or proselytising their faith publicly. The decree 
was signed by the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister 
for Home Affairs.142 This decree indicated that the government wanted to avoid a public 
narrative which implies that the state was being un-Islamic or even heretic in allowing 
an allegedly ‘heretic sect’ to continue its practices in Indonesia. This ban demonstrates 
the state’s limits to toleration, particularly when discrepancies between value systems 
become too much, often for the sake of the interest of the wider public and the coherence 
of the state.143 This move raised concern over the supposed values of tolerance preached 
by the nationalist narrative and speculations of Indonesia becoming a more Islamist 
country.144 The government, in this case, chose to align itself with the radical and political 
Islamists in the country at the expense of an inclusive approach to multiculturalism. As 
a result, there was a significant crackdown on many Ahmadiyah mosques across 
Indonesia, including by unauthorised non-state actors.145  
Other minorities within Islam also face different types of persecution. For 
example, in the Sunni-Shi’a cleavage which stems from disagreements over the successor 
of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century, most Indonesians are taught in the 
Sunni tradition. There is thus a negative connotation attached to Shi’ism, which is 
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considered an erroneous interpretation of Islam by Sunni leaders. In this regard, localised 
small-scale violent conflicts have broken out in the past between adherents of Sunnism 
and Shi’ism, such as in Madura in 2012.146 
In this regard, Alamsyah Djafar from the Wahid Foundation argues that the 
significant influence of Islam on various aspects of governance in Indonesia has created 
an environment that is fertile for a more hard-line take on religious identity. If the state 
breaches the religious freedom of its citizens, then non-state actors are more likely to 
engage in discriminative behaviour, particularly against religious minorites. For 
example, non-state Muslim vigilante groups have barricaded buildings used for worship 
by minority religious groups without significant resistance from the rest of the population 
and the government. Parts of the religious majority can also have their freedom restricted, 
as evident through the policing of women’s clothing in Aceh which is done towards 
Muslim women by both state and non-state actors. In turn, this policing has led non-
Muslim women to also dress conservatively in public out of fear of persecution.147 
Ambiguity in Indonesia’s laws against discrimination contains a loophole which 
further enables discrimination on the basis of religious identity. The Law No. 40 of 2008 
on the Eradication of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination does not explicitly outlaw 
discrimination on the account of religion. This failure to mention discrimination on the 
basis of religion is striking, given Indonesia’s religious diversity and history of religious 
tensions. Article 1 of this law defines ‘race’ as a ‘categorisation based on physical trait 
marks and lines of heritage’ and ‘ethnicity’ as ‘categorisation based on faith, values, 
habits, traditions, norms, language, history, geography and kinship.’148 At first glance, 
this law thus covers many aspects of identity, including ethno-regional identity (‘race’, 
‘traditions’, ‘geography’, ‘language’, ‘kinship’) and religious identity (‘faith’). However, 
the exact wording of this law implies that discrimination on the account of religious 
identity is not explicitly outlawed. The law refrains from using the word ‘agama’ 
(religion) and instead uses the more ambiguous word ‘kepercayaan’ (faith), which in the 
Indonesian language does not always carry the connotation of a religious belief. Even 
then, ‘faith’ is only classified as one element of ‘ethnicity’. It leaves religious minorities 
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at a vulnerable position when religious discrimination is not explicitly outlawed in the 
legal system.  
Furthermore, this law against discrimination limits its own authority on 
ambiguous terms as stated in Articles 2(1) and 2(2), as follows: 
(1) The eradication of racial and ethnic discrimination shall be conducted 
based on the norms of equality, freedom, justice and universal values of 
humanity. 
(2) The norms of equality, freedom, justice and universal values of 
humanity as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be conducted by taking into 
account the values of religion, socio-cultural conditions and laws valid in 
the jurisdiction of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.149 
The Explanatory Addendum of this law specifies that the term ‘values of religion’ 
in the abovementioned article refers to ‘values adhered to by each religion which govern 
interpersonal relations as well as the relations between individuals and their 
environment’.150 The ‘religions’ addressed in this article are limited to the six recognised 
ones. This explanation restricts the law’s own authority and provides a loophole through 
which discriminatory acts could be defended if they were constructed as part of the so-
called ‘values’ supposedly ‘adhered to’ by the Indonesian people. For example, 
discrimination against LGBTQ people could be defended as acts which upheld religious 
principles. Traditional cultural practices that contradict religious teachings could also be 
construed as offensive towards religion. In contrast, Presidential Decree No. 
1/PNPS/1965 categorises blasphemy and abuse against religion as a criminal offence.151 
This situation provides a legal advantage for people who operate on, or claim to be 
operating on, a religious platform.  
 
4.5.3 Indigenous faith groups 
The recognition of localised indigenous faith groups constitutes another challenge for 
religious diversity in Indonesia, as this lack of recognition negatively impacts the faith 
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groups’ freedom to exercise their religious practices. The state does not deny their 
presence; however, indigenous faith groups face administrative obstacles to fully 
exercise their rights as citizens. For example, adherents of indigenous faith groups 
struggle to have their faith correctly stated on documents of identification, while it is the 
norm in Indonesia to have one’s religious identity on official documents. The 
government’s efforts to increase recognition and accommodation for these indigenous 
faith groups are uncoordinated and sporadic. In 2017, the Indonesian Ministry of 
Education and Culture published an encyclopaedia on various indigenous faith groups 
(aliran kepercayaan) in the country. In total, there were 169 separate faith groups and 
organisations listed in the encyclopaedia.152 The purpose of the publication as stated in 
the introduction of the encyclopaedia was to acknowledge the legacy of culture and local 
wisdom found in various faith groups across the country, as well as to raise the public’s 
awareness of them.153 However, while this encyclopaedia is already in its third edition, 
it is not widely circulated or immediately available to the public and thus has little impact 
on the public discourse on indigenous faith groups. 
An anonymous consultation with an official within the Ministry of Education and 
Culture revealed that some parts of the ministry had been pushing for public schools to 
provide religious education in accordance with the local faith groups, particularly in 
remote areas where there are a higher concentration of adherents of such faith groups. 
There were no official numbers, but it was indicated that this effort had come to fruition 
in a few areas. However, the official involved in this effort felt that they were faced with 
prejudice both from the public and peers within the government, as indigenous faith 
groups are often portrayed as less civilised than world religions. This official’s 
reservations about being identified as a participant in itself indicates the sensitivity of the 
issue of the recognition of indigenous faith groups. 
Alamsyah Djafar argues that the present differentiation between world religions 
and indigenous faith groups in Indonesia could be traced back to one speech by Suharto 
in 1978. The speech, which was made in front of parliament to ratify Indonesia’s white 
paper (Garis Besar Haluan Negara/GBHN) at the time, contained passages in which 
Suharto stated that faith groups were not religions and could not be recognised as such. 
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These passages had led to the institutionalised discrimination against the so-called faith 
groups which in turn trickled down into the mind-set of society.154 
According to Rukka Sombolinggi of AMAN, the Indonesian society is not 
entirely ready for a full legal recognition of these faith groups, as the general public 
already has the perception that these groups are not on par with world religions. As an 
advocate for the rights of indigenous peoples in Indonesia, Sombolinggi gave a striking 
statement on the predicament of the indigenous faith groups in Indonesia:  
It is really sad in our country. All the recognised religions are imported 
religions. Don’t you agree? The recognised ones… It’s like this. This 
country of ours is so… How should I put it… So convoluted in its thinking, 
so that our foundational value as the Indonesian nation, which is so diverse, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, has been betrayed. Ancestral religions, those are 
religions inherited along with our diverse culture, along with the wisdom to 
manage natural resources across the archipelago in a just manner, they have 
been eradicated. The ones that are recognised are all imported religions. 
Christianity, Catholicism, Islam, those are all from the Middle East. That’s 
where they come from, where their roots are. Right? Those three. Buddhism, 
Hinduism, they are also foreign. Confucianism. The same. Ancestral 
religions are not recognised at all. So there is actually something wrong with 
us. We cannot blame others as we are all complicit. You, me, the parliament, 
religious leaders, religious leaders of major religions, all of us. We are guilty 
because we keep silent about it.155 
Sombolinggi strongly rejected the public narrative that indigenous faith groups 
pose a threat to established world religions in Indonesia. She said that they were small in 
number, with current estimates at one million people within a total population of over 
250 million. She was, however, wary of the potential of their legal recognition, if this 
recognition were to be paired with a differentiation between the faith groups as ‘aliran 
kepercayaan’ (‘faith groups’) and ‘agama’ (‘religions’). This differentiation, according 
to Sombolinggi, would continue to foster a discriminative environment towards them, as 
it implies that faith groups are ‘lesser’ than world religions.156 
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A widespread perception of the importance of religiosity constitutes another 
challenge, as a public declaration of one’s faith is considered indispensable. Sombolinggi 
shared a personal anecdote of trying to erase the information on her religious identity on 
her ID card, which is legally enabled through Article 64 in the Law No. 24 of 2013 on 
Citizen Administration. This article states that citizens whose faiths were not yet legally 
recognised by the state may leave their religious information empty on any citizenship-
related paperwork.157 Yet Sombolinggi encountered significant resistance on the side of 
public servants in charge of issuing ID cards when she asked to amend hers. Despite her 
best efforts to convince local civil administrators about the legality of the procedure and 
her being of age to make that decision for herself, her mother had to give a letter of 
consent for her to erase the information on religious identity on her ID card. 
Leaders of religious minorities interviewed for this research all expressed their 
support for the legal recognition of Indonesia’s indigenous faith groups, indicating that 
the negative public image of indigenous faith groups was a matter beyond religious 
teachings. Johanes Subagio from the Catholic Church in Banda Aceh stated that a legal 
recognition would make it easier for the adherents of such faith groups to obtain official 
paperwork.158 Elifas Maspaitella from the Protestant Church of Maluku similarly 
expressed his support for the legal recognition of Indonesia’s indigenous faith groups.159 
Monsignor Mandagi from the Roman Catholic Church in Ambon stated that whether or 
not the legal system recognised these indigenous faith groups, they were there; as such, 
their rights as equal citizens before the law should be recognised by the state.160  
Since the fieldwork for this research was conducted, Indonesia has produced a 
regulation which increases legal accommodation of indigenous faith groups by enabling 
the legal registration of marriages for them from July 2019.161 The regulation overhauls 
several aspects of citizen administration in Indonesia and has an entire chapter dedicated 
to the registration of marriages conducted in the tradition of indigenous faith groups.162 
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It thus addresses some of the past bureaucratic hurdles faced by children of families in 
indigenous faith groups, such as obtaining birth certificates. This regulation is another 
step toward a more inclusive framework for multiculturalism in Indonesia. 
 
4.5.4 Religious segregation 
The separation between religious groups is another challenge for interfaith relations in 
Indonesia. Indonesia’s marriage laws contribute to the perpetuation of religious 
cleavages in society by inhibiting interreligious marriages. The Law No. 1 of 1974 states 
that a marriage can only be legally recognised by the civil registry if a religious covenant 
has been held. This stipulation is entailed in Articles 1 and 2:163 
A marriage shall be the physical and emotional bond between a man and a 
woman with the purpose of building a happy and everlasting family and 
household in accordance with the Belief in God. (Article 1) 
A marriage shall be legal if conducted according to the laws of religions and 
faiths. (Article 2.1) 
This law thus implies that both parties in a marriage must be of the same religion, 
because in turn, the rules of religious marriage covenants usually dictate that both parties 
in the marriage are of the same religion.164 For example, Islamic marriage laws stipulate 
that both the groom and the bride should be Muslims, even though Muslim men are 
allowed to marry ‘a pious woman of the Book’, meaning a woman from an Abrahamic 
religion. Still, such mixed marriages are very rare. Having been in force since 1974, this 
law reflects that the attitude towards the salience of religion in marriage has been 
relatively stable in Indonesia. The process of drafting this very law itself involved 
negotiations between the government and Islamist groups who demanded Indonesia’s 
marriage law not contradict Islamic practices.165 In addition, the existing social pressure 
is high for couples to share the same religion. As a result, interreligious weddings are 
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very rare; more commonly, one party converts to their partner’s religion even though this 
conversion would involve serious objections from family members. 
Another challenge relating to the segregation between religious groups takes the 
form of religious education. Indonesia acknowledges many types of formal education, 
including religious schools, such as pesantren and madrasah (Islamic schools). There are 
also schools associated with various churches throughout the country. Schools hold a 
strategic importance as a place for intercultural interaction in which students can make 
friends with peers from different social groups.166 Thus, the type of school attended by 
young people can have significant influence on their interactions in the community. 
However, multiculturalism is not a natural experience in many religious and private 
schools.167 Instead, schools with a religious background tend to segregate and promote 
exclusivity.168 The homogeneity of students’ background in segregated religious schools 
may limit the schools’ capacity in providing an adequate citizenship education, as pupils 
of religious schools are less likely to have friends from other religions compared to pupils 
of public schools.169 While the provision of education in accordance with the people’s 
religious values is an important part of their cultural rights, there are potential social 
repercussions of segregating schools based on people’s religion. Therefore, the state has 
a continuing challenge to find an appropriate balance between protecting the people’s 




This chapter has examined multiculturalism in Indonesia through the extent of legal 
pluralism in the state and concludes that Indonesia’s framework for diversity has adopted 
an inequitable approach to multiculturalism. First, there are different degrees of 
accommodation provided towards majority and minority groups, with policies for 
minorities leaning toward toleration instead of equal recognition and accommodation. 
Second, while the constitution guarantees the expression of ethno-regional and religious 
                                                 
166 Lyn Parker, Chang-Yau Hoon, and Raihani, “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-
Ethnic and Inter-Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia,” South East Asia 
Research 22, no. 4 (2014): 477. 
167 Hoon, “Multicultural Citizenship Education in Indonesia,” 510. 
168 Ibid., 495. 
169 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 304. 
144 
 
identities, its derivation into various laws shows inconsistencies and loopholes. For 
example, even though Indonesia’s legal framework supposedly provides equal 
recognition for world religions, the situation on the field indicates that religious 
minorities often have to conform to the expectations of the Muslim majority. Smaller 
minority groups such as indigenous faith and ethno-regional groups are often overlooked 
by national legislation.  
The treatment of ethno-regional diversity is different from that of religious 
diversity; the expression of various ethno-regional identities is accommodated to a 
significantly larger extent than religious identities. For example, the establishment of new 
administrative provinces since 1998 indicates that formerly overlooked ethno-regional 
entities are increasingly allowed to formally express themselves. In addition, the 
traditional rights of traditional communities/indigenous peoples are gradually getting 
more legal recognition, such as their rights to their ancestral territory. 
By contrast, religious groups beyond the six mainstream world religions are 
facing a risk of persecution. Indonesia’s law against discrimination explicitly 
criminalises discrimination on the basis of ethnic differences but does not explicitly 
categorise discrimination on the basis of religious identity as a criminal offence. In 
addition, Indonesia’s law against the defamation of religion enables the prosecution of 
people who are perceived as blasphemous by mainstream religious groups, but not by 
non-official religions. Furthermore, Indonesia’s legal framework facilitates the 
hardening of religious identity through its marriage laws, which impedes interreligious 
marriages within the population. The recent legal recognition extended to marriage 
covenants in the fashion of indigenous faith groups has yet to show its impact. 
However, privileges extended towards Islam in Indonesia can be interpreted as an 
attempt to mollify political Islamists and prevent them from directly challenging 
Indonesia’s overall framework for diversity. This attitude is reflected in the state’s ban 
on the Ahmadiyah following increased pressure from conservative and influential 
Islamic groups. Similarly, the state banned the Islamist organisation Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia when it explicitly defied Pancasila as Indonesia’s foundation, showing the 
limits of the state’s toleration for political Islam. Paradoxically, the privileges granted to 
Indonesia’s Muslim majority help secure the state’s framework of Unity in Diversity, 
while they simultaneously foster an environment which normalises disadvantages on the 
side of religious minorities. 
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This chapter has highlighted the unique features of multiculturalism in Indonesia, 
both its strength and weakness. Indonesia’s take on ethno-regional diversity has been 
largely successful. For example, the significant delegation of political authority to the 
provincial level, paired with the reinstitution of traditional units of governance, has 
increased contentment with Indonesia’s central government. It has thus reduced potential 
conflicts between national and ethno-regional identities to the extent that Indonesia has 
not seen regional uprisings since 2005 other than in Papua. This situation is in line with 
theories stating that the recognition and accommodation of identities leads to the increase 
in the people’s contentment with the state. 
At the same time, Indonesia’s management of religious diversity has not achieved 
a similar level of success. Despite the recognition of six world religions, Islam’s 
influence in various aspects of the country’s legal system highlights its predominance 
vis-à-vis other religions in Indonesia. Yet, Islamist groups continue to demand for Islamic 
law to occupy more space within Indonesia’s legal system, some even demanding to 
entirely replace the Pancasila with Islamic law. In this case, the preponderant 
accommodation accorded to Islam in Indonesia has not led to a desired degree of 
contentment with the state. 
The contrast between policies pertaining to ethno-regional diversity and those 
pertaining to religious diversity as shown in this chapter has thus indicated that they 
constitute different dimensions within Indonesia’s diversity. Ethno-regional identity 
occupies a different role to religious identity, and these two types of identity possess 
different degrees of salience for both the people and the state. The role and salience of 
ethno-regional identity and religious identity are discussed in more detail respectively in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
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5 National and Ethno-regional Identity in Indonesia 
This chapter discusses the relation between national and ethno-regional1 identities in 
Indonesia, where there are more than 700 local ethno-regional groups, the largest of 
which include the Javanese, Sundanese, Batak and Minang. Each ethno-regional group 
comes with its own culture, including traditions, language and costumes, giving 
Indonesia a remarkable cultural diversity. This chapter argues that the Indonesian 
national identity is more salient than existing ethno-regional identities. This argument is 
based on data gathered from laypeople and university student participants in the 
provinces of Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West Java. 56 laypeople participants of various 
backgrounds took part in one-on-one in-depth interviews I conducted. Across eight 
universities, 237 university students filled out self-administered questionnaires, followed 
up by one focus group discussion at each university involving ten to twelve participants. 
Two additional, smaller focus groups were held exclusively with students from minority 
backgrounds. Findings from laypeople and university student participants support each 
other, further affirming their validity. In addition, statements from elite interviewees are 
shown where appropriate to better analyse the issues at hand. 
The salience of the Indonesian national identity has been enabled by a prevalent 
narrative of ethno-regional groups being sub-nations of a larger Indonesian nation. 
Furthermore, this narrative portrays ethno-regional diversity as a source of cultural 
wealth as opposed to a threat to unity. Furthermore, participants interpreted their national 
and ethno-regional identities as different aspects of their selves. Participants perceived 
their Indonesian national identity as a primarily civic identity, associated with a sense of 
citizenship and duty towards the state. Meanwhile, participants understood their ethno-
regional identity as a primarily ethnic2 attachment, associated with themes such as 
kinship, family and local traditions. However, the civic-ethnic distinction is not clear-
cut; for instance, participants associated their Indonesian identity with traditionally ethnic 
themes such as birthplace and home. Furthermore, the participants’ shared understanding 
of Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism as an important part of the country’s national 
                                                 
1 I have decided to use the term ‘ethno-regional groups’ as a differentiation from Kymlicka’s 
usage of the term ‘ethnic groups’. The emphasis on regional identity pertains to the fact that not 
all participants in a particular province identified with the local ethnic majority, but still shared 
significant local idiosyncrasies with them. Furthermore, the ethnic dimension in the term ‘ethno-
regional’ encompasses cultural elements such as customs and traditions. 
2 The use of the term ‘ethnic’ also encompasses cultural elements such as traditions and history. 
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identity added an element of shared culture and history. There are thus cultural elements 
in both the Indonesian national identity and various ethno-regional identities. In addition, 
the history of regional struggles against colonialism has been incorporated into the 
history of Indonesia, which further interlinks national and ethno-regional identities. 
Participants indicated that they considered their respective ethno-regional 
identities to be sub-parts of a shared Indonesian national identity. For example, 
participants preferred to use the Indonesian national language to regional languages in 
public; meanwhile, they primarily used regional languages within private circles. 
Furthermore, participants did not perceive differences in ethno-regional identity as a 
barrier to friendships, courtships and marriages, particularly among younger generations. 
However, some issues remain. Participants indicated the regular occurrence of 
discrimination against ethno-regional minorities and the persistence of prejudices 
between different ethno-regional groups. Chinese-Indonesians in particular are prone to 
discrimination because, as Kymlicka’s definition of an ‘ethnic group’, they do not 
constitute the local majority anywhere in Indonesia. In turn, the participants’ experience 
of discrimination negatively affected the participants’ feelings associated to their national 
and ethno-regional identities. 
 
5.1 The Indonesian National Identity 
The Indonesian national identity is primarily understood by participants as a civic 
identity, associated with their rights and responsibilities as citizens. For instance, in the 
questionnaires, the most frequent theme mentioned by university student participants in 
relation to their Indonesian identity was their ‘sense of ownership towards Indonesia’, as 
mentioned by 37 out of 237 student participants (15.6%). The theme of ‘a sense of duty’ 
was mentioned 21 times (8.9%), and the theme of ‘love for the country’ was mentioned 
17 times (7.1%). Ten participants (4.2%) mentioned the theme of benefits received from 
the state. Among laypeople participants, the theme of rights and responsibilities as 
citizens was mentioned by 15 participants (6.3%). For example: 
I am very happy to be Indonesian. It is a great country, and I think it’s 
recently taking better care of its citizens. My younger siblings, still in junior 
and senior high school, they get free education. (Participant J-09) 
148 
 
I feel positive about being Indonesian. I get benefits from the state. 
(Participant M-03) 
Participants also described what they perceived as typical of the Indonesian 
nation in civic terms, citing values such as diversity and harmonious coexistence between 
various cultural groups. For example, 18 laypeople participants (32.1%) stated that 
diversity was an inherent part of the Indonesian identity:  
This is what I think is characteristic of Indonesia: first, archipelagic nation. 
Second, arts and culture. Third, ethnic diversity. (Participant M-10) 
How do I describe the Indonesian nation? I would say, well, it is a very 
diverse nation, wealthy in terms of culture. Diverse peoples from Sabang3 
to Merauke4 who are now one nation. (Participant WJ-15) 
The theme of diversity was used by 49 university student participants (20.1%) to 
describe the Indonesian nation. Despite the largely homogeneous local social 
environment, participants from Aceh and Maluku claimed to feel similarly proud about 
diversity in Indonesia as the participants from the more diverse areas of Jakarta or West 
Java. In the focus groups, ‘diversity’ was always the first thing mentioned by university 
students when asked to describe Indonesia. The statements suggested their belief, at least 
on a perfunctory level, in the existence of tolerance between different ethno-regional and 
religious groups in Indonesia. Particularly in Aceh, participants did not elaborate on 
personal experiences with diversity but used phrases like ‘as we all know’ or ‘as we are 
taught’, implying that Indonesia’s diversity was much-recited jargon. The following 
statement from a participant in University Maluku A was very typical of university 
student participants:  
I feel very positive about what exists in Indonesia: diversity in ethnicity, 
language, religion and yet we remain one as Indonesia. 
The cultural element of the Indonesian national identity, meanwhile, was 
reflected in the participants’ understanding of a shared history of struggling against 
colonialism. Among laypeople participants, eleven (19.6%) mentioned Indonesia’s 
colonial history. For example: 
                                                 
3 Sabang is the western-most city in Indonesia. 
4 Merauke is the eastern-most city in Indonesia. 
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We are one nation because our ancestors fought off the Dutch together. 
Since then, we have been working together to build the nation, too. 
(Participant M-02) 
University student participants also displayed a similar understanding of a shared history 
of colonialism as a source of national identity. The theme of shared history was 
mentioned by eleven university student participants. To take one example: 
I feel that Indonesia was occupied for so long. Err, what is it, plenty of 
national heroes died for us to have independence. So for us, as the younger 
generation, it is our duty as students to study well. And then, we, err, have 
to give our best to fill this independence. We may not let it go in vain. We 
have to make sure the nation remains united and independent. (University 
Maluku A) 
At the same time, participants associated their national identity with the theme of 
birthplace and home, suggesting that the Indonesian national identity also contained 
ethnic attachments, thus blurring the civic-ethnic distinction.5 Eighteen laypeople 
participants (32.1%) associated their Indonesian identity with the theme of ‘home’, such 
as Participant WJ-11: 
Since I was born, until now, I do feel proud [about being Indonesian]. I was 
born in Indonesia, I eat in Indonesia, and everything I did was in Indonesia. 
Among university student participants, the theme of birthplace was mentioned 45 times 
(18.9%). A participant in University West Java A wrote in the questionnaire, “No matter 
what, [Indonesia] is my birthplace”. This sentiment was echoed by others: 
I have a very strong sense of belonging to Indonesia because it is where I 
was born and it is my country. (University Aceh A) 
Because I was born as an Indonesian child therefore I love and care about 
my country very much. (University Maluku B) 
The participants’ shared understanding of the Indonesian national identity has 
been shaped by its method of socialisation. Participants shared the idea that national 
identity was mainly introduced to them through formal channels, particularly the 
education system. For instance, 41 out of 56 laypeople participants (73.2%) stated that 
                                                 
5 Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, 49. 
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they became aware of their Indonesian identity during their elementary school years. Six 
further participants stated that their national identity was developed during their high 
school years. This identity was shaped by the usage of Indonesian as the primary 
language of instruction in the education system. Participants also recalled their 
attendance at their schools’ weekly flag-hoisting ceremonies during which they watched 
the Indonesian flag being raised accompanied by hearing the Indonesian national anthem. 
Participants further reported that their understanding of Indonesia was shaped by history 
classes that touched upon topics such as the national struggle towards independence, as 
well as citizenship classes that introduced the Pancasila as the fundamental principles of 
Indonesia.6 In addition, citizenship classes socialised the narrative of Indonesia being an 
inherently diverse nation, with various ethno-regional groups constituting its sub-nations. 
Reflecting the modernist approach to nationalism which emphasises the role of 
the mass media in spreading national identity, three laypeople participants (5.4%) 
claimed that they recalled feeling Indonesian when hearing the national anthem on 
television or radio. These three participants were above the age of 40 and recalled how 
the national anthem used to be played daily during the New Order, marking the start and 
end of the broadcast. Meanwhile, Participant M-02, a retired navy member, said that he 
particularly felt Indonesian upon joining the navy when he trained with fellow recruits 
from all across the country. In this regard, the understanding of the Indonesian national 
identity of the state institution was systematically imprinted upon its recruits. These 
recruits also received first-hand experience of the diversity promoted by Indonesia’s 
national motto of Unity in Diversity. 
Two laypeople participants (3.6%) claimed that they realised their Indonesian 
national identity upon encountering foreigners, which recalls the importance of primers 
and triggers for people’s awareness of their identity. In this case, the encounter with 
foreigners triggered the participants’ Indonesian identity to come to the fore. The 
Indonesian national identity in itself, however, had already been shaped and primed by 
the participants’ environment, including their education. One of these two participants 
stated that he felt Indonesian upon making friends with a foreigner as a child, which led 
him to realise the differences between Indonesians and foreigners. The other participant 
stated that she truly realised her Indonesian identity when she was mistaken as a 
                                                 
6 The five principles of the Pancasila are ‘Belief in God’, ‘Just and Civilised Humanity’, 
‘National Unity’, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Social Justice’. 
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foreigner. The misrecognition triggered the participant to decidedly declare her 
nationality, as she realised that it made her upset to have her national identity mistaken 
by others. 
A significant majority of both laypeople and university student participants felt 
positive about their Indonesian national identity. Using a Likert scale, among 56 
laypeople participants, seven claimed to feel ‘very positive’ (12.5%), 33 claimed to feel 
‘positive’ (58.9%), 14 claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ (25%), 2 claimed to feel ‘negative’ 
(3.6%) and none claimed to feel ‘very negative’ about being Indonesian. Forty-three 
university student participants claimed to feel ‘very positive’ (18.1%) and 127 claimed 
to feel ‘positive’ about being Indonesian (53.6%). 51 participants claimed to feel 
‘indifferent’ (21.5%), and only 16 claimed to feel ‘negative’ (6.8%). No participant chose 
the ‘very negative’ option. The most striking finding here was that the highest number of 
participants claimed to feel ‘positive’ about their Indonesian national identity. 
Furthermore, not one single participant claimed to feel ‘very negative’ about their 
national identity.  
However, there were slight variations in the distribution of answers between the 
four provinces, as well as between age groups, as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below: 
Table 5.1: University student participants’ feelings about their Indonesian identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 4 2 15 22 43 
Positive 39 31 28 28 127 
Indifferent 13 20 14 4 51 
Negative 4 7 1 4 16 
Very negative 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.2: Laypeople participants’ feelings about their Indonesian identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 2 3 0 2 7 
Positive 5 7 10 11 33 
Indifferent 4 6 4 0 14 
Negative 1 0 1 0 2 
Very negative 0 0 0 0 0 
Both tables show a higher tendency towards ‘indifference’ in Jakarta and West 
Java compared to Aceh and Maluku. This finding contradicted initial assumptions that 
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participants from peripheral areas that were not as economically developed as the central 
provinces would claim less positive feelings about being Indonesian. For instance, Table 
5.1 shows that 15 of 59 university student participants in Aceh claimed to feel ‘very 
positive’ about being Indonesian (25.4%), as did 22 out of 58 university student 
participants in Maluku (37.9%). Meanwhile, only four out of 60 university student 
participants in Jakarta claimed to feel ‘very positive’ about being Indonesian (6.6%), as 
did two out of 60 participants in West Java (3.3.%). A similar trend is observable among 
laypeople participants, as shown in Table 5.2. In both Aceh and Jakarta, four participants 
claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ and one claimed to feel ‘negative’ about their Indonesian 
national identity. In West Java, six participants claimed to feel ‘indifferent’; however, 
not one single participant in Maluku claimed this feeling. 
The explanation for this variation between the provinces was found in the 
participants’ descriptions of their feeling. For example, university student participants in 
Jakarta and West Java were more likely to compare Indonesia to other more developed 
countries, which negatively affected their feeling about being Indonesian. Students from 
these provinces were also more likely to be critical of the government. For example, 
participants from Jakarta wrote the following statements, the likes of which were not 
found from participants from Aceh or Maluku:  
I love Indonesia, but I do not like how the government runs the system 
which is inconsistent and still abused by corruptors. Besides that, 
currently, Indonesians easily fall prey to hoaxes, etc. (University Jakarta 
A)  
For a long time, I often saw developed countries like America or other 
European countries on TV and always wanted to live in a country like 
that. (University Jakarta B) 
By contrast, university student participants from Aceh and Maluku typically 
paired their positive feelings with their satisfaction with the ongoing development that 
they personally witnessed in their respective region, as evident in the following 
statements: 
Lately, Indonesia has shown that it can provide a lot of the people’s 




I feel positive. There has been significant development in Ambon, things are 
now much better. (University Maluku B) 
Laypeople participants, meanwhile, most often associated their positive feeling 
about their national identity with their appreciation for the good state of the relationship 
between different cultural groups in Indonesia, particularly in the region they lived in. It 
was possible that laypeople participants were reluctant to be completely candid with a 
researcher who constituted a social other to them, especially because the information was 
gathered through one-on-one interviews. However, the participants’ explanations for 
their positive feelings made sense, particularly for older participants who had 
experienced violent conflict in their province in the past and had witnessed significant 
improvements in the present. For example, participants stated: 
Indonesia is a beautiful country and its people are friendly towards each 
other. There is definitely a feeling that we are part of the same nation, 
whatever your own background is. (Participant M-09) 
There has been a lot of improvement here in Aceh, it is much safer, it makes 
me feel proud to be Indonesian. (Participant A-07) 
At the same time, there is a noticeable difference between university student and 
laypeople participants in Aceh and Maluku, shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. A noticeably 
higher portion of university student participants claimed to feel ‘very positive’ about their 
national identity in comparison to the laypeople participants. In this regard, the laypeople 
participants’ personal experience with and memories of violent conflict had affected their 
feelings about their national identity. While most of these participants claimed to feel 
positive about their national identity in relation to present peace and development, their 
awareness of past conflicts also made them less exuberant. 
Most of the participants who claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about their national 
identity attributed their feeling to having an equal amount of positive and negative 
thoughts about it, including nine out of 14 laypeople participants (64.3%) and 39 out of 
51 university student participants (76.5%). Their ‘indifference’, thus, did not constitute 
an aloofness towards their Indonesian identity. Among university student participants 
who claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about their national identity, the most common themes 
included discontentment with corruption, poverty and slow development in the country. 
Corruption was mentioned by four participants, poverty was mentioned three times and 
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slow development was mentioned seven times. Among laypeople participants, the 
themes were more varied, usually connected to the individual experiences of participants. 
For example, participants stated: 
I feel just so-so… On the positive side, well, it is pleasant to live in 
Indonesia. There is no pressure, there is no… no… I see in other countries, 
some have really high stress levels. In Indonesia, I say, the stress level is 
not, not high. On the negative side, I see that politics in Indonesia is very 
messed up, in my opinion…  I mean, this is subjective, but I think many 
people who are in the right are being scrutinised for faults in the name of 
particular interests. (Participant WJ-05) 
Being Indonesian? Just average. As a street food vendor, life is just so-so. 
[…] I moved here more than twenty years ago. My life is just so-so. People 
say you can go to Jakarta to make a fortune, but if you don’t have a good 
education or connections, you can’t do a lot. (Participant J-05) 
However, five out of 14 laypeople participants (35.7%) claimed aloofness or 
detachment to their national identity, as did eight university student participants (15.6%). 
For example, Participant WJ-07 said: 
Maybe it was my fate to be born here, so I just accept it. … Indonesian, 
Sundanese, I do not like to attach strong emotions to these things. 
Participants from minority backgrounds were more likely to feel ‘indifferent’ or 
‘negative’ about their national identity. For example, three out of five Chinese-
Indonesian laypeople participants7 claimed to feel indifferent about their Indonesian 
identity. Among 56 laypeople participants, the two participants who claimed to feel 
negative about their national identity were both minorities, despite being in different 
situations. The first was Participant A-05, an Acehnese Muslim from Aceh.8 This 
participant claimed to feel negative about being Indonesian because of repeated 
experience of failing his scholarship applications to the Indonesian government. He 
stated that this experience made him feel unappreciated by the state. He also cited some 
                                                 
7 Chinese-Indonesians make up 1.2 percent of the Indonesian population. Na’im and Syaputra, 
“Kewarganegaraan, Suku Bangsa, Agama Dan Bahasa Sehari-Hari Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil 
Sensus Penduduk 2010,” 9. 
8 The Acehnese are a local majority ethno-regional group in Aceh, but make up only 1.73 percent 
of the Indonesian population. “Statistik Politik 2016,”  167. 
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trauma from his experience living as a young child in a conflict area during Aceh’s 
separatist era.  
The other laypeople participant who claimed to feel ‘negative’ about their 
Indonesian national identity was Participant J-08, a fifty-five-year-old Chinese-
Indonesian from Jakarta. She stated that despite a relatively comfortable life in Jakarta, 
she was still traumatised by past anti-Chinese sentiments and violence in Jakarta around 
1998.9 In 1998, Participant J-08 had to seek refuge with her family in Semarang until the 
situation in Jakarta calmed down. Due to this experience, she was particularly upset with 
recent developments in Indonesian politics, particularly around the 2017 gubernatorial 
elections in Jakarta which stirred up anti-Chinese sentiments.10 
Similar trends were observed among 16 university student participants who 
claimed to feel negative about their Indonesian national identity. This finding suggests 
that minority groups are more likely to feel negative about their national identity. These 
16 participants were all from minority backgrounds who associated their feeling with 
negative experiences related to their minority status, including exclusion and bullying. 
The challenges of discrimination against minorities in Indonesia and their implications 
for multiculturalism in the country are further discussed in section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Ethno-regional Identities in Indonesia 
In contrast to the primarily civic national identity, participants indicated their ethno-
regional identity to be a primarily ethnic attachment, associated with themes such as 
kinship and family. Among laypeople participants, the theme of kinship was mentioned 
14 times (by 25% of laypeople participants), indicating that ethnic identity provided the 
impression of an extended family.11 For example, participant J-10 stated: 
Batak people have a very high sense of kinship. Even in Jakarta, if you meet 
someone from the same clan as yourself, you feel like they are family. Batak 
                                                 
9 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Singapore: Singapore Press, 
2006), 77-78, 110-15. 
10 Hisanori Kato, “The Challenge to Religious Tolerance: Fundamentalists' Resistance to a 
Non-Muslim Leader in Indonesia,” Comparative Civilizations Review, no. 77 (2017): 79-80. 
11 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 56. 
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people are also very hardworking and dependable. They help you find jobs, 
introduce you to people.  
University student participants similarly associated their ethno-regional identity with the 
themes of kinship and family, which was mentioned 52 times (21.9% of university 
student participants). Participants likened being part of an ethnic group to being part of a 
larger extended family in statements such as these:  
My ethnic group has a very strong sense of kinship and there is nothing 
beyond this keen sense of kinship in the ethnic group. (University Aceh A) 
Because whether or not we realise it, we are of one kin so that we take care 
of each other. (University Maluku A) 
Because wherever and whenever I meet with Batak people, they always care 
of me and we also respect each other. (University Jakarta A) 
Participants added a cultural dimension to their ethno-regional identity, 
associating it with traditions and shared regional history. Participants reported similar 
narratives of history within their respective ethno-regional groups, which in turn 
enhanced ‘feelings of belonging, solidarity, and loyalty’.12 Twelve laypeople participants 
mentioned the theme of shared history in relation to their ethno-regional identity, as did 
twenty university students. Interestingly, participants from various ethno-regional 
backgrounds reported connections between the local history of struggle against 
colonialism with that of Indonesia as a whole, thus providing a link between ethno-
regional and the Indonesian national identity. In Aceh, for example, participants 
described the province as an important part of Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism, 
as well as its role as the port of entry for Islam in the archipelago. In Maluku, meanwhile, 
participants expressed their pride in sharing the same ethno-regional background of 
national heroes such as Captain Pattimura and Martha Christina Tiahahu who fought 
against Dutch colonialists in the early 19th century. These participants then linked their 
local history to that of Indonesia. For instance, Participant M-10 said: 
I do feel proud. Firstly, as a Moluccan and secondly as a Moluccan female. 
When I see Martha Christina’s statue, it inspires me. … It gives me a 
fighting spirit. I may not have to raise arms as she did against colonialists, 
                                                 
12 Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity, 82. 
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but I can continue to improve myself and contribute to development in 
Indonesia. 
Participants further indicated their feeling about their respective ethno-regional 
identity using a Likert scale, with the results presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below: 
Table 5.3: University student participants’ feelings about their ethno-regional 
identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 13 8 33 23 77 
Positive 28 28 21 31 109 
Indifferent 15 22 4 3 44 
Negative 3 2 1 1 7 
Very negative 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.4: Laypeople participants’ feelings about their ethno-regional identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 2 2 4 1 9 
Positive 6 7 6 12 31 
Indifferent 4 5 5 0 14 
Negative 0 2 0 0 2 
Very negative 0 0 0 0 0 
There are some similarities that can be observed in the tables above. Most 
noticeable is how both among university student and laypeople participants, the largest 
portion of participants claimed to feel ‘positive’ about their ethno-regional identity: 109 
out of 237 university students (45.9%) and 31 out of 56 laypeople participants (55.4%). 
This trend was also consistent between the four provinces. Another noticeable similarity 
is that not one single participant claimed to feel ‘very negative’ about their ethno-regional 
identity. 
The variations between the provinces were interesting. Table 5.3 above shows 
that university student participants in Jakarta and West Java were more likely to feel 
‘indifferent’ about their ethno-regional identity compared to those in Aceh and Maluku. 
The latter, in turn, were more likely to feel ‘very positive’ about their ethno-regional 
identity. This finding suggests that participants from more heterogeneous areas in Jakarta 
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and West Java did not attach as much salience to their ethno-regional identity as their 
peers in Aceh and Maluku. In this regard, participants from Jakarta and West Java stated 
that the heterogeneous environment on their campus had enabled a first-hand experience 
with cultural diversity in Indonesia, which in turn led them to believe that ethno-regional 
identities were not particularly salient. However, the diversity in the participants from 
Jakarta and West Java also meant that there were higher numbers of participants from 
minority backgrounds. These participants attributed their indifference to their experience 
with discrimination due to their minority status. Hence, the negative social implications 
of the participants’ minority status affected their feelings about their ethno-regional 
identity. 
Meanwhile, participants from Aceh and Maluku were more homogeneous, with 
most of the participants coming from the local majority group. Therefore, these 
participants were less likely to have negative experiences in relation to their ethno-
regional identity. Furthermore, the higher portion of university student participants who 
claimed to feel ‘very positive’ or ‘positive’ about their ethno-regional identity in Aceh 
and Maluku reflected the participants’ strong sense of pride in their identity. 
Among laypeople participants, the trend is slightly different. The distribution of 
answers is similar in Jakarta, West Java and Aceh; however, in Maluku, all but one 
laypeople participants claimed to feel ‘positive’ about their ethno-regional identity. The 
remaining participant claimed to feel ‘very positive’. The participants’ answers indicated 
that in recovering from the 1999 violent conflict, the population in Maluku have put 
significant effort into ensuring positive intergroup relations in society, which in turn has 
fostered their sense of belonging. In Aceh, meanwhile, participants claimed to be wary 
of overly strong attachments towards their ethno-regional identity because of their 
potential to cause conflict, including separatism. The findings thus suggest that 
depending on the narrative shared among the population, a relatively recent history of 
violent conflict affects people’s sense of belonging towards their ethno-regional group 
differently. 
Aside from the abovementioned variations, laypeople and university student 
participants largely expressed similar reasons for their feelings about their respective 
ethno-regional identity. For instance, participants who claimed to feel ‘very positive’ or 
‘positive’ similarly associated their respective ethno-regional identity with positive traits. 
In total, this theme was mentioned by 19 laypeople participants and 74 university student 
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participants. Participants from similar ethno-regional backgrounds further mentioned the 
same traits for their ethno-regional group, which suggested that their association had been 
socialised widely within the group, sometimes to the extent that their statements 
resembled stereotypes. Among laypeople participants, for example, seven out of eight 
Sundanese participants (87.5%) cited that their ethno-regional group was known for 
being polite and ‘halus’.13 Meanwhile, nine out of twelve Acehnese participants (75%) 
stated that Acehnese people were ‘strongly principled’, sometimes to the extent of being 
‘stubborn’; nevertheless, this trait was seen as a strength and a desirable trait in Aceh. 
University student participants similarly associated their ethno-regional identity with 
perceived positive traits, for example: 
Sundanese people are known to be polite and friendly. (University West 
Java B)  
I believe that Batak people are known for their persistence, stubbornness, 
justice (mostly in legal matters, because most Batak are good at seeing both 
sides of the stories as lawyers or politicians, etc.) They believe in educating 
their children, and sending them off to school is a very important goal in 
their eyes. (University Jakarta A) 
Because the Moluccan ethnic group teaches the values of cooperation and 
helping each other. (University Maluku B) 
The similarities between participants of particular ethno-regional backgrounds 
suggest that even though ethno-regional identity was largely socialised organically, they 
adhered to certain standards and idiosyncrasies. For example, participants claimed to 
have learned their regional language from parents and other family members, as well as 
their immediate environment. Regional traditions and idiosyncrasies were socialised 
similarly. However, participants further claimed that in recent years, they had seen an 
increase in regional mass media which helped increased people’s awareness of regional 
languages and cultures. In addition, the education system took part in introducing ethno-
regional languages through language and art classes, which further standardised the 
participants’ understanding of their identities. In this regard, participants who claimed to 
feel ‘indifferent’ or ‘negative’ about their ethno-regional identity also associated their 
                                                 
13 There is no English word that can entirely capture the meaning of ‘halus’. It can be translated 
into ‘soft’ or ‘delicate’, but it also means ‘refined’ or ‘sophisticated’, considered to be desirable 
traits in West Java. Anderson, Language and Power, 50-51. 
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respective ethno-regional group with the same perceived negative traits, again to the 
extent that their statements resembled stereotypes.  
There were other issues that caused participants to claim feeling ‘indifferent’ 
about their ethno-regional identities. For example, participants mentioned their 
awareness of the potential of conflict in an overly keen ethno-regional identity, which in 
turn led them to downplay their own sense of this aspect of their identity. This statement 
was particularly prevalent among participants in Aceh with its relatively recent separatist 
history. At the same time, participants stated that unfamiliarity with their ethno-regional 
group’s idiosyncrasies caused their indifference. Five laypeople participants claimed that 
due to having grown up away from the area of origin of their ethno-regional group, they 
felt unfamiliar with its idiosyncrasies. This situation shows that a person’s belonging to 
an ethno-regional group is not only a matter of descent, but also a matter of culture and 
that a person’s life experience can alter their perception on the importance of descent.14 
For example, Participant J-04, of Javanese descent, stated that she was born and raised 
in Jakarta, even though both of her parents were Javanese. She primarily used Indonesian 
and only passively understood the Javanese language. She said: 
In my school years, I was a Jakartan kid through and through. Javanese 
traditions and customs seemed so traditional and so different from what I 
am used to in the capital. 
Similarly, for example, some university student participants gave the following 
statements: 
I do not know much about the ways of my ethnic group. I was born and raised 
in Jakarta and only visit my grandparents in Central Java annually. 
(University Jakarta A) 
I moved around a lot while growing up. I do not feel anything significant 
about my ethnic group. (University Jakarta B) 
Among laypeople participants, there were five who claimed to feel equally 
indifferent about their Indonesian and ethno-regional identity. Among university student 
participants, there were 27 (11.4%) who were similarly indifferent about their national 
and ethno-regional identities. These participants mentioned a common theme: they did 
                                                 
14 Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity, 88-90. 
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not perceive identity labels as particularly important, and avoided over-attachment to any 
particular aspect of their selves. Among these participants, one displayed a particularly 
sophisticated understanding of identity. He stated that his indifference was due to the 
interchangeability of the most important aspect of his identity, depending on the context, 
echoing self-categorisation theories of identity:15 
If I were chatting with someone from Bandung, I would say I’m from 
Cimahi.16 But if I met someone from Jakarta, I would say Bandung, as there 
is a common Sundanese heritage. But if I were talking with someone from 
another country, well, I would surely say Indonesian.  
There was one more factor that caused university student participants in particular 
to claim feeling ‘indifferent’ about their ethno-regional identity: an ethnically mixed 
parentage. For instance, there were six laypeople participants and 12 university student 
participants who identified as ‘ethnically mixed’. These participants’ ethnically mixed 
parentage implied several situations. Six participants, for example, preferred to describe 
themselves just as ‘Indonesians’ compared to using compound nouns for their ethno-
regional identity. Four participants stated that they did not feel a strong attachment to the 
ethno-regional backgrounds of their parents, feeling that they did not really belong in 
either group. For example, a participant from University West Java B stated: 
My parents are from different ethnic groups and [my ethno-regional identity] 
does not matter in my day-to-day life. 
Meanwhile, almost all participants who claimed to feel ‘negative’ about their 
ethno-regional identity came from minority groups. Their statements indicated that the 
negative social implications of their minority status affected their feeling about their 
ethno-regional identity. Chinese-Indonesian participants were even more vulnerable 
because of their position as a minority within minorities. There were two university 
student participants who claimed to feel ‘negative’ about their ethno-regional identity 
because they thought that strong attachments to their ethno-regional group had been the 
source of past conflicts. In this regard, they wanted to distance themselves from this 
                                                 
15 S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Katherine J. Reynolds, “Identity, Influence, 
and Change: Rediscovering John Turner's Vision for Social Psychology,” The British Journal 
of Social Psychology 51, no. 2 (2012): 206-07. 
16 Cimahi is a regency neighbouring Bandung, usually considered a suburb of the latter. 
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tendency towards over-attachment and preferred to focus on their Indonesian national 
identity.  
 
5.3 The Relationship between National Identity and Ethno-regional Identities 
The prevalent narrative linking the Indonesian national identity with various ethno-
regional identities has led participants to consider their respective ethno-regional 
identities to be part of a larger Indonesian nation even though there were no significant 
differences in their feelings about these two dimensions of identity. The survey results, 
as shown in Tables 5.1 to 5.4, indicate that participants’ feelings about their national and 
ethno-regional identities are fairly similar, with the only noticeable difference being that 
more university student participants felt ‘very positive’ about their ethno-regional 
identity compared to their national identity. However, participants consistently described 
their ethno-regional group as sub-nations of the Indonesian nation, for example:  
The ethnic group is merely a sub-nationality, national identity should be 
stronger. (University Aceh A) 
Whatever the ethnic group, we remain one Indonesia. (University West Java 
B)  
This ethnic identity is merely something I was born into. Beyond this, I have 
stronger ties to a united Indonesia. (University West Java A) 
The numbers in Tables 5.2 and 5.4 meanwhile suggest that, among laypeople 
participants, people had similar feelings about their national and ethno-regional 
identities. Hence, it is possible for people to feel equally positive about their national and 
ethno-regional identities concurrently. On their own, the numbers do not give more 
details about the relationship between the Indonesian national identity and ethno-regional 
identities; however, the way laypeople participants described this relationship revealed a 
similar narrative to that described by the participants above. 
Within this narrative of Indonesia as a large nation consisting of various ethno-
regional sub-nations, laypeople participants perceived their national identity as more 
salient than their ethno-regional identities. For example, participants stated: 
I feel positive about being Ambonese. But, I am Indonesian first. I do love 
Maluku, yes, I love Ambon. The strength of this feeling is almost equal to 
my love for Indonesia. (Participant M-01) 
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It does not matter so much what ethnic group I am from. I am Indonesian 
first. (Participant J-12) 
There were further indications that participants considered their Indonesian 
national identity to be more salient than their ethno-regional identity. Seven out of 14 
laypeople participants (50%) who claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about their ethno-regional 
identity stated that their Indonesian identity was more important than their ethnic group. 
Five out of these 14 participants (35.7%) explicitly stated that their indifference towards 
their ethno-regional identity was due to their mixed parentage. Statements given by these 
participants further indicated that the socialisation of identities through their parents 
significantly contributed to their stronger identification with the Indonesian identity. For 
instance, participants with an ethnically mixed parentage stated that their parents 
communicated with each other and with them mainly in Indonesian to circumvent their 
difference in regional languages. This prevalent use of the national language made them 
feel first and foremost Indonesian.  
The findings further suggest that people in heterogeneous areas like Jakarta and 
Bandung, West Java’s capital, are more likely to communicate using the national 
language. Among laypeople participants, 29 (51.8%) claimed to use Indonesian more 
than their respective regional languages. For instance, in Jakarta, nine out of 12 
participants (75%) claimed to primarily use Indonesian daily. In West Java, it was ten 
out of 16 participants (62.5%). In Aceh, meanwhile, it was eight out of 15 participants 
(53.3%), suggesting a wider preference for the Acehnese regional language within the 
province’s more homogeneous setting. Nevertheless, the majority of participants from 
Aceh claimed to use Indonesian more than the Acehnese language.  
Maluku was the exception here, with only two out of 13 participants (15.4%) 
claiming to primarily use Indonesian. Maluku’s population is more homogeneous than 
Jakarta’s, which helps explain the prevalence of local languages. However, the finding 
in Aceh suggests that homogeneity does not necessarily cause such a predominant 
preference for the regional language. Thus, there is another explanation for Maluku. Even 
though 84.6% of participants claimed to use the regional language more than the national 
language, the colloquial regional language of Maluku itself was already quite similar to 
Indonesian. The local language uses many words that are simpler, shorter versions of 
Indonesian words, with the addition of local terminologies, honorifics, and accent. 
During the fieldwork in Ambon, for instance, I found it very straightforward to follow 
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the conversations of locals. Local languages like Sundanese and Acehnese, however, are 
linguistically more distinct from Indonesian. Six participants in Maluku called the 
language they used most ‘bahasa sehari-hari’ (daily/colloquial language) and called 
Indonesian ‘bahasa resmi’ (formal/official language).17 The similarities between the 
local colloquial language in Maluku and Indonesian suggested that the latter was more 
prevalent than the participants realised. 
Furthermore, all laypeople participants claimed to use Indonesian in formal 
situations and between different ethno-regional groups. While 27 out of 56 participants 
(48.2%) claimed to use their regional language more than Indonesian in informal 
situations, they claimed to be ready to switch their language if they realised they were 
talking to someone from a different region. This situation was certainly reflected in the 
participants’ readiness and willingness to be interviewed in Indonesian. For example, 
participants gave the following statements: 
I think I speak mostly in Indonesian. At work, I always use Indonesian 
unless I am speaking privately to friends who are also Batak. At home, I 
speak the Batak language with my wife, but less so with my children. 
They speak Indonesian all the time. Well, after all, they grew up in 
Jakarta, not like me. With school friends, they only speak in Indonesian. 
It’s different in Medan, even though television is using Indonesian. But 
yes, now that I think about it, now I speak Indonesian more than Batak. 
Must have been since I moved to Jakarta. (Participant J-10, Batak) 
[I speak] mostly Acehnese. All my friends, my boss, are from around 
here. I only seldom speak Indonesian, like right now, with you. But I 
remember going on vacation around Java in 2016. Yes, with my family. 
I remember I was happy because I could communicate with everyone 
using Indonesian. It’s times like that when you feel like a true Indonesian. 
(Participant A-07, Acehnese) 
                                                 
17 Sneddon, The Indonesian Language, 121. The distinction of colloquial and formal language is 
called diglossia, defined as a situation where there is codified superposed variety of a language 
used for formal communication different from the language used in daily conversations. For 
example, ‘I want to meet you’ in the formal form is ‘saya ingin bertemu anda’ and in one variation 
of the colloquial form is ‘aku pingin ketemu kamu’. There are variations in forms of address, as 
well as in the prefixes and suffixes, but the core of the verbs remain. 
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University student participants indicated a similar preference for Indonesian, 
particularly for formal situations, as shown in Table 5.5 below. In comparison to 
laypeople participants, the numbers suggest that the younger generation were more likely 
to primarily communicate using the national language. In the questionnaire, participants 
were able to freely write what languages they used, in any combination. Thus, some 
participants indicated that they mixed languages in various situations, including foreign 
languages, as shown in the table below. 
















At home 99 49 2 53 10 
On campus 153 3 10 20 27 
With friends 120 14 0 52 27 
On social 
media 
112 3 19 17 62 
The table shows that whether at home, on campus, with friends, or on social 
media, a considerable majority of the university student participants used mostly 
Indonesian to communicate. Only 49 participants (20.7%) claimed to primarily use their 
regional language at home while 53 (22.4%) claimed to use a mixture of the national and 
regional languages at home. Furthermore, only three participants (1.3%) claimed to 
primarily use their regional language on campus. These three participants were all from 
Maluku, showing consistency with how 11 out of 13 (84.6%) laypeople participants from 
Maluku claimed to primarily use their regional language. The findings on the language 
use of university student participants are consistent with the findings of Tjipta Sari et al., 
who in 2018 studied the usage of national and regional languages by adolescents across 
four ethnic groups in Indonesia and found the participants to be more proficient in 
Indonesian compared to their respective regional languages.18 
The usage of Indonesian was most prevalent on campus, which reaffirmed its 
preferred usage in public and formal settings. Indonesian was the compulsory language 
                                                 
18 Betty Tjipta Sari et al., “Contextualized Bilingualism among Adolescents from Four 
Different Ethnic Groups in Indonesia,” International Journal of Bilingualism  (2018): 12. 
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of instruction in most universities in this study, barring University Jakarta A which held 
lectures in English; however, participants’ use of the language on campus included 
communication among peers outside classroom settings. Among these university student 
participants, furthermore, the use of Indonesian was even more prevalent than regional 
languages even in private settings. Participants claimed to only use regional languages 
with friends from a similar ethno-regional background as themselves. Otherwise, 
Indonesian was the preferred language. Their choice of language thus reinforced the 
shared identity between the participants of a conversation, whether ethno-regional 
identity among speakers of similar ethno-regional backgrounds or the Indonesian 
national identity among diverse ethno-regional backgrounds. 
Participants did not only use Indonesian to be understood by others, but also 
because they were proud to use the national language. They said that it made them feel 
like they were a part of something bigger, and they particularly felt Indonesian when they 
were able to communicate with people from different regions using Indonesian. For 
example, in one focus group a participant from University Aceh B said: 
Yes, we like to use Indonesian on campus. We know that most students know 
Acehnese, but in groups, there are sometimes students from elsewhere. So 
we, err, we want everyone to, err, be able to take part in the conversations. 
This statement was followed by another participant who said: 
It makes us proud, Miss. It shows that we are all Indonesians. And we can 
communicate with, with, you know, people from all over the country. 
Similar to the statements above, students in more homogeneous regions such as 
Aceh and Maluku stated in the focus groups that they were proud to use Indonesian in 
public and while they were on campus they were aware of students from other regions. 
This situation was directly observable on the campuses of Universities Aceh A and B, 
where students were heard conversing around campus using Indonesian. Vendors of food 
and beverages on campus were ready to communicate with customers using Indonesian, 
even though they would respond in kind if someone spoke Acehnese with them. The 
situation was similar on the campuses of universities Maluku A and B where campus 
staff were seen communicating with students using Indonesian. 
The desire to be understood was consistently shown to be the primary reason 
participants’ preferred to use certain languages in a given situation, including when they 
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preferred to use foreign languages. Sixty-two participants (26.1%) claimed to use a 
mixture of Indonesian and foreign languages on social media. Participants explained that 
their usage of foreign languages (mainly English) was because they believed to have a 
more global audience on social media and wanted to be understood by this audience. 
Nineteen participants (8%) claimed to primarily use English on their social media; in 
addition, ten participants (4.2%) stated that they mostly used a foreign language and 27 
(11.4%) claimed to primarily use Indonesian mixed with a foreign language on campus. 
These were almost exclusively students from University Jakarta A. This university had a 
significant number of international students, making up about ten percent of its student 
body. As such, the university uses English as its primary language of instruction, which 
in turn explained the prevalence use of foreign languages on campus in comparison to 
other universities in this research.19 
Clothing is another ubiquitous display of people’s identity. People can don 
national clothing to declare their membership to a nation.20 Participants in this research, 
for instance, displayed the higher salience of the Indonesian national identity compared 
to ethno-regional identities through their choice of clothing for formal events. In the 
questionnaires, university student participants were asked to indicate what type of 
clothing they would wear to an event with a dress code of ‘traditional clothing’. Across 
Indonesia, each region has its own traditional costume, but in 2009 batik was recognised 
as an Indonesian national heritage by UNESCO.21 It is not unusual for invitations to 
formal events to indicate a dress code as ‘national clothing’ or ‘traditional clothing’. In 
this research, batik was the participants’ overall top choice, signalling a preference to 
display national identity over ethno-regional identity, as claimed by 93 out of 237 
participants (39.2%). While this number is not an absolute majority, it still far outweighed 
the next contender, the kebaya, a traditional blouse from Central Java, which was chosen 
by 36 participants (15.2%).  
The kebaya, while historically hailing from Central Java, has been popularised 
throughout the country as the attire of choice for Indonesia’s first ladies throughout 
different presidencies, as all but one of Indonesia’s presidents to the present day have 
                                                 
19 International students were excluded from participating in this research; thus, the results 
shown here were obtained only from Indonesian citizens. 
20 Marzel, Dress and Ideology Fashioning Identity from Antiquity to the Present, 4-6. 




been of Javanese descent.22 Variations of the kebaya can be found among others in West 
Java (kebaya Sunda) and Bali (kebaya Bali), as well as among the Betawi (kebaya nona) 
and Chinese-Indonesians (kebaya encim). Therefore, despite being a more female-
specific attire, the kebaya could have been chosen by more participants from beyond 
Central Java. With regard to batik, some of the participants’ preference for batik must be 
attributed to the practicality of the batik cloth, which is mostly not gender-specific, can 
be tailored into various types of clothing and is thus less elaborate and easier to wear 
compared to traditional regional costumes.  
There were variations across regions with regard to the participants’ preference 
for the batik. The highest number of participants who chose batik was found in Jakarta 
with 30 out of 60 participants (50%), then in West Java with 28 out of 60 participants 
(46.6%) and in Aceh with 20 out of 59 participants (33.9%). It was only in Maluku that 
batik was outnumbered by traditional Moluccan costume, with 24 out of 58 participants 
(41.4%) opting for the latter and only 15 for batik (25.9%). Fifteen out of 58 participants 
is, however, still a significant number. Furthermore, a high number of participants from 
Maluku claimed to feel ‘very positive’ (22 out of 58/37.9%) and ‘positive’ (28 out of 
58/48.3%) about being Indonesian. Therefore, the higher preference for the Moluccan 
regional costume does not necessarily translate into a weak Indonesian national identity. 
The participants’ perception of the importance of ethno-regional identity was 
further indicated by their statements on their preferences for candidates running for 
office. In present-day Indonesia, mayors, regents and governors are directly elected by 
the population, and the data collection for this research in 2018 coincided with the year 
for regional elections. Laypeople participants were asked to describe their vision of an 
ideal regional leader for whom they would vote. All participants stated that for a regional 
leader, their leadership abilities and track record were more important than their ethnic 
background. For the most part, local candidates are more likely to run in regional 
elections anyway, but none of the participants insisted that a candidate had to be a local. 
From the tone of their statements, it was apparent that participants implied that ethno-
regional identity should take a backseat to the candidates’ actual capabilities. For 
example, Participant A-05, an Acehnese, said: 
                                                 
22 Suciati, “Visual Effects of the First Ladies' Kebaya Clothing on the Image of Indonesian 




A candidate has to have the knowledge, and not just theoretical knowledge, 
but also real-life experience. They have to be a leader and know about 
leadership, and do not seek power for their own advantage. […] I do look at 
their background. But ethnic group or religion, those things don’t determine 
their capability. 
Ethno-regional identity is also expected to take a backseat for people working for 
the Indonesian government, as evident in a statement provided by Azis Nurwahyudi, 
Director for Public Diplomacy at Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
When someone becomes a diplomat at the Foreign Ministry, they are not a 
diplomat of their ethnic group, they become a diplomat of Indonesia… They 
cannot be, for instance, a Javanese diplomat. Take myself as an example, 
even though I come from Java, but since I became a diplomat and was 
dispatched abroad, the mind-set has to be about being a representative of the 
Indonesian nation.23 
This statement reflects how identity is multi-layered and that certain aspects of identity 
come to the foreground depending on specific contexts. In this regard, national identity 
is expected to be more dominant than ethno-regional identities within the context of a 
profession, as government employees are supposed to represent the entirety of the 
country. The expectation to subordinate ethno-regional identities to the national identity 
implies that the latter is the overarching identity. 
While the findings indicated that the Indonesian national identity prevails over 
ethno-regional identities, it was particularly interesting to further investigate to what 
extent this was the case in Aceh and Maluku in relation to their history of separatism. 
The findings indicated that the participants’ awareness of these issues contributed to them 
declaring the importance of the Indonesian national identity, especially in preventing 
future conflicts. In the questionnaires, university student participants indicated the 
strength of their attachment towards Indonesia using a Likert scale. As shown in Table 
5.6 below, 96 participants (40.5%) stated their attachment to Indonesia to be ‘very strong’ 
and 98 participants (41.4%) chose ‘strong’. Thirty-eight participants (16.1%) chose 
                                                 
23 Nurwahyudi, interview by Sidi. 
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‘indifferent’, 4 participants (1.7%) chose ‘weak’ and 1 participant (0.4%) chose ‘very 
weak’.  
Table 5.6: University student participants’ strength of attachment towards Indonesia 
Sense of 
Attachment 
Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very strong 22 9 27 37 96 
Strong 26 33 21 18 98 
Indifferent 10 15 10 3 38 
Weak 2 2 0 0 4 
Very weak 0 1 0 0 1 
Noticeably more participants in Aceh and Maluku claimed to have ‘very strong’ 
attachments towards Indonesia than participants in Jakarta and West Java. In Maluku, 37 
out of 58 participants (63.8%) claimed a ‘very strong’ sense of attachment, and in Aceh 
27 out of 59 participants (45.8%) claimed the same. In comparison, only 22 out of 60 
participants (36.6%)  in Jakarta claimed a ‘very strong’ sense of attachment, and only 9 
out of 60 participants (15%) in West Java did so. The stronger sense of attachment to the 
state in Aceh and Maluku corresponded with the more positive feelings that local 
participants claimed about their national identity compared to participants from Jakarta 
and West Java, as shown in Table 5.1. Thus, instead of displaying a weaker sense of 
national identity, participants from Aceh and Maluku did the opposite. 
In this regard, there was a unique feature about university student participants 
from Maluku: 22 out of 58 participants (37.9%) in Maluku claimed their ethnic group to 
be ‘Indonesian’ instead of a specific local ethnicity, far exceeding participants from other 
regions in this research project. In Jakarta, only five students (8.3%) claimed their ethnic 
group to be Indonesian. There were seven in West Java (11.6%) and eleven (18.6%) in 
Aceh. It is possible that Maluku’s history of separatism combined with a prolonged 
violent interreligious conflict in 199924 has led to a greater emphasis on unity and a 
common Indonesian identity within the local population of Maluku. Unfortunately, this 
finding did not emerge until the fieldwork had been concluded, and further follow-up 
with participants was not possible to examine what caused the prevalence of the 
Indonesian identity in Maluku. However, previous research argues that past local peace-
                                                 
24 Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia, 88-106. 
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building efforts have shifted people’s focus from differentiating factors to unifying 
factors within society in Maluku, which helps explain their preference to declare their 
ethno-regional identity as ‘Indonesian’.25  
In Aceh, meanwhile, the participants’ strong attachments to Indonesia can be 
attributed to narratives that purposefully align the interpretation of the Indonesian 
national identity with local ideals. For instance, in line with the strong Islamic influence 
in Aceh, Acehnese participants who claimed having a ‘very strong’ or ‘strong’ sense of 
attachment towards Indonesia attributed their feeling to the country’s Muslim-majority 
population and its accommodation of Islamic practices. This theme did not occur in other 
provinces. For example, a participant from University Aceh A claiming to have a very 
strong attachment to Indonesia wrote: 
Indonesia has a good religion, namely Islam. Islam is a very strong religion 
and Islam is very beautiful for Indonesia. 
This statement suggests that despite having a localised understanding of an ideal national 
identity, participants nevertheless displayed significant identification with Indonesia. 
Furthermore, participants stated their contentment with the ongoing development in 
Aceh. For example: 
In the last few years, Aceh has developed a lot. The government… The 
central and regional ones, both, I think, have pushed this development. You 
see it yourself, right, Miss? The roads are nicely paved, infrastructure is 
getting better. 
The answers provided by laypeople and university student participants in Aceh 
regarding their Indonesian national identity challenged the opinion of former Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement/GAM) members who claimed that there was still 
significant discontent with Indonesia in the province. For instance, Munawar Liza Zainal, 
a former high-ranking member of GAM, claimed that there were still problematic aspects 
of the current governance which could potentially lower Aceh’s trust in the Indonesian 
government.26 Similarly, Bakhtiar Abdullah, the former spokesperson of GAM, 
expressed his dismay with the way the peace settlement between Indonesia and GAM 
                                                 
25 Christopher R. Duncan, “Reconciliation and Revitalization: The Resurgence of Tradition in 
Postconflict Tobelo, North Maluku, Eastern Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 4 
(2009): 1077-78. 
26 Zainal, interview by Sidi. 
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had been implemented and claimed that there was a continued discontent among the 
population.27  
The discrepancy between the opinion of the former GAM members and the 
opinion of laypeople and student participants indicated a shifting narrative on the relation 
between Aceh and the rest of Indonesia. Kemal Pasha, an anthropologist from Universitas 
Malikussaleh, stated that there used to be local narratives in which Indonesia was 
portrayed as an enemy of Aceh. However, this narrative was becoming less popular in 
the present. He said: 
At some point in the past, Indonesia was seen as the oppressor. In the past, 
the juxtaposition, particularly between the Indonesian army and the Free 
Aceh Movement, was quite strong. But what I observe, particularly in the 
last five years or so, this is taking a step back. For example, the pride in the 
Acehnese identity channelled through various expressions or dictions of the 
Free Aceh Movements, whose leaders have since become governors or 
regents, has lessened as these figureheads fail in providing the welfare that 
they promised. […] This has led the people to see that the cultivated pride 
in Acehnese identity was more of a political move so that they do not view 
Indonesia as a social other anymore. I even believe that if a referendum were 
to be held today, people would not vote for Aceh to separate from 
Indonesia.28 
The discrepancy between these former GAM members and the other participants 
was also caused by a generational gap, particularly when thinking about university 
student participants. The university student participants were young adults aged between 
18 and 24 years old, while both Abdullah and Zainal were of advanced age. In addition, 
the student participants were likely to have experienced their Indonesian national identity 
in a more organic way than older generations, in addition to their education and the mass 
media. There were indeed aspects of the present Indonesian state that the university 
student participants were discontented with, such as issues of corruption. However, their 
discontentment did not lead as far as a disassociation from the state. This situation also 
applied to older laypeople participants from Aceh; eleven out of 15 laypeople participants 
                                                 
27 Abdullah, interview by Sidi. 
28 Pasha, interview by Sidi. 
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(73.3%) in Aceh were Acehnese, and seven out of them (46.7%) claimed to feel ‘positive’ 
about their Indonesian identity. There were no indications from participants of any 
willingness to undergo another separatist movement, as their immediate safety and 
economic stability were more important than ethno-regional sentiments. 
 
5.4 Ethno-regional Identity in Interpersonal Relationships 
The participants’ attitude towards ethno-regional differences in interpersonal 
relationships further indicated the relatively low salience of ethno-regional identities in 
Indonesia. For instance, ethnically-mixed courtship and marriages were widely accepted 
among participants in accordance with Indonesia’s marriage laws, which have always 
accommodated ethnically-mixed marriages.29 The participants’ acceptance of ethnically-
mixed marriages, however, was more prevalent among younger laypeople participants, 
which suggests that there is an intergenerational shift in the people’s attitude. This shift 
in attitude was reflected in the laypeople participants’ own marriages. Out of 56 
laypeople participants, 28 (50%) were married. Out of these 28, nine participants were 
married to someone from a different ethnic group than themselves, making up almost a 
third of all married participants (32.1%). As a comparison, only five out of 56 participants 
(9%) were born out of ethnically-mixed marriages, indicating that there were less mixed 
marriages in the generation before them. 
Older laypeople participants were more likely to be married to partners from their 
own ethno-regional group. As ethnically-mixed marriages were not as common for the 
older generation, ten younger laypeople participants reported having had older relatives 
display their objection to an ethnically-mixed courtship. The objection was usually tied 
to a negative stereotype attached to the other ethno-regional group in the relationship. 
Four other participants shared that their parents had explicitly stated that they would 
prefer them to marry within the same ethno-regional group. Two participants who were 
in an ethnically-mixed marriage stated that they faced initial objections from parents 
before finally securing their consent. Here are some statements from these younger 
participants: 
                                                 
29 “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 Tentang Perkawinan.” 
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My mother said I could be with anyone from any ethnic group […] but 
then I had this ex-boyfriend from a different ethnic group, from 
Palembang. […] With this guy from Palembang, people told me, 
especially my parents, ‘Are you sure about him? Sure?’ In the end, we 
didn’t end up together, my parents kept saying people from Palembang 
were stingy and harsh, unlike the gentleness of the Sundanese or 
Javanese. (Participant WJ-16, Sunda-Javanese) 
In this day and age, I do not feel like, what do you call it, there is a thing 
like ethnic hierarchy in Indonesia. My parents used to talk about it. I think 
we should not pay attention to such a hierarchy anymore, the most important 
thing is how the two families can, what now, can communicate well. 
(Participant WJ-09, Javanese) 
My wife is Acehnese. I think my parents would have liked to have a Batak 
daughter-in-law, you know, because of traditions, but for me, the [difference 
in] ethnic group should not be a problem. And we married in the end. Yes, 
my parents gave their consent. (Participant A-01) 
Aside from the generational factor, ethno-regional identity was still salient in 
relation to Kymlicka’s differentiation between ‘national minorities’ and ‘ethnic 
immigrant groups’.30  For instance, Chinese-Indonesians are a minority group without 
their own delineated territory. As such, they were more likely to experience social 
othering than ethno-regional groups considered indigenous to Indonesia. This othering 
was detected in the scarcity of marriages between Chinese-Indonesians and other ethno-
regional groups. Among participants, all married Chinese-Indonesians had a spouse from 
their own ethnic background. Out of 56 laypeople participants, only Participant WJ-15 
reported having a Chinese-Indonesian mother and a Sundanese father. This participant 
stated that he thought his family was rather unique due to its diversity when compared to 
most families that he knew.  
Information gathered from university student participants indicated that 
differences in ethno-regional identity are becoming less salient as a marker for difference 
for younger generations. In the questionnaires, university student participants indicated 
whether there was any ethno-regional diversity in their family, including their 
                                                 
30 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 11, 17. 
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grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles, first cousins and in-laws: 116 stated that their 
families were homogeneous (48.9%), while 107 participants declared varying degrees of 
ethno-regional diversity (45.1%). Participants who reported ethno-regional diversity in 
their families then described their feelings about it, and not a single participant expressed 
any kind of discontent. Ethno-regional diversity in families was thus considered 
acceptable, even normal.  
University student participants then indicated whether they had had a romantic 
relationship with someone from a different ethno-regional group than themselves, and 
their responses showed a similar acceptance for ethnically-mixed courtship. Out of 237 
participants, 62 (26.2%) stated that they were or had previously been in a romantic 
relationship with someone from a different ethno-regional background than themselves. 
Out of these 62, only two stated that they had encountered a negative reaction to their 
relationship from their social environment. Five participants claimed to have encountered 
indifference. Seventeen participants reported positive reactions, and nine participants 
even claimed to have encountered very positive reactions to their relationship. These 
reported reactions further indicated the increasing acceptability of interethnic romantic 
relationships, including their potential development into marriages. These reported 
reactions were more telling than the sheer number of participants who reported having 
had interethnic romantic relationships, as 62 does not represent a majority out of 237 
participants. However, it has to be taken into account that some participants might not 
have been in any romantic relationship at all. 
Differences in ethno-regional identity is even less salient in the formation of 
friendships. For example, 156 university student participants (65.8%) claimed to have 
close friends from ethno-regional groups different than themselves. In addition, all 
participants welcomed ethno-regional diversity in their circle of friends and peers on 
campus. Participants thought they benefitted from ethno-regional diversity among their 
friends, encouraged by the diversity they experienced on campus, as evident in their 
statements:  
It’s good that people from all across the country come and study at this 
university. This enabled me to experience Indonesia’s diversity first hand 




 My campus gives me a lot of experience with friends from a diversity of 
ethnic groups and cultures, it provides a good lesson for me. (University 
Maluku A) 
 At [University Jakarta B] there are so many other ethnic groups. So I am 
happy to get to know the cultures of other ethnic groups. And for the first 
time, I am personally experiencing Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in 
Diversity). (University Jakarta B) 
 Indeed, 214 out of 237 participants (90.3%) gave positive comments about the 
ethno-regional diversity on their campuses. They described their campuses not just as a 
place to study and attain a university degree, but also to get to know people from different 
parts of Indonesia who had come to the university.  This situation reiterates the 
importance of education as a means to introduce multiculturalism.31 Furthermore, the 
students’ interaction with peers from diverse ethno-regional backgrounds enabled real-
life experiences with diversity, which as Kymlicka argues is more important than 
learning about diversity and multiculturalism in theory.32 
In this regard, a previous study has produced results which correspond with this 
research, indicating that young people living in urban areas are more likely to interact 
with and have friends from diverse backgrounds when compared to the rural 
population.33 This tendency does not necessarily mean that the urban population are 
friendlier than the rural population, but indicates that the former have more opportunities 
to interact within a heterogeneous community.34 
 
5.5 Issues with Ethno-regional Diversity 
Despite the relatively low salience of ethno-regional identity as a marker for difference, 
some issues remain with the existence of lingering prejudices and unaddressed 
grievances between various ethno-regional groups in Indonesia. Among university 
student participants, indications of tensions below the surface appeared in discussions 
about ethno-regional diversity among peers. While 214 participants (90.3%) commended 
                                                 
31 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, 236. 
32 Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 293. 
33 Parker, Hoon, and Raihani, “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic and Inter-
Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia,” 477. 
34 Ibid., 474. 
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diversity on their campuses, 23 participants (9.7%) wished for more inclusivity, citing 
prejudice and reporting varying degrees of separation between various ethno-regional 
groups, as well as between them and Chinese-Indonesians. For example: 
 There is mutual appreciation and no real discrimination. But there are 
certain ethnic groups or ethnicities that tend to mingle exclusively among 
themselves, usually Chinese people, but not all of them. (University West 
Java B) 
 There are still groups who refuse to make friends or acknowledge relatives 
who come from kampongs/small villages. So on campus, there is still a lack 
of unity and kinship. (University Maluku B) 
Some observations during the fieldwork further indicated existing prejudices 
within society. For example, while riding on an angkot35 in Ambon, I observed an older 
female who could not get enough space to sit comfortably because another female took 
up a lot of space. The latter would not shift to accommodate the former. The older female 
did not say anything for a while and sat in silence, but as soon as the younger female 
alighted, the former started cursing and loudly stated in an unsavoury tone that the other 
woman must have been a Butonese to behave that way. The Butonese are an ethnic group 
from Buton, an island located off the southeast peninsula of Sulawesi. They are a local 
minority, make up about 10 percent of Maluku’s population.36 None of the remaining 
passengers did anything to stop her cursing. Her ability to make such problematic 
statements in a public space implied that her attitude was considered permissible and 
reflected wider prejudicial assumptions faced by the Butonese in Ambon.  
The situations described above showed persisting stereotypes and negative 
sentiments that participants did not address or admit to. The situation corresponded with 
the 2016 large-scale study by the Wahid Foundation in 2016 which found that only 0.6 
percent of its participants were determined to be completely accepting of people from 
social groups different than themselves while 49 percent was considered ‘intolerant’.37 
                                                 
35 A minivan repurposed for public transport, with a capacity to transport about ten people at a 
time. 
36 Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta, Indonesia's Population : Ethnicity 
and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003), 155. 
37 “A Measure of the Extent of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism within Muslim 
Society in Indonesia,”  7. 
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The situation also corresponds with a previous study which reports that stereotyping 
towards other ethnicities and religions in Indonesia continues despite positive interethnic 
and interfaith experiences.38 In this regard, the persistence of stereotypes explains the 
regular occurrence of violent incidents relating to identity issues, such as the 601 separate 
incidents in 2014 reported by the Habibie Foundation.39  
The persistence of prejudice was also observed in statements by the laypeople 
participants’ statements which indicated the ubiquity of jokes based on ethno-regional 
stereotypes, even though participants claimed that they did not harbour negative feelings 
towards ethno-regional groups different than themselves. Among laypeople participants, 
28 (50%) shared experiences of having jokes made about their ethno-regional identity, 
including participants from majority backgrounds. Twenty out of these 28 participants 
claimed that the jokes were harmless or of a friendly nature, thus they did not consider 
the jokes as a form of discrimination. For example, Participant A-05, a male Ambonese 
in Maluku, said that he would regularly joke with friends from different ethno-regional 
groups and they would tease each other with existing stereotypes. He did not feel that the 
jokes would offend anyone involved, even though during the interview he reflected on 
whether there was an instance when he had offended someone. The remaining eight 
participants did think the jokes made about them as a form of discrimination, stating that 
the jokes hurt their feelings and they felt malicious. 
Eight further laypeople participants (14.3%) reported having experienced more 
obvious forms of discrimination due do their ethno-regional identity, ranging from casual 
jokes to bullying to institutionalised discrimination. Every instance of discrimination 
took place in situations where the participants were in a minority position. Here are some 
statements from these participants: 
I first felt conscious about ethnic groups during my undergraduate years, 
because I went to university in Java, you know, but as I told you I am from 
Sulawesi, well I went to university in Java, so I mingled with all sorts of 
people. Well, it was then that I felt people were starting to question my 
identity. Back in my village nobody asked where you were from. And then, 
well, yeah, there was, you know … what do you call it … a prejudice, people 
                                                 
38 Parker, Hoon, and Raihani, “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic and Inter-
Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia,” 485. 
39 Abdulrahim et al., “Indeks Intensitas Kekerasan 2015,” 12-17. 
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always thought that, because people always make these assumptions, back 
then, every time I said I was from Sulawesi, people always thought I liked 
to fight, rough, you know. The stigma was there. (Participant WJ-02, 
Mandar) 
I was the only Chinese in the school, so I really felt it… Being called, err, 
‘can’t open her eyes’, or like, ‘ooh, so cocky’, or like, ‘stingy’, you know, 
so differentiating. Every little thing, they would single me out. (Participant 
WJ-13, Chinese-Indonesian)  
Among university student participants, 28 (11.8%) reported that they had 
personally experienced discrimination on account of their minority status. 
Unsurprisingly, those who reported experiencing discrimination were part of minority 
ethno-regional groups, or were in a particular situation where they were the minority, 
such as when travelling to a different region within Indonesia. The instances reported 
included verbal assault, stereotyping and systematic exclusion. For example: 
Two years ago when I was studying in Yogyakarta people always 
commented that Acehnese people were rough and like to use marijuana. 
(University Aceh A) 
I was rejected from joining a group activity because I am not from here 
[Maluku]. I was talked about in public. (University Maluku B) 
When I was looking for a boarding room some landlords refused people 
from certain ethnic groups, including Batak people. (University Jakarta A) 
I was being called Chinese in a derogatory manner, with animal names as 
suffixes. (University West Java B) 
In line with the last abovementioned statement, Chinese-Indonesian participants 
in particular showed that their minority status negatively affected their feeling about their 
identity as Chinese-Indonesians. Out of 56 laypeople participants, the only two claiming 
feeling ‘negative’ about being part of their ethno-regional group were Chinese-
Indonesians. Both participants claimed to feel unsafe due to a recent increase in anti-
Chinese sentiments in Indonesia.40 One participant particularly mentioned that as a 
                                                 
40 Kato, “The Challenge to Religious Tolerance: Fundamentalists' Resistance to a Non-Muslim 
Leader in Indonesia,” 79-80. 
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minority, she experienced constant micro-aggressions from her neighbours and she had 
experienced bullying from fellow students during her school years.  
Furthermore, the negative experiences associated with their status as ethnic 
minorities affected the participants’ feeling about their national identity. There were five 
Chinese-Indonesians among laypeople participants: one from Jakarta, three from West 
Java, and one from Aceh. The aforementioned participant from Jakarta claimed to feel 
‘negative’ about being Indonesian. The three participants from West Java claimed to feel 
‘indifferent’, citing various experiences of discrimination including bullying and name-
calling. The one participant from Aceh claimed to feel ‘positive’ about being Indonesian. 
This participant mentioned that she felt safer and more comfortable living as a minority 
in Banda Aceh compared to what she had heard from other Chinese-Indonesians from 
Jakarta. She stated that contrary to what people might think about living as a Chinese 
woman in Banda Aceh with its highly homogeneous culture, it was a comfortable place 
for her. This statement suggests that the experience of living as an ethno-regional 
minority varies from place to place in Indonesia. Overall, the participants’ experience 
with ethno-regional diversity in Indonesia varied depending on their individual majority 
or minority status and the immediate environment they lived in. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that presently, ethno-regional diversity is largely accepted as an 
inherent part of the Indonesian national identity. The dominant narrative on the 
Indonesian national identity positions various ethno-regional groups as sub-nations of a 
larger nation. Within this narrative, a strong Indonesian national identity can coexist with 
similarly strong ethno-regional identities. Even in Aceh, with its separatist history, 
participants largely expressed positive feelings about their Indonesian identity. The 
coexistence of the Indonesian national identity and people’s diverse ethno-regional 
identities is further enabled by them fulfilling different roles, complementing each other. 
Participants understood their Indonesian national primarily as a civic attachment, 
associating it with their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Furthermore, participants 
defined the Indonesian national identity in civic values such as ‘diversity’, ‘tolerance’ 
and ‘multiculturalism’, indicating that the Indonesian national identity is easier to 
understand in civic terms, which can be more inclusive than ethnic terms. At the same 
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time, there is a cultural dimension to the Indonesian national identity, such as the notion 
of a shared history fighting against colonialism. Meanwhile, participants viewed their 
ethno-regional identity as a primarily ethnic attachment, associated with themes such as 
kinship, family and traditions. However, the distinction between civic and ethnic 
dimensions of identity is not always clear cut. For instance, participants associated the 
themes of birthplace and home, commonly understood as ethnic attachments, with their 
Indonesian national identity. 
The complementarity of national identity and ethno-regional identity was most 
apparent through the participants’ language use. Participants used Indonesian to 
communicate across ethnic groups, particularly in public and formal settings, and used 
regional languages in more private, intimate settings in which participants of the 
conversation were known to share a regional language. Their readiness to use the 
Indonesian language to converse with people from different ethno-regional backgrounds 
than themselves showed a shared sense of belonging to the Indonesian nation. 
Participants’ language use further indicated a potential decline in the salience of ethno-
regional identity along with the increasing number of ethno-regional diversity within 
families. Participants from ethnically mixed families reported a decline in their use of 
regional languages, particularly among the younger generation, and even more so in 
heterogeneous urban settings. The participants’ increasing acceptance of interethnic 
courtship and marriages may further contribute to the decreasing salience of ethno-
regional identities.  
At the same time, even though ethno-regional diversity has been accepted as an 
inherent part of the Indonesian national identity, various challenges pertaining to ethno-
regional diversity remain, such as persisting stereotyping and ongoing discrimination 
between ethno-regional groups, particularly against minorities. There is a gap between 
the narrative of Indonesia as an inherently diverse country and the unaddressed 
grievances between ethno-regional groups. Furthermore, people across Indonesia 
experience and understand diversity in varying manners, resulting in a similarly varied 
actualisation of multiculturalism. There were indications that participants’ understanding 
of diversity and multiculturalism was more perfunctory and superficial than they 
admitted. However, altogether, the narrative of Indonesia as a nation that is ethnically 
diverse is prevalent among all participants and has enabled the coexistence between 
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national identity and various ethno-regional identitis. Ethno-regional identities thus do 
not pose a considerable challenge to overall national unity.
183 
 
6 Religious Identity in Indonesia 
Religion and religious identity are issues that have permeated debates on the Indonesian 
national identity at least since the years around Indonesia’s declaration of independence 
in 1945. Since then, debates on the role of religion within the state, particularly Islam, 
have been central in shaping the political spectrum in Indonesia.1 Contrary to the 
assumption that religion would be on the decline as Indonesia became increasingly 
modernised and secularised, religion continues to significantly influence different 
aspects of life both public and private.2  
Today, Indonesia presents itself as a moderate and tolerant Muslim-majority 
country. Besides Islam, there are five other legally recognised world religions: 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. However, religious 
minorities continue to face various kinds of discrimination. For instance, more than 150 
so-called indigenous faith groups do not get equal recognition from the state, impacting 
the accommodation of their religious and cultural rights. In both the private and public 
realm, religion continues to be a significant marker of difference; for instance, marriage 
laws devised in 1974 continue to inhibit interreligious marriages. 
This chapter contributes to the discussion on the relationship between religious 
and national identities in Indonesia, as well as the conditions pertaining to interfaith 
relations. It argues that in Indonesia, religious identity is more significant than both 
national and ethno-regional identity, as religion is perceived as the people’s primary 
source of spiritual and moral guidance. The data used in this chapter has been obtained 
from one-on-one interviews with 56 laypeople participants across Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku 
and West Java, as well as self-administered questionnaires with 237 university student 
participants across eight universities and focus groups that informed the previous chapter. 
Relevant statements from elite participants are also used to analyse their responses. 
This chapter further argues that religious identity affects people’s decision-
making in various aspects of life, including their political choices and views on statehood. 
With over 87 percent of the Indonesian population being Muslim, political Islamists have 
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continued to push for more legal accommodation for Islam, at times to the extent of 
constitutional status. The salience of religion for people, coupled with Indonesia’s 
inequitable framework for religious diversity, creates an environment that supports the 
continued hardening of religious identities and normalises privileges for the religious 
majority at the expense of minorities. Thus, the state’s attempt to mollify political 
Islamists for the protection of Indonesia’s larger framework for multiculturalism could 
actually challenge the very framework it is trying to protect. 
 
6.1 The Salience of Religious Identity 
Data gathered from participants across Jakarta, West Java, Aceh and Maluku shows the 
salience of religion and religious identity for Indonesia’s population. Firstly, 55 out of 
56 laypeople participants claimed to be religious or to belong to one of the six major 
world religions recognised legally in Indonesia. Out of 237 university student 
participants, 236 declared themselves as religious.  
The distribution of religious affiliation among participants represented the 
religious diversity in the country. Among laypeople participants, 38 were Muslim 
(67.9%), 12 were Protestants of various denominations (21.4%), four were Catholic 
(7.1%) and one was a Buddhist (1.8%); one participant claimed to be spiritual but non-
denominational (1.8%). Among university student participants, 158 were Muslims 
(66.7%), 58 were Protestants of various denominations (24.5%), 13 were Catholic 
(5.5%), five were Buddhists (2.1%) and two were Hindu (0.1%). One participant did not 
indicate any religious affiliation. According to Indonesia’s most recent national census 
in 2010, 87.18 percent of the population are Muslims, while 6.96 percent are Protestants, 
2.91 percent are Catholics, 1.69 percent are Hindus, 0.72 percent are Buddhists, and 0.05 
percent are Confucians.3 In the same census, 0.13 percent claimed to be ‘others’ while 
0.38 percent were unaccounted for.4 The noticeably larger number of Protestants in the 
sample of university student participants compared to the percentage of Indonesia’s 
Protestant population was caused by data collection in Maluku, one of Indonesia’s 
Protestant-majority areas. Unfortunately, due to the snowball-sampling method for 
recruitment, there were no participants from a Confucian background. There were also 
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no laypeople participants from a Hindu background. Otherwise, the sample is a fair 
representation of religious diversity in the country.  
The high number of participants who claimed religious identity as the most 
important aspect of their identity indicates the salience of religious identity in Indonesia. 
Thirty laypeople participants (53.6%) and 134 university student participants (56.5%) 
claimed religion to be the most important aspect of their identity. This finding was 
consistent across the four provinces. Among laypeople participants, eight out of 12 
participants in Jakarta claimed religion to be the most important aspect of their identity 
(66.7%), as did seven out of 16 participants in West Java (43.8%), nine out of 15 
participants in Aceh (60%) and six out of 13 participants in Maluku (46.2%). In 
comparison, overall, only 13 out of 56 laypeople participants (23.2%) claimed national 
identity to be the most important aspect of their identity, and only three (5.4%) claimed 
the same about their ethno-regional identity. The same trend was seen among university 
student participants with 134 participants (56.5%) ranking religion as the most important 
aspect of their identity. The state and nation share the next position, with the ‘state’ 
representing the formal state apparatus of Indonesia and the nation representing the 
Indonesian people. Ethnicity came in at fourth place, while the participants’ area of origin 
is viewed as the least important aspect of their identity, as seen in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Ranking of university student participants’ aspects of identity in order of 
importance (1=most important, 5=least important) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
State 39 69 57 36 27 
Nation 41 80 61 19 27 
Religion 134 18 39 19 18 
Ethnicity 8 38 45 100 37 
Area of origin 6 23 26 54 119 
Participants considered religion and religious identity to be the most personal and 
intrinsic aspect of their selves, seeing religion as a moral compass fundamental in 
distinguishing right from wrong and good from bad. The theme of religion as a moral 
compass was mentioned by 20 laypeople participants (35.7%) as well as 64 university 
student participants (27.0%). Another common theme was the participants’ belief in the 
everlasting nature of religious identity; 14 laypeople participants (25%) and 29 university 
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student participants (12.2%) stated that their religious identity would stay with them 
beyond death. Furthermore, 12 laypeople participants (21.4%) and 25 university student 
participants (10.5%) stated that their religious identity gave them a sense of belonging to 
a religious community that transcended nationalities. Here are some statements from the 
participants: 
Our religion teaches us good and bad, right and wrong. These principles 
would apply whether or not I am Indonesian or whether or not I am 
Acehnese. And after I pass away, only my religion would matter anyway. 
(Participant A-05, Muslim) 
Of course the most important [identity] for me is religion! How can we shed 
our religion? Our religion and deeds will stick with us beyond death. God 
forbid we go to hell. (Participant M-12, Muslim) 
We are part of the Ummah, a community. I was also raised among religious 
people. My grandfather owned a pesantren (Islamic religious school) in the 
past. I was also involved in running it. So for me, Islam is very, very 
positive. I also went to a high school with a religious affiliation. […] 
Religion is the foundation for me to become a better person. (Participant 
WJ-06, Muslim) 
In the focus groups, university student participants repeatedly stated that religion 
was central to their identity. In all focus groups, statements of this nature were met with 
concurrence from other participants through nodding and assenting non-verbal 
expressions. For example, in University Maluku B, a participant said, “Religion is 
important, of course. It teaches us to love one another and to be a good person.” This 
statement was followed by another participant who said, “Yes, and when we practice 
religion or do good things, we are supposed to only hope for divine reward. Our 
behaviour in this life will determine the next.” Fellow participants then nodded in 
agreement. Similarly, in University Aceh B, a participant said, “Religion is very 
important because we will be held accountable for it in the afterlife.” This statement was 
met with a murmur of agreement from fellow participants, indicating a general consensus 
on the salience of religion. In University West Java A, there was one participant who 
stated that he was not religious, but he did not contradict his peers on this matter. This 
agreement showed a widely shared perception of the importance of religion.  
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The salience of religion was further shown through the participants’ feelings 
about their religious identity. Participants indicated their feeling about their religious 
identity using a Likert scale. A majority of participants claimed to feel ‘very positive’ or 
‘positive’ about their religious identity. Among laypeople participants, 16 claimed to feel 
‘very positive’ about their religious identity (28.6%) , 31 claimed to feel ‘positive’ 
(55.4%), eight claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ (14.3%), while only one claimed to feel 
‘negative’ (1.8%), as shown in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2: Laypeople participants’ feelings about their religious identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 4 4 6 2 16 
Positive 5 7 9 10 31 
Indifferent 3 4 0 1 8 
Negative 0 1 0 0 1 
Very negative 0 0 0 0 0 
University student participants provided a similar distribution of answers. Out of 
237 participants, 99 claimed to feel ‘very positive’ (41.8%) and 81 claimed to feel 
‘positive’ (34.2%) about being part of their religious group. 39 claimed to feel 
‘indifferent’ (16.5%) , 14 claimed to feel ‘negative’ (5.9%) and four claimed to feel ‘very 
negative’ (1.7%), as seen in Table 6.3 below: 
Table 6.3: University student participants’ feelings about their religious identity 
Feeling Jakarta West Java Aceh Maluku Total 
Very positive 24 15 34 26 99 
Positive 18 24 15 24 81 
Indifferent 13 16 5 5 39 
Negative 4 3 5 2 14 
Very negative 1 2 0 1 4 
The most noticeable difference between laypeople and university student 
participants was the absence of laypeople participants feeling ‘very negative’ about their 
religious identity. Four university student participants who claimed to feel ‘very 
negative’ about their religious identity expressed their discontent with the potential 
negative impacts of high-strung religious sentiments on interfaith relations. Their opinion 
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suggested that university student participants were more critical than laypeople 
participants about the impact of religious differences within society. 
Besides this difference, however, both groups of participants expressed similar 
themes in relation to their feelings about their religious identity. University student 
participants who claimed ‘very positive’ and ‘positive’ feelings similarly associated their 
feelings with their belief of how their faith provided a fundamental guide for their lives. 
The participants’ line of reasoning confirmed the theory that religion is typically very 
central to an individual’s identity.5 Such statements were not limited to the Muslim 
majority, but were found from participants of various religious groups. The following 
statements, provided respectively by a Muslim, Protestant and Catholic participant, 
demonstrate this point: 
Religion is an important part of my life. Without religion, I do not have a 
life view and faith in God Almighty, religion makes my life regulated, safe 
and planned. (University Jakarta A, Muslim) 
I define myself as Christian, I believe in Christian teachings. I have a strong 
positive feeling towards my faith, my church and my fellow Christian 
brothers and sisters. (University West Java A, Protestant) 
Because my religion leads me to salvation. And for me, God is everything. 
(University Maluku A, Catholic) 
University student participants from the Muslim majority who claimed to feel 
‘very positive’ or ‘positive’ about their religious identity reflected both on the internal 
values of Islam as well as the positive accommodation they received for this aspect of 
their identity. For example: 
My religious group is Islam. Islam is a perfect religion and is tolerant of 
other religions, and Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country. Many 
regulations are accommodating towards Islam and that’s good. (University 
Aceh A) 
Because Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia and other religions can 
accept it well. (University Maluku A) 
                                                 
5 Sande and Zanna, “Cognitive Dissonance Theory,” 65. 
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Maybe it’s because Islam is the biggest majority in Indonesia. It is easy to 
find places to pray, Muslim clothes and halal food. (University Jakarta A) 
Similarly, among laypeople participants, nine Muslim participants mentioned the extent 
of the accommodation provided for them to freely practise their religion, such as the 
availability of houses of worship and the ability to display their faith through clothing 
and ornaments. Three further Muslim participants also mentioned the widespread 
availability of halal food in Indonesia. 
By contrast, participants from minority religions who claimed to feel ‘very 
positive’ or ‘positive’ about their religion were more likely to only reflect on the positive 
internal values of their religion as opposed to the negative socio-political implications of 
their minority status. For example: 
Because our religion teaches us to have love and compassion for each other 
not just within the religion but also our neighbours of other faiths. 
(University Maluku B, Catholic) 
Christianity teaches us how to love others/your neighbours as yourself, to 
be humble, to have a big heart towards everyone but of course it is hard to 
do in practice/on a daily basis. (University Jakarta A, Protestant) 
Buddhism is a religion that teaches universal love and compassion. 
(University West Java B, Buddhist) 
Laypeople participants from minority religions who claimed to feel ‘very 
positive’ and ‘positive’ about their religious identity also typically focused on the internal 
positive traits of their religion. Among laypeople participants, the most commonly 
mentioned theme was the participants’ view of religion being inherently ‘good’, 
mentioned by 13 participants, followed by the participants’ own strong faith, mentioned 
by 11 participants.  
However, in contrast, participants who felt less than ‘positive’ about their 
religious identity typically reflected on the negative social implications of religious 
difference, as opposed to the internal values of religion. Five out of eight participants 
who claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about their religious identity consciously chose not to 
attach much importance to any particular aspect of their identity, be it religious, national 
or ethno-regional identity. These participants claimed to be wary of the negative 
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implications of overzealous attachments towards group identities. For instance, 
Participant J-12, a Muslim, said: 
Yes, I chose ‘indifferent’ for all three [national, ethno-regional and religious 
identities]. I just happen to have been born into these roles, so I don’t want 
to boast about any of them. There are positive and negative aspects of my 
religion, nationality, ethnic group… It’s not that these things don’t mean 
anything to me, but people should not make a big deal out of them. 
Three further participants claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about their religious 
identity, but not about their national and ethno-regional identity. The first one, Participant 
M-13, a Muslim from Maluku, stated that she felt indifferent about her religious identity 
because it did not affect her life in present-day Maluku. Despite a violent religious 
conflict in Maluku in 1999, she stated that nowadays she did not feel any significant 
differences between religions, as she was able to live peacefully in the same 
neighbourhood with people from various religious backgrounds. The second one, 
Participant WJ-02 stated that in being a Shia Muslim, a minority group in Sunni-majority 
Indonesia, it was difficult for him to openly and fully express his religious identity. 
Meanwhile, the third one, Participant WJ-10, a Protestant, claimed his own lack of faith 
as the reason for his feeling. This participant was the only layperson for whom religion 
did not have any particular salience. He said: 
I’m only doing [the religious practices] because it is what I have known 
since birth. It’s just, like, automatic.  
Among university student participants, there were 39 who claimed to feel 
‘indifferent’ about their religious identity (16.5%). Out of these, 21 participants stated 
their belief that all religions taught similar values despite differences in religious 
practices. Here are some samples of the participants’ statements: 
My religion is one of the existing religions in the world and so are others. 
So then I hold my identity dearly but only because it is who I am, not to be 
used to feel superior or putting barriers from the others, so [I chose] 
indifferent. (University Jakarta A, Muslim) 
I do not have any problem with religious differences so for me it is 
indifferent. In the end, all religions want to make us good people. 
(University Jakarta B, Muslim) 
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Whatever the religion, what matters is to be good in life, universally. 
(University West Java B, Buddhist) 
The other sixteen university student participants who claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ 
about their religious identity cited the sensitivity of religious differences and wariness of 
potential interreligious conflicts. They did not want to be overly proud or attached to their 
religion because of its potential socio-political implications, as seen through the 
following statements: 
Religion is of course very important, but over-attachment towards any 
religious group is not a good thing. (University West Java A, Muslim) 
Religion is a paramount issue because it can cause disunity among the 
people. Some say that because Indonesia is Muslim-majority, Islam has to 
come before other religions. For me, we still have to appreciate other 
religions and ethnic groups. (University Aceh A, Muslim) 
Because as we can see in Maluku there was an interreligious conflict but 
since then we have learned our lesson. Now the people of Maluku are a 
tolerant people but there are still remnants of the conflict and religion can 
be a sensitive topic that needs to be handled carefully to avoid conflicts. 
(University Maluku B, Protestant) 
There were two participants who did not put much value on their religious identity 
in itself, and thus had no particularly positive nor negative feelings about it: 
Because I do not care that much about religious identity. (University Jakarta 
B, Muslim) 
There are no special feelings. (University West Java B, Protestant) 
These two last participants were the only ones who stated that religion held no particular 
salience for them; for the other 37 university student participants, it was instead their 
awareness of the contentiousness of religion that made them consciously mitigate their 
attachment to their religious identity. 
The variation between different provinces in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows that 
participants from Jakarta and West Java were more likely to feel ‘indifferent’ about their 
religious identity compared to those from Aceh and Maluku. The participants’ 
explanations about their feeling indicated that a more diverse environment contributed to 
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a richer interaction between religious groups, causing religious identity to become less 
salient, as reflected in a statement from Participant WJ-02, a Muslim: 
Well, in my workplace there are plenty of different ethnicities, also different 
religions. Plenty of Muslims, also plenty of Chinese-Indonesians. Most of 
us interact just fine. It’s all good and we get to know each other. In my 
family also, there are Catholics in my wife’s family, there are Muslims too, 
so the interaction between different people is quite usual to me. 
Meanwhile, the only laypeople participant who claimed to feel ‘negative’ about 
their religious identity was Participant WJ-12, a 24-year-old Protestant from Bandung. 
This participant reflected on the negative social implications of his minority status. He 
stated that his feeling stemmed from his fear of the increased presence of identity politics 
in Indonesia which appealed towards a hard-line approach to Islam. He cited an 
increasing stigmatisation against non-Muslims and an increasing difficulty in interacting 
with some Muslims just on the account of religious differences. 
Similarly, 18 university student participants who claimed to feel ‘negative’ or 
‘very negative’ about their religious identity reflected on the negative socio-political 
implications of religious difference. For example: 
I am not saying that my religion is negative, but there are bad individuals in 
my religious group who are too fanatic and not accompanied by tolerance. 
(University West Java B, Muslim) 
Because religion is such a sensitive matter, just one disagreement can result 
in an interreligious conflict. (University Maluku A, Protestant) 
Because until now religion is still used to divide people. (University Aceh 
B, Protestant) 
 Participants who claimed to feel negative or very negative about their 
religious identity were also more likely to feel indifferent about their national 
identity. For instance, Participant WJ-12 claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ about his 
Indonesian identity and ‘negative’ about his ethno-regional identity. He claimed 
that his indifference to his national identity was partially caused by his negative 
experiences as an adherent of a minority religion. Similarly, among university 
student participants, those who claimed to feel ‘negative’ about their religious 
identity claimed to feel ‘indifferent’ or ‘negative’ about their national identity, 
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connecting the accommodation of their religious identity to their overall feeling 
about being Indonesian citizens. 
 
6.2 Religious Identity and Politics 
The participants’ statements indicated that religion and religious identity had significant 
socio-political implications. As a Muslim-majority country, Islam has a particular 
influence on Indonesian politics with debates circulating around the ideal relation 
between the state and Islam. In particular, there are debates on the extent to which Islam 
should be incorporated into the state. Laypeople participants provided statements 
relevant to this debate. For example: 
To me, the most important thing is religion. I was taught that religion should 
be the foundation of everything. From what I heard, even the Pancasila is 
based on religion, right? The first principle does say to believe in God before 
everything else. (Participant WJ-08, Muslim) 
The most important identity of all is a religious Indonesia. Indonesia with a 
religious character. […]  Yes, probably, for us, looking at the Indonesian 
culture, many Indonesian cultures have a religious aspect to it. (Participant 
A-01, Muslim) 
These statements, both provided by Muslim participants, indicated their belief in the 
inseparability of the state from Islam. These participants were not actively involved in 
politics, and yet their statements revealed their understanding of politics. The statement 
of Participant WJ-08 suggested an understanding of the Pancasila with an exaggerated 
role of religion for the Indonesian state.6 Participant WJ-08’s statement further suggests 
a narrative in which ‘Belief in God’ has always been Pancasila’s first principle. This 
narrative, in turn, further cemented the centrality of religion in the Indonesian state in the 
minds of the people. 
Previous research has debated to what extent Indonesian Muslims desire the 
implementation of Sharia instead of the Pancasila as the foundation of the state. A poll 
                                                 
6 Chapter Three addressed how President Soekarno initially made nationalism as the first 
principle of the Pancasila; belief in God was the fifth and last principle. Belief in God was only 
made into Pancasila’s first principle later on as a compromise with political Islamists. Ricklefs, 
A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300, 209. 
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in 2003 suggested that sixty percent of its sample ‘would not mind having Indonesia 
change to Sharia law’.7 By contrast, in the same year, another poll suggested that ‘militant 
Islam’ was losing support to a more ‘moderate tradition’.8 The discrepancy between these 
two polls illuminated the debate in the country, and their results should be viewed 
critically, as the wording of the polls can affect their result. The use of the word ‘Sharia’ 
as a term for Islamic law is more likely to evoke positive images and associations with 
religious teachings. By contrast, the term ‘militant Islam’ is more likely to conjure violent 
images and be associated with things like terrorism. Therefore, it makes sense that more 
participants of the second poll opted for the ‘moderate tradition’. 
Demands for constitutional status for Islam in Indonesia has existed at least since 
the 1940s.9 The same demand fuelled the separatist movement in Aceh under the banner 
of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement/GAM). Munawar Liza Zainal and 
Bakhtiar Abdullah, two former high-ranking members of GAM, both stated that one of 
their main motivations was the desire to freely express an Islamic identity beyond the 
confines of Indonesia’s legal framework and its ambiguous relation with religion. For 
instance, Zainal and Abdullah both said, “Aceh is Islam, Islam is Aceh.”10 
Kemal Pasha, an anthropologist from Universitas Malikussaleh, stated that in 
Aceh, politicians have used religion as a platform to garner support from the people, 
particularly from the local Muslim majority. In doing so, politicians used rhetoric that 
glorified Islam over minority religions, which in turn pulled the public discourse away 
from a more inclusive and tolerant view on religious diversity. For example, there is a 
test of Qur’an recitation for candidates for Aceh’s governor, mayors and regent. Even 
though the test was said to apply only to Muslim candidates, it signalled that candidates 
that were non-Muslim, or Muslims that were not ‘pious’, were not desirable for office.11 
In the focus groups, university student participants from Aceh were favourable towards 
a more widespread implementation of Islamic law across Indonesia, which reaffirmed 
Aceh’s support for a larger Islamic influence within Indonesia’s legal system.12  
                                                 
7 Gerald L. Houseman, Researching Indonesia : A Guide to Political Analysis (Lewiston, N.Y.: 
E. Mellen Press, 2004), 37. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300, 209. 
10 Zainal, interview by Sidi. Abdullah, interview by Sidi. 
11 Pasha, interview by Sidi. 
12 Salim, Challenging the Secular State, 2. 
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The use of religion to gain political support, however, was not limited to Aceh. 
For instance, Participant J-01, a 35-year-old Muslim, showcased how religion was 
politicised by local clerics in Indonesia, which made her question how religion should 
shape her political choice:  
Well, I didn’t use to think much about it. But in the last years, the imam in 
the mosque near my place has been saying that we should only have a 
Muslim leader, being a Muslim-majority… It makes me confused, to be 
honest. Some people at work say I should just look at merits. It’s confusing. 
The question whether or not Muslims should demand to only be led by a pious 
Muslim leader is another point of contention in Indonesia’s discourse on the relation 
between the state and religion. Opinions on this matter vary greatly, and to some extent 
are influenced by the personal religious beliefs of individuals. For example, some 
scholars contend that a diverse country like Indonesia should be ruled by an able leader 
regardless of their religious background.13 One research project presented in 2018, 
meanwhile, argues that Indonesian voters considered religious issues to be part of their 
political decision making, such as when deciding which party to vote for.14  
Laypeople participants were quite reserved in expressing their opinion on how 
religious identity affected their decisions in terms of politics. For instance, only two 
laypeople participants openly stated that they would only vote for a Muslim candidate in 
the 2018 regional gubernatorial elections: Participant WJ-04, a 25-year-old Muslim from 
West Java and Participant A-04, a 36-year-old Muslim from Aceh. Participant A-04 
decisively said, “It is only natural that a Muslim-majority region like Aceh has a pious 
Muslim governor.” Meanwhile, Participant WJ-04 was more hesitant, but nevertheless 
stated a preference for a Muslim governor: 
I’m not really into politics, so I don’t really know what factors to watch out 
for in a candidate. But I think generally, err, we have to, err, look at their 
history. Have they been involved in cases, and so on. I would avoid someone 
like that. We have to elect a good person. Of course, particularly I would 
                                                 
13 Mary Silvita, “Presiden Non-Muslim Dalam Komunitas Masyarakat Muslim,” [Non-Muslim 
Presidents in a Muslim Majority Society.] Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 7, no. 1 (2014): 58. 
14 Diego Fossati et al., “Representation beneath the Surface: Political Islam, Party Competition, 
and Citizen-Political Linkages in Indonesia” (paper presented at the New Zealand Political 
Studies Association Conference, Wellington, 27 November 2018). 
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look at their religion. As far as I know, according to my religion, it is crucial 
that we have a leader from the same religion. 
The low number of explicit wishes for a Muslim governor on the part of Muslim 
participants, however, did not mean that religious identity was not politically salient. 
Instead, participants expressed their preferences in less direct ways. Muslim participants, 
in particular, generally showed an implicit preference for a Muslim political leader. 
Nineteen Muslim laypeople participants expressed this preference in different ways, for 
example:  
Well, when it comes to elections… The first thing to look at is, I think, the 
candidates’ track record. Things like religion or ethnicity should come 
second. (Participant WJ-03) 
Of course I look at the candidates’ profile. Honestly, this is Aceh. All 
candidates would be Muslims anyway because, err, that’s how things are. 
I’m sure you know a non-Muslim candidate could never win here, what with 
the Sharia and all. (Participant A-01) 
Yes. Yes, I think it is important to have someone who does not do 
corruption. Someone who can get the job done well. But you know it is even 
better if we have a Muslim leader, right? (Participant J-06) 
The implicit preference among Muslim participants to have a political leader from 
an Islamic background partly stemmed from their belief in the perfection of their religion. 
For example, a Muslim participant from University Aceh A gave the following statement:  
Islam is the most perfect religion. With Islam, we can change the state for 
the better by following religious teachings. (University Aceh A, Muslim) 
Other participants were not as explicit in their reasoning about the relation between the 
state and Islam, yet the theme of perfection in Islam was repeatedly mentioned, for 
instance: 
 I am proud to be part of Islam because it is the last religion revealed and is 
the perfection of all previous religions. (University Aceh A, Muslim) 




Because my religion is the most perfect religion. (University Jakarta B, 
Muslim) 
By contrast, participants from minority religions did not give a similar weight on 
religious similarities between themselves and political leaders. They only stated their 
wish for a competent leader, particularly one with a good track record that is free of 
corruption. This situation implied their resignation that political candidates from a 
minority religion had a lower chance of being elected into office. 
With regard to the salience of religious identity in politics, Maluku has developed 
a pre-emptive solution: since 2003, local gubernatorial elections feature pairs of 
candidates from different religious backgrounds. For instance, a Christian gubernatorial 
candidate runs for office together with a Muslim vice-gubernatorial candidate, and vice 
versa. Interestingly, this criterion of an interfaith pairing was not part of the official 
requirements for the 2018 gubernatorial elections.15  However, this self-imposed tradition 
has been successful in inhibiting candidates from running on a religious platform, which 
in turn could spark interreligious conflicts.16 For instance, one participant said: 
The most important thing for a regional leader is that they lead well. Right? 
Honest, good, in accordance with the platform that they run on. […] It does 
not matter if they are a Christian. Right? I mean, if we see, most of the 
regional leaders here are Christians… Right? We think that even though 
they are Christian, the most important thing is that they lead Ambon well. 
Don’t you think? […] After all, they usually have a Muslim deputy. Or it’s 
the other way around. So it doesn’t matter what religion they are as long as 
they lead well. (Participant M-12, Muslim) 
Maluku’s approach to religion in local politics thus showed one positive way to manage 
religious diversity, particularly given its political salience, by pre-empting the potential 
utilisation of religious identity as a platform for electoral politics. 
 
                                                 
15 “Pengumuman Pendaftaran Bakal Pasangan Calon Dalam Pemilihan Gubernur Dan Wakil 
Gubernur Maluku Tahun 2018,” ed. Komisi Pemilihan Umum Provinsi Maluku (2018). 




6.3 Religious Identity in Interpersonal Relationships 
The salience of religion and religious identity is also observable in the participants’ 
interpersonal relationships. Religious identity is particularly significant in the formation 
of families. Participants considered religion a major determinant in choosing potential 
marriage partners. Participants were more at ease when discussing the topic of marriage 
compared to discussing politics, possibly because the topic was considered more 
personal. Hence, the participants were not quite as vigilant to appear politically correct 
as they were when discussing regional elections.  
Among the 56 laypeople participants, 28 (50%) were married. Among these 28, 
not a single participant was in an interreligious marriage. This lack of interreligious 
marriages shows that religion is commonly used to select a suitable marriage partner 
across all provinces and religious groups. There was, however, one participant who was 
married to a religious convert. Participant WJ-02 recounted how he married his wife: 
My marriage was at first opposed by my parents, […] it was a religious 
issue, at that time, my wife-to-be was a Catholic while I was a Muslim. So 
it was quite different. But now she is a Muslim. It is always hard when you 
come from families with different backgrounds. But I talked nicely with my 
parents, and I got my way in the end. We are all on good terms these days. 
This participant recounted how his then wife-to-be converted to Islam, stating that her 
conversion took place prior to their wedding plans: 
[Her conversion] was not directly caused by our wedding plans… I never 
really talked about it… Well, when we were dating we never talked about 
religion. But she converted anyway. Her father was Catholic, but he was the 
one who took her to the mosque to convert. It was rather sudden. I asked her 
why she converted. She said she wanted to be like her mother. Turns out her 
mother had converted to Islam as well. And coincidentally she lived among 
predominantly Muslim friends. So she became a Muslim. 
Despite the bride’s conversion prior to the wedding, there were still, however, 
objections from the groom’s family before they finally consented to the marriage. Among 
the participants, the insistence on married couples sharing the religion was linked to their 
view of religion as a fundamental moral guide. At the same time, participants viewed 
religious differences as seeds of discord within a family. For example:  
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I don’t mind marrying someone from a different ethnic group, but, you 
know. It would be a hassle if my spouse and I were from different religions. 
One of us would have to convert to the other’s religion. (Participant WJ-05, 
Catholic) 
My parents are from different ethnic groups, but both are Muslims. My own 
brother married a Batak, well, from Medan, but she is also a Muslim. … So 
far, there are no interreligious marriages. … For myself, not really, but 
religion matters. Not so much ethnic groups. Any ethnic group is alright, 
because the more we, err, the more we open up our traditions, the greater 
our knowledge will be. But only with someone from a different ethnic 
group. Not with a different religion. (Participant A-06, Muslim) 
Of course my husband-to-be’s religion was a factor that I took into 
consideration. But I didn’t care about ethnic differences. At least he had to 
be loving. But certainly we have to share the same faith. That will be the 
foundation for the family. (Participant M-01, Protestant) 
This conservative attitude towards religion was equally observable among 
unmarried participants. Out of 28 unmarried participants, 21 (75%) expressed a strong 
preference for a spouse from their own religious group. Participants in Aceh were the 
most religiously conservative, with no participants willing to consider an interreligious 
marriage. In Maluku, six out of seven unmarried participants wished for a marriage 
partner from their own religion; in Jakarta, it was four out of six and in West Java seven 
out of eleven participants.  
Participants’ attitude towards past interreligious romantic relationships is another 
indicator of the salience of religious identity. Even though ten laypeople participants 
(17.9%) reported having had a past romantic relationship with someone from a different 
religion than themselves, eight of these participants described their past romance as being 
unsustainable for marriage. Interreligious romances were thus only viewed as a dalliance. 
For example, Participant WJ-03, a 32-year-old Muslim female, said the following: 
I had this ex-boyfriend who was a Christian. People asked what we were 
doing and whether we knew where we were heading to with the relationship, 
err, but I was younger and we weren’t really thinking about marriage at all. 
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You know, in the end, we separated before the feelings between us got too 
strong. So yeah, obviously we broke up.  
Furthermore, the reaction garnered by participants from their social environment 
indicated a more widespread aversion to interreligious romance. Three participants stated 
that they kept their interreligious relationship a secret from their families out of fear of 
rejection. Another three participants shared that after announcing their interreligious 
relationships, their families displayed various forms of rejection to the couple, such as 
through whispers behind the participants’ backs or straightforward demands to end the 
relationship. Similarly, participants reported negative reactions from family members 
towards relatives who had previously married outside the family’s religion, with attitudes 
ranging from discouraging the marriage to permanent estrangement.  
There were two participants who claimed that their families were accepting of 
their respective interreligious relationships; however, this acceptance was caused by 
perceived similarities between the religions involved. One participant, Participant WJ-
12, a Protestant, had previously dated a Catholic, while the other, Participant J-06 was a 
Catholic who had previously dated a Protestant. The participants claimed that the 
common denomination of Christianity was sufficient for their families to accept their 
relationship, in comparison to other religious groups in Indonesia.  
There was one participant who received positive reactions to his interreligious 
romance, but this participant was the exception. Participant WJ-15, a Catholic, reported 
that his parents accepted his past interreligious relationships due to his exceptionally 
diverse family background. He had had past relationships with a Muslim, a Buddhist and 
a Protestant. He said: 
In terms of religion, err, even Mum and Dad are from different religions. 
Mum is a Christian, and Dad is, well, I mean it’s not that big of a difference, 
Mum is a Protestant and Dad is a Catholic. Mum is Chinese-Indonesian and 
Dad is not. That was already a difference. And then, my relatives… Yes 
there are some, Mum’s eldest brother, he also… Mum’s brother is Christian 
and his wife is Muslim. There are plenty, actually. I think there’s one from 
every religion. My paternal grandmother was also a Muslim even though 
Dad is Catholic. […] and for myself, in terms of religious difference, it’s 
not a matter for me. I mean, why, err, well religion is a matter of personal 
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faith. The important thing is for us to build each other up without 
differentiating. Isn’t Indonesia supposed to be about Bhinneka Tunggal Ika? 
The attitude of Participant WJ-15 and his family towards religious differences was 
unique. There was no other participant which described a similar religious diversity in 
their family. This rarity further supports the argument that religious identity continues to 
be a significant marker of difference in Indonesia. 
University student participants also indicated an inhibition towards religious 
differences between romantic partners. For instance, only 21 out of 237 participants 
(8.9%) reported having had romantic relations with someone from a different religion 
than themselves. Even more telling was that 19 of these 21 reported negative reactions 
from their social environment to their relationship, including outright demands to end the 
romance. Two participants reported indifference from their surroundings. In the focus 
groups, university student participants confirmed that they preferred a potential future 
spouse from their own religious group. This finding thus confirms a previous study 
stating that young people in Indonesia do not mind having a romantic relationship with 
people from different ethnicities, but less so when it comes to a difference in religion.17  
The participants’ inhibition to interreligious romantic relationships is related to 
the lack of marriage prospects, as religious expectations and Indonesia’s legal system 
reinforce each other in inhibiting interreligious marriages. Indonesia’s marriage laws 
combine religious and secular laws: a marriage can only be legally registered if a 
religious covenant has been conducted by relevant religious authorities.18 Complications 
thus arise for interreligious couples, because one party in the couple would have to 
convert to their partner’s religion, at least on paper. Considering the central role of 
religion for the participants’ sense of identity, a conversion would, in turn, involve a 
significant compromise. 
However, participants did not consider differences in religious identity to be a 
barrier to friendship. Sixty-seven university student participants (28.3%), for example, 
explicitly welcomed religious diversity among their peers on campus:  
                                                 
17 Parker, Hoon, and Raihani, “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic and Inter-
Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia,” 478-79. 
18 Kate O'Shaughnessy, Gender, State and Social Power in Contemporary Indonesia Divorce 
and Marriage Law, (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009). 1. 
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[Diversity is] very good, because on the campus of University [Maluku A] 
there is not just one single religion, but many. (University Maluku A, 
Protestant) 
It’s really good since probably my campus has a balanced number of 
different religions and everyone is basically free to do their religious 
conduct. (University Jakarta A, Buddhist) 
This finding indicates the participants’ acceptance of religious diversity among their 
friends and supports the argument of a previous study which found that most young 
people in Indonesia visit their friends from other faiths on religious holidays.19 Similarly, 
thirty separate laypeople participants (53.6%) expressed that they were used to religious 
diversity in their workplace or in their neighbourhood. For example, participants stated: 
There are colleagues from all sorts of religious backgrounds in this office. 
We are used to it, it’s nothing extraordinary. (Participant WJ-7) 
This neighbourhood is diverse. Muslims, yes, also Protestants and 
Catholics. There is a Mosque over there, and a Church just across the main 
street. (Participant M-12) 
 
6.4 Issues with Religious Diversity 
There are, nevertheless, significant issues with religious diversity in Indonesia. For 
instance, participants from minority religions were less likely to feel ‘very positive’ or 
‘positive’ about their religious identity, and they were more likely to reflect on the 
negative social implications of their minority status. Table 6.4 on the following page 
shows a discrepancy between Muslim laypeople participants and participants from other 
religious groups in their feeling about their respective religious identity: 
 
 
                                                 
19 Parker, Hoon, and Raihani, “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic and Inter-
Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia,” 477. 
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Islam 14 21 3 0 0 
Protestantism 1 8 2 1 0 
Catholicism 0 2 2 0 0 
Buddhism 1 0 0 0 0 
Non-
denominational 
0 0 1 0 0 
The numbers in the table show that the way participants felt about their religious 
identity was affected by their individual religion. Muslim participants were more likely 
to feel ‘very positive’ about their religious identity in comparison to other religious 
groups. Approximately 36 percent of all Muslim laypeople participants chose ‘very 
positive’, in comparison to 8 percent of Protestant laypeople participants and none of the 
Catholic laypeople participants. The discrepancy between Muslim and non-Muslim 
participants was further detected in their explanation about their feeling, as Muslim 
participants who claimed to feel ‘very positive’ about their religious identity described 
both the perceived positive values of their religion as well as the accommodation they 
received for their religious practices in Indonesia. By contrast, non-Muslim participants 
who claimed to feel ‘very positive’ about their religious identity only focused on the 
perceived internal values of their religion, including the singular Buddhist participant 
who claimed to feel very positive about her religious identity. This participant stated that 
her ‘very positive’ feeling stemmed from her belief she was a part of the world’s most 
peaceful religion and her strong faith in the religious teachings of Buddhism.  
University student participants similarly showed that Muslim participants were 
the most likely to feel ‘very positive’ about their religious identity, as seen in Table 6.5: 








Islam 81 46 21 8 2 
Protestantism 15 27 10 5 1 
Catholicism 2 4 5 1 1 
Buddhism 1 3 1 0 0 
Hindu 0 1 1 0 0 
n/a 0 0 1 0 0 
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The most noteworthy finding in Table 6.5 above is the overwhelming amount of 
Muslim university student participants who claimed to feel ‘very positive’ about their 
religious identity in comparison to participants from other religious backgrounds. Out of 
158 Muslim participants, 81 participants (51.2 %) claimed to feel ‘very positive’, while 
among Protestant participants, only 15 out of 58 (25.9%) claimed the same. Only 2 out 
of 13 Catholic participants (15.3%) and 1 out 5 Buddhist participants (20%) claimed to 
feel ‘very positive’ about their religious identity, while none of the Hindu participants 
claimed the same. Similar to the finding from laypeople participants, Muslim university 
student participants were more likely to reflect both on the internal values of their religion 
as well as the accommodation that they received for their religious practices. By contrast, 
university student participants from minority religions who claimed to feel ‘very 
positive’ about their religious identity tended to exclusively reflect on the internal values 
of their religion. 
The stories of discrimination shared by minority participants, juxtaposed with the 
contentment expressed by Muslim participants about the accommodation that had 
received to express their religious identity, clearly indicated a disparity between the 
majority and minorities, as participants from minority religions who claimed to feel ‘very 
positive’ about their religious identity downplayed the social implications of their 
minority position. This disparity was further demonstrated by the participants’ accounts 
of experiences with discrimination related to their religious identity.  
Five laypeople participants (8.9%) stated that they had personally experienced 
discrimination. For example, Participant J-06, a Catholic from Balikpapan who moved 
to Jakarta in 2007, recalled how he was rejected from a boarding house because of his 
religion. He stated that the owner of the boarding house had specifically asked about his 
religion and promptly stated that his boarding house was only for Muslim males. In West 
Java, Participant WJ-10, a Protestant, recalled how her peers in elementary school used 
to mock her for her religion, calling her an ‘infidel’ and saying things that were hurtful 
to her, such as how she would never ‘go to heaven’. This participant stated that her peers 
became more restrained as they grew older. Participant WJ-15, a Catholic from Bandung, 
stated that from time to time his friends or colleagues would joke with him using 
stereotypes of his religion or call him ‘dirty’ for eating pork. The most violent case of 
discrimination was reported by Participant WJ-13, a Protestant from Bandung: 
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When I was at church, there, when I was still in junior high school, there 
was this incidence where the [Islamic Defenders Front]20 blocked the 
church. So I saw with my own eyes how they treated us. It was really 
inhuman, if I may say so. Well, the church building was shaped like a regular 
house, and strictly speaking we did not have a license [to give the place the 
status of house of worship]. I want to say, they kept saying they acted in the 
name of religion, but their ways did not show it at all. […] This was either 
in 2009 or 2010. I think the news can still be found. The incidence made it 
on the news on TV.21 But what they showed on the TV was not about our 
fear. They only said that there was a forced closure of an unlicensed church 
and some demonstrations. But they did not report about the way the mob 
arrived, the main attention was not there at all on TV. 
In the questionnaires, 19 university student participants (8.1%) reported incidents 
of discrimination. All of them were from minority religions. Eighteen students (7.6%) 
reported insults and jokes using stereotypes of minority religions. One student reported 
being denied boarding in a student flat by the landlord upon finding out that they were 
not a Muslim. In the focus groups with minority students, participants revealed more 
systematic forms of discrimination which they faced. The separate focus group allowed 
them to express things that they could have been reluctant to share in front of their peers 
from majority groups. One participant from University West Java A, for instance, 
reported that the university’s academic calendar overlooked religious holidays of 
minorities, among other things, by holding examinations on Christmas Eve. She said: 
 The University held an end-of-semester exam on Christmas Eve. I live with 
my parents so I still got to spend Christmas with them. But some of us come 
from outside of Java, so they could not be home for Christmas. 
Her fellow participants further stated that lecturers had assigned essays or group 
work over the holiday period of minority religions, but had always made sure there were 
                                                 
20 The Islamic Defenders Front, or Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is a conservative Islamic group, 
whose members are known to spread hate speech, conduct illegal raids on ‘un-Islamic 
establishments’ such as cafes and nightclubs, and forcibly barricade houses of worship of 
minority religions. Mark Woodward et al., “The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, 
Violence and the State in Indonesia,” Dynamics of Muslim Life 8, no. 2 (2014): 155. 




no assignments over the period of Eid-l-Fitri, the largest annual Muslim holiday. One 
participant said: 
It made me feel like our holidays are not appreciated as much. I don’t mind 
a shorter break compared to the Eid break but at least I want to celebrate 
without doing assignments. It’s even worse when it’s group work because 
then we have to meet up with other students and cannot spend the day with 
family. 
A Catholic participant from University Aceh A explained that when he had first 
enrolled at the university all students were required to attend lectures on Islam. Religious 
education is compulsory by law including at tertiary level in Indonesia; however, students 
are entitled to an education according to their religion, and are not required to study other 
religions. Yet the lack of adequate teaching staff or classrooms often impedes the 
implementation of this law, particularly in the provision of religious education for 
religious minorities.22 The religious minority students at University Aceh A stated that 
they had been willing to take part in the Islamic lectures; however, they could never attain 
full marks for the paper, which they felt was due to them being non-Muslims. One 
participant said: 
At first I thought they were going to teach us about Islam from an academic 
perspective. As it turned out, what do you call it, the lectures were more on 
your personal conduct as a Muslim. And I still said that I would get through 
it and tried my best. And then, the lecturer gave me a C. The same happened 
to my Christian friends. So we thought, this must be because we weren’t 
Muslim. 
The religious minority students at University Aceh A further explained that they had 
collectively filed a complaint about the situation to the university. Since the complaint, 
the university had been providing separate religious classes for students from minority 
religions. However, due to a lack of lecturers from minority religions, they had to go to 
houses of worship outside the campus area for instruction.  
One student indicated that the disadvantages faced by students from minority 
religions were not recognised by the majority: asked whether they thought their peers 
                                                 
22 Raihani, “Minority Right to Attend Religious Education in Indonesia,” Al-Jami'ah: Journal 
of Islamic Studies 53, no. 1 (2015): 8. 
207 
 
were aware of these situations, one participant from University West Java A said: “No 
one has ever bothered to ask [us].” Her statement was welcomed by nods from other 
participants, indicating that the non-recognition was commonplace. Thus, while 
privileges enjoyed by the majority were perceived as common, ongoing systemic 
discrimination against minority students went unnoticed.  
The findings from the focus group discussions with minority students further 
indicated that discrimination was underreported by both laypeople and university student 
participants. Only five out of 56 laypeople participants reported having personally 
experienced discrimination (8.9%), as well as nineteen out of 237 university student 
participants (8.1%). In total, 21 incidents involved verbal assaults, two incidents involved 
exclusion from boarding houses, and one incident involved a violent forced closure of a 
house of worship. In addition, 11 other laypeople participants across the four provinces 
claimed to have heard jokes made about their religion (19.6%), but they did not consider 
having personally experienced discrimination. This finding further indicates that 
discrimination involving jokes about religious stereotypes was more widespread than 
reported, which in turn indicates the ubiquity of stereotyping within the population. The 
findings also correspond with the 2016 research by the Wahid Foundation, which 
concluded that only 0.6 percent out of 1,520 participants across 34 provinces in Indonesia 
were completely accepting of their social others.23 
On the subject of discrimination, there was a disparity between the more central 
provinces of Jakarta and West Java and the more peripheral provinces of Aceh and 
Maluku. All laypeople participants who admitted to having personally experienced 
discrimination because of their religious identity were from Jakarta and West Java; there 
were none from the other provinces. For Aceh, the lack of reported religiously motivated 
discrimination was firstly due to the homogeneity of the participants. 14 out of 15 
participants from Aceh were Muslim, which is the religious majority in the province, 
constituting 98.19 percent of its population.24 Given the participants’ majority position, 
they were unlikely to have faced discrimination on account of their religious identity 
while living in Aceh.  
                                                 
23 “A Measure of the Extent of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism within Muslim 
Society in Indonesia,”  7. 
24 Na’im and Syaputra, “Kewarganegaraan, Suku Bangsa, Agama Dan Bahasa Sehari-Hari 
Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010,” 44. 
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Participant A-11, the only participant from a minority religion in Aceh, implied 
in her interview that she had applied significant limitations on herself in her life in the 
province. Her statements further indicated that the expression of her religious identity 
was only tolerated, as opposed to accepted by her social environment. This participant, a 
Protestant born and raised in Banda Aceh, claimed that she had never personally 
experienced discrimination in relation to her religious identity. However, her statements 
revealed some implicit limitations to her freedom to express her identity. For instance, 
she stated that she was able to freely worship “in designated areas”, implying restrictions 
to her religious freedom. Her statement indicated the local condition in which the 
religious services of minority religions, if held inside private dwelings with no permit, 
typically causes scrutiny from hard-line Islamists. As indicated by Participant WJ-13 
earlier, in some cases, vigilante groups have taken it upon themselves to forcibly shut 
down such services. Participant A-11 further stated that in knowing how adult Muslim 
females were required to cover up under Aceh’s sharia laws, while she did not wear a 
headscarf, she never wore “sexy clothes” in public because she had to “know her place”. 
This participant accepted these restrictions as a matter of course, further indicating the 
dominance of Muslim religious practices at the expense of religious minorities. Indeed, 
in Banda Aceh, it is unusual to see adult females without any sort of head covering in 
public, other than around Peunayong, the Chinatown of Banda Aceh. Even there, adult 
females without head coverings are usually modestly dressed; for example, they do not 
show bare arms or cleavage and do not wear short skirts or short trousers. 
In comparison, participants in Maluku did not acknowledge the existence of 
discrimination on religious grounds as part of their conscious effort to build positive 
interfaith relations following a violent religious conflict in 1999.25 While participants 
recounted stories of personal experience in relation to the 1999 conflict, not a single 
participant claimed to have personally experienced discrimination due to their religious 
identity in the present day. Participants further gave the impression that it was presently 
taboo to speak about religious discrimination. Instead, participants who were old enough 
to remember the 1999 conflict emphasised how interfaith relations had improved 
significantly since then. For example, Participant M-11, a 38-year-old Muslim born and 
raised in Ambon said: 
                                                 
25 Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia, 88-106. 
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No, I have never experienced discrimination since Ambon returned to peace. 
I can worship freely and attend a neighbourhood Qur’an recitation group. I 
wear my headscarf when going about town and it’s quite ubiquitous. It’s 
safe, you know. 
Participant M-08, a 25-year-old Protestant born and raised in Ambon echoed her 
sentiments:  
I have lived in Ambon since I was born. It is good to live here. I do not really 
remember the events around the conflict… My family doesn’t like to bring 
it up either. The harmony among the people has become good, even very 
good for the time being. People respect each other’s religions. 
The participants’ statements were in line with those of religious figures in 
Maluku, who emphasised the role of local wisdom in maintaining harmonious interfaith 
relations. Reflecting the intersections of aspects of identity, this local wisdom appeals to 
the people’s commonalities in ethnicity and nationality to overcome religious cleavages. 
For example, both Elifas Maspaitella, Secretary of the Protestant Church of Maluku, as 
well as Monsignor Petrus Canisius Mandagi, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Amboina in Maluku, similarly emphasised the importance of the ‘pela gandong’ 
principle.26 The principle of pela gandong is based on the idea of a broader kinship 
between different religious groups.27 It is a long-standing, ancestral pact agreed upon by 
two or more groups in the community to be bound by an extended kinship, appealing to 
a common ancestry that cannot be disintegrated by differences in religion.28 Maspaitella 
explained that the pela gandong principle had existed in Maluku long before the 
proliferation of world religions:  
The culture of kinship in various places in Maluku shows that religious 
difference is not an obstacle for kinship, because we are related, perhaps of 
different faiths but coming from a common ancestor, and religion is a more 
recent entity, in the history of proliferation. The kinship had existed long 
before. The Moluccan people is not a new people, right? It is a very ancient 
                                                 
26 Maspaitella, interview by Sidi; Mandagi, interview by Sidi. 
27 S. B. Hoedodo Tonny, Surjo Joko, and Qodir Zuly, “Local Political Conflict and Pela 





community, […] whoever it is, from whatever ethnic group they are in 
Maluku, whatever their religion is, we are all of the same kin.29  
The pela gandong principle was also mentioned by all laypeople participants in Maluku, 
for example: 
There is a good relationship between Christian and Muslim communities 
here. We have the pela gandong, you know? If a Christian village wants to 
build a church than people from its Muslim brother village will come and 
help. And the other way around, too. (Participant M-03, Protestant) 
Furthermore, observations on the field showed that people in Ambon were able 
to freely display their religious identity in public. Markers of religious identity were seen 
in people’s clothing, such as headscarves or crucifix-shaped accessories, as well as in 
graffiti with religious images on buildings. Houses displayed decorations with religious 
symbols, such as depictions of religious images or calligraphy. In some locations, both 
church bells and the call to prayer from mosques could be heard.  
It was, however, noticeable through the predominant display of either Christian 
imagery or Islamic symbols in different neighbourhoods that the local society was still 
somewhat segregated. Therefore, the local society is not as well integrated as participants 
claimed. Furthermore, people could usually tell whether someone was a Christian or a 
Muslim simply by asking which part of the city they lived in. Participants from Maluku, 
both in the individual interviews and the focus groups, could not explain this segregation, 
stating that things had always been that way in Ambon. Participants were reluctant to 
further discuss the segregation between religious communities in Maluku, hinting at the 
possibility of unaddressed grievances from the past as well as their fear of igniting 
another conflict. 
The participants’ reluctance to discuss issues with religious diversity reaffirms 
the arguments presented by Aan Permana, a researcher from the Habibie Centre,30 about 
unresolved issues between various religious groups which have inhibited meaningful 
interfaith interaction and contributed to the perpetuation of discriminative behaviour:  
For example, maybe we claim to be tolerant; we have a neighbour, for 
example, me being a Muslim with a Catholic or Protestant or Hindu or 
                                                 
29 Maspaitella, interview by Sidi. 
30 “About the Habibie Center”. 
211 
 
Buddhist neighbour. And we are tolerant, fine. What do you call it, we can 
live as neighbours, act nice, never have a conflict with them. We are not 
enemies, if you want. But we don’t mingle either; maybe we seldom hold 
conversations, have no interest to meet up with each other.31 
Thus, overall, while interfaith relations in Indonesia are peaceful on the surface, the 
quality of the interactions between people vary significantly. Tolerance between religious 
groups does not always translate into acceptance; adherents of minority religions 
continue to face various types of discrimination. 
Another significant challenge for religious diversity in Indonesia concerns the 
provision of equal recognition for the country’s indigenous faith groups. Beside the six 
world religions officially recognised by Indonesia’s legal system,32 there are over 150 
local indigenous faith groups across the country.33 These faith groups do not enjoy the 
same legal recognition as the six world religions.34 Focus group discussions with 
university student participants indicated the divided opinions on the place of these 
indigenous faith groups within Indonesia. Participants often neglected to mention the 
existence of these indigenous faith groups in the narrative of Indonesia’s religious 
diversity. For example, when asked to describe religious diversity in Indonesia, 
participants across four provinces consistently exclusively referred to six world religions:  
In Indonesia, we are proud and respectful of religious diversity. As you 
know yourself, we have six different religions: Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. These religions have 
their holidays celebrated nationally and we can find houses of worship for 
each religion anywhere around the country. (University West Java B) 
Religious diversity in Indonesia… I think it’s quite unique, where the 
country recognises six religions officially. (University Jakarta B) 
Speaking of diversity, I think, in terms of religion… There are six religions 
in Indonesia, and the public facilities provided by the government… I think, 
in every region, they have provided, like, mosques… For example, 
                                                 
31 Aan Permana, interview by Budi Annisa Sidi, 7 May 2018. 
32 Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. 
33 Ensiklopedia Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, v-xi. 
34 Shah, “Constitutional Arrangements on Religion and Religious Freedom in Malaysia and 
Indonesia: Furthering or Inhibiting Rights?,” 262. 
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churches, temples… I think the government has provided such public 
facilities quite well. (University Aceh A) 
Religious diversity in Indonesia is very good. We have Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism and also Confucianism. The relations are good as well. 
For example, this campus has a Protestant background but we welcome 
everyone… There are students from various religious backgrounds. 
(University Maluku B) 
Upon being reminded of the existence of indigenous faith groups in Indonesia, 
participants started to provide a range of opinions on the issue of their legal recognition. 
Some answers indicated that religious tolerance is more perfunctory and superficial than 
acknowledged by the participants. For instance, participants carefully approached the 
issue by providing generic statements about religious rights, but without explicit support 
for the equal recognition of indigenous faith groups with world religions: 
Minority rights should be recognised by the government, so that they don’t 
feel excluded. This is also important to prevent our nation from breaking 
apart. (University Aceh A) 
Every citizen of Indonesia should have the same rights and responsibilities 
whether they are a majority or a minority. The government should respect 
everyone equally. (University Maluku B) 
I had to ask the participants to be more specific with their opinions on the legal 
recognition of indigenous faith groups vis-à-vis the six world religions. Specifically, 
participants were asked to share their opinion on the right of the adherents of indigenous 
faith groups to declare their faith in official documents. The hesitation on the part of the 
participants to answer this question was palpable. Some participants spoke in favour of 
their equal recognition. For example:  
If Indonesia is truly about Unity in Diversity, there should not be a reason 
why these faith groups cannot be recognised. (University Jakarta B) 
I think it would be good if adherents of such faith groups can be recognised 
on paper. Then they won’t have to pretend they belonged to another religion 
just for the sake of paperwork. (University West Java B) 
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The first abovementioned participant associated the right of indigenous faith groups for 
proper recognition with Indonesia’s national motto. Indonesia’s adoption of the motto 
‘Unity in Diversity’ was thus interpreted as a commitment towards inclusivity by some 
participants; however, participants who were opposed to the equal recognition of these 
faith groups similarly claimed to base their opinion on the foundations of the Indonesian 
state. For example, these participants said that the recognition of indigenous faith groups 
would contradict the first principle of the Pancasila, Belief in God, which they 
interpreted as a commitment to monotheism: 
I don’t think [their legal recognition] is necessary. It would go against the 
principle of Belief in God. These people worship idols and the like. They 
are not proper religions. (University Aceh B) 
It is dangerous to recognise faith groups on the same level as religion. If we 
do that, how can we measure what is religion and what is not? People could 
make up anything and call it religion. It will make Indonesia prone to 
negative foreign influences. (University Aceh A) 
Focus group participants in Aceh particularly voiced the opinion that Indonesia should 
only grant proper legal recognition to monotheistic world religions. A couple of 
participants in University Maluku A similarly stated that polytheistic faith groups did not 
fit into the monotheistic framework of Indonesia; however, this opinion was not 
unanimously supported by other participants the way it was in Aceh. 
The participants’ opposition to the legal recognition of indigenous faith groups 
partly stemmed from a lack of understanding of what they were. In University Aceh B, 
one participant confused the indigenous faith groups with different schools of thought 
within world religions, such as the Sunni and Shia division within Islam. Other 
participants confused the term ‘faith groups’ with ideologies such as communism, and 
even sexuality; they clearly understood the term ‘faith groups’ in a pejorative manner. In 
University Aceh A, one participant said the following:  
I disagree with the inclusion of faith groups on ID cards, because, well, for 
one, it has a high risk of allowing other things to enter Indonesia, and that 
could destroy Indonesia with things that don’t suit our morality. Things that 
don’t suit our constitution and don’t suit the Indonesian culture. For 
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example, LGBT, which I think, for those people is a matter of faith. But in 
terms of matters relating to the state, to Indonesia, it is a transgression. 
As the discussion digressed into the issue of gender and sexuality, it was 
necessary for me to interject into the discussion and explain to the participants that the 
term ‘faith groups’ referred to faiths and religions that had existed in Indonesia prior to 
the dissemination of world religions and persisted in small, localised areas. Despite this 
explanation, the participants’ objection to the recognition of the faith groups persisted, 
as my explanation was countered with the following opinion: 
I still disagree with their recognition. Because, Indonesia itself, we all know, 
already has six religions. We know, there are different religions in many 
regions that want to be acknowledged by the state. Like that faith group in 
Java. They want the state or people in the government to acknowledge that 
they also exist. There are also, as we know, other faith systems such as 
animism or dynamism, of which we know that they also push to be 
recognised on a similar level with other religions. And I do remember there 
is a law that outlaws discrimination against Indonesian citizens. But we also 
need to have standards on what religions are. We already have, as the 
foundation of the state, the principle of ‘Belief in God’. And there are 
already six recognised religions. Beyond those, it should be unnecessary. 
While this research project does not address the issue of sexual or gender identity, 
the participants’ mention of the LGBTQ community as a ‘transgression’ recalled the 
conservative Islamist narrative prevalent in Aceh. In this regard, Kemal Pasha, an 
anthropologist from Universitas Malikussaleh explained that the Acehnese local 
population’s pejorative view of the LGBTQ community was part of the increasingly 
monolithic understanding of Islam in the province. Pasha further argued that Aceh used 
to be far more accepting towards the local LGBTQ community, such as towards 
transwomen who traditionally worked as beauticians and makeup artists.35 In the past, 
the Acehnese court had employed androgynous sida-sida or capados, akin to eunuchs, 
who acted as the monarch’s right hand and gatekeeper, particularly during the regime of 
Acehnese queens in the 17th century.36 Furthermore, Acehnese folk tales featured 
                                                 
35 Pasha, interview by Sidi. 
36 Barbara Watson Andaya, The Flaming Womb : Repositioning Women in Early Modern 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2006), 177-78. 
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characters of ambiguous sex and gender characteristics, such as the story of a ‘Bamboo 
Princess’ who grew a white beard and died when the king had her beard cut off.37 
Previous research by Eleni Polymenopoulou similarly argues that the public’s attitude 
towards the LGBTQ community has turned more hostile over the years as Aceh 
increasingly presents itself as a conservative Muslim province.38  
It was difficult to alter the narrative on so-called faith groups which has permeated 
society for a long time. Despite my attempt to explain the definition of the indigenous 
faith groups, a participant followed up the previous discussant by equating them with 
ideologies which they perceived could “endanger the state’s morality”, such as Atheism 
and Satanism. This confusion showed that they were unwilling to reconsider their 
position on the recognition of indigenous faith groups. Following this opinion, no other 
participants wanted to speak up in favour of the indigenous faith groups.  
Some participants objected to the idea of legally recognising indigenous faith 
groups on official documents, not out of a lack of understanding of what the faith groups 
were, but out of fear of putting them in a more vulnerable position. In University West 
Java A, as well as in both universities in Jakarta, focus group participants rejected the 
legal recognition of local faith groups on ID cards out of concern that it would only put 
their adherents in an open and vulnerable position, making them targets for 
discrimination. These students did not believe that the people in Indonesia were ready 
for such a change in attitude towards faith, as stated by one student from University West 
Java A: 
I think this is unnecessary right now. I think it will be confusing to most 
people, and they might not know how to include their faith group on their 
ID. And what for? They would just become targets of discrimination 
because now everyone can see on their ID that they don’t belong to a big 
religion. 
Students from University West Java B, meanwhile, were of the opinion that religious 
identity should be a more private matter and was not necessary to be included on official 
documents: 
                                                 
37 Marjaana Jauhola, Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia Negotiating Normativity 
through Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives in Aceh (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 60. 
38 Eleni Polymenopoulou, “Lgbti Rights in Indonesia: A Human Rights Perspective,” Asia-
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 19, no. 1 (2018): 33-34. 
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Instead of fretting about including minority faith groups on ID cards, we 
should just abolish the inclusion of any faiths on official documents. Plenty 
of people are only declaring a religion out of obligation anyway.  
During the discussion on indigenous faith groups, instead of the previous 
murmurs of concurrence and nodding, there were far more puzzled looks from 
participants. Hesitation was palpable from participants who seemed too shy or scared to 
make a statement on the issue and opted to whisper among themselves. By contrast, 
participants who did express an opinion on the issue of indigenous faith groups were 
usually quite decided in their tone. Typically, participants waited until one of them was 
confident enough to voice a strong opinion, after which two to three participants repeated 
what was said by the former participant.  
The issue of declaring a person’s religious identity on official documents also 
concerned individuals who did not identify with any religion in particular. Participant J-
04 was the only layperson not belonging to any religious group. Not belonging to a 
religious group is a rarity in Indonesia, where the first principle of the Pancasila, ‘Belief 
in God’, implies that good citizens must be religious.39 Participant J-04, a 32-year-old 
from Jakarta, stated that she was born and raised as a Muslim. However, upon reaching 
adulthood she decided to identify as non-denominational as she was becoming more 
critical of religious authorities and the politicising of religion. On her official documents, 
however, she still retained Islam as her religion, as doing so was easier in terms of 
bureaucracy. Recalling her estrangement from some family members and former friends 
after her decision to renounce religion, she thought that neither the society nor the 
government in Indonesia was ready for people publicly declaring their belief other than 
for one of the six officially recognised religions in Indonesia. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the salience of religion and religious identity for laypeople 
and university students in Indonesia and has raised some issues arising from religious 
diversity in the country. Firstly, religion and religious identity are considered the most 
important aspect of a person’s identity by a significant majority of laypeople and 
                                                 
39 Elizabeth Pisani, Indonesia Etc. : Exploring the Improbable Nation, First edition. ed., 
Indonesia Etcetera (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 314-15. 
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university student participants. Adherents of minority religions in Indonesia tend to feel 
less positive about their religious identity compared to the Muslim majority, particularly 
when considering the socio-political implications of their religious identity; nevertheless, 
religion remains at the centre of their selves with perceived internal virtues which 
function as a source of moral guidance and is seen as more salient than both their ethno-
regional and national identities. Participants of this research, for instance, expressed that 
their religious identity allowed them to be part of a group which transcends nations and 
nationalities. With this paramount salience, religious identity is thus likely to influence 
people’s decision making in various aspects of their lives. For instance, religious 
difference is considered a particularly significant barrier to courtship and marriage. 
Religious identity also influences people’s political decisions. The continued 
salience of religious identity in Indonesia, including for the younger generations, helps 
explain the persistence of debates on the relation between the state and religion to the 
present day. The majority of Muslim participants did not insist on having a Muslim as 
their political leader; nevertheless, they exhibited a preference to vote for candidates for 
political offices who shared their faith. 
Meanwhile, other religious groups in Indonesia are likely to resign themselves to 
their minority position. In discussing the qualities of their ideal political leader, adherents 
of minority religions displayed awareness that Muslim candidates were more likely to be 
elected into office. Furthermore, adherents of minority religions tend to resign 
themselves to systematic discrimination, as is evident through minority students in Aceh 
who agreed to attend lectures on Islam and those in West Java who had to sit 
examinations on Christmas Eve. In this regard, the prevalence of discriminatory 
behaviour which is not recognised as such by the religious majority constitutes a 
challenge to religious diversity in Indonesia. The treatment of religious minorities is often 
merely toleration, which can enable sustained negative stereotyping between religious 
groups and may, in turn, prolong existing grievances.  
Muslim participants recited significant privileges for Islam which they enjoyed 
in the country. These privileges seem to have been taken for granted; privileges for the 
majority religious group thus appear normal to the population. In turn, discrimination 
against religious minorities does not appear as jarring, and members of the majority 
religion often do not realise that they are exhibiting discriminatory behaviour. For 
example, there is a prevalent narrative that indigenous faith groups are not equal to world 
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religions and, as such, do not require equal legal treatment from the state. The situation 
of indigenous faith groups in Indonesia is a particularly noticeable deficiency in 
Indonesia’s framework for multiculturalism, particularly in addressing religious 
diversity.  
Within this framework for religious diversity, while religious identity is equally 
important to all religious groups in Indonesia, they experience different degrees of 
recognition and accommodation from the state and within society. As participants 
considered their religious identity to be more salient than both their national and ethno-
regional identities, the state should focus more on the provision of adequate 
accommodation for all religious groups. Otherwise, as displayed by participants in this 
research, adherents of minority religions are less likely to feel positive about their 




This thesis was an endeavour to better understand the current conditions pertaining to 
national identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia, particularly the state’s framework for 
cultural diversity, as an important of maintaining national unity. It examined the 
importance of ethno-regional and religious identities for the Indonesian people and how 
these two aspects of identity affect their understanding of their national identity. 
Furthermore, it sought the relationship between cultural diversity and national unity; 
specifically, to what extent a state can celebrate its internal cultural pluralism while still 
maintaining its unity and national identity. 
To this end, I analysed the relevant literature, laws and regulations, as well as 
information gathered from laypeople, university students and elite participants across 
four provinces in Indonesia: Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West Java. I have observed that 
the Indonesian national identity is more predominant than people’s various ethno-
regional identities. This predominance is enabled by a prevalent narrative of Indonesia 
as an inherently culturally diverse nation with various ethno-regional groups constituting 
its sub-nations, united by a common history of fighting against Dutch colonialism. Within 
this narrative, national identity and ethno-regional identity constitute different aspects of 
people’s selves that complement each other. Religious identity, meanwhile, is the most 
central aspect of people’s identity and is more salient than both national and ethno-
regional identities. Religious identity thus affects most aspects of people’s lives, 
including their political and romantic choices. Furthermore, religious identity acts as a 
more significant marker of difference than ethno-regional identity. 
In consideration of the relationship between national, ethno-regional and 
religious identities in Indonesia, this thesis argued that the Indonesian state has adopted 
an inequitable framework for multiculturalism. On the one hand, post-1998, this 
framework has increasingly provided due recognition and accommodation to various 
ethno-regional groups, including smaller traditional, indigenous communities and 
immigrant ethnic minorities such as Chinese-Indonesians which upheld the people’s 
contentment and positive identification with the Indonesian state. On the other hand, this 
framework still limits the expression of religious identities by only acknowledging and 
accommodating six world religions and inhibiting interreligious marriages. Furthermore, 
this framework confers considerable privileges to Islam which are not enjoyed by any 
other religion in the country in an attempt to mollify political Islamists who have been 
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demanding a constitutional status for Islam since before Indonesia’s political 
independence. Hence, this approach to multiculturalism is intended to protect Indonesia’s 
overall framework for cultural diversity; however, this framework has fostered an 
environment which normalises privileges for Indonesia’s Muslim majority at the expense 
of religious minorities. As such, this framework also threatens the very multiculturalism 
which it aims to protect. 
The first section of this conclusion addresses the research questions of this thesis 
and highlights the main findings and arguments in relation to these questions. It begins 
with discussing the relationship between national, ethno-regional and religious identities 
in Indonesia before continuing with an examination of Indonesia’s framework for 
diversity. This discussion is presented alongside the implications of the findings on 
relevant theories. Finally, this conclusion presents some policy implications of the 
findings for the Indonesian government as well as some recommendations for future 
research.  
 
Observations, Findings and Implications on Theory 
The central research question in this thesis addresses the way the Indonesian state 
maintains national identity and unity in consideration of the country’s internal cultural 
diversity as well as post-1998 democratisation processes. In order to answer this question, 
this thesis has analysed the relationship between national, ethno-regional and religious 
identities in Indonesia. 
Relevant literature on identity indicates that it is complex and multi-layered. A 
person’s identity is constituted of multiple aspects with varying degrees of salience. 
Narratives can determine the relationship between different aspects of people’s identity, 
which can enable their coexistence, or, alternatively, cause them to contradict each other. 
In turn, because of the multi-faceted nature of identity, no social group is completely 
uniform. Nations, as a form of social group, experience varying degrees of internal 
diversity. In this regard, national, ethno-regional and religious identities occupy different 
but interconnected roles within people’s selves in present-day Indonesia. 
The Indonesian national identity is understood as a primarily civic identity and is 
associated with people’s rights and responsibilities as citizens. In addition, the Indonesian 
national identity has a cultural dimension, as people also associate it with a shared history 
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of fighting against Dutch colonialism. Meanwhile, ethno-regional identity is primarily 
associated with ethnic attachments such as kinship and family. It is also associated with 
cultural attachments pertaining to local traditions and history. The way participants 
understand these aspects of their identity has shown that the traditional civic-ethnic 
distinction in theories of nationalism is not clear-cut. Therefore, while the civic-ethnic 
distinction is useful for understanding underlying types of nationalism, this distinction is 
not always applicable in practice. For instance, participants primarily described their 
Indonesian national identity in civic terms and their ethno-regional identity in ethnic 
terms. At the same time, participants associated the theme of birth and home with their 
national identity, even though ‘birth’ is commonly understood as an ethnic attachment. 
Furthermore, both national identity and ethno-regional identity contain a cultural 
dimension. The cultural dimension of the Indonesian national identity manifests in the 
participants’ sense of shared history. Similarly, participants associated their ethno-
regional identity with a cultural dimension such as regional history that is in turn 
intertwined with Indonesia’s history.  
The intertwining of regional and national history, particularly in relation to a 
common history of fighting against colonialism, is part of the narrative which has enabled 
the establishment of the Indonesian state. Within this prevalent narrative, Indonesia is 
portrayed as a culturally diverse but united nation that consists of various ethno-regional 
‘sub-nations’ (suku bangsa). This narrative has further enabled national identity and 
ethno-regional identities to co-exist in a largely complementary relationship, in which 
strong ethno-regional sentiments do not necessarily translate into a weak sense of 
national identity. The prevalence of this narrative can be detected in the participants’ 
daily language use. A large majority of participants primarily used the Indonesian 
national language for their daily communication, particularly within public and formal 
settings. Regional languages, meanwhile, are reserved for private and intimate settings. 
Furthermore, participants who used their respective regional language more than the 
Indonesian language were prepared to switch to Indonesian when conversing with 
someone who did not speak the same regional language as them, indicating a shared sense 
of belonging to the Indonesian nation. The relationship between these aspects of identity 
has demonstrated that national and ethno-regional identities are not by default mutually 




Participants perceived their national and ethno-regional identities in an equally 
positive manner, showing that a positive national identity can coexist with a positive 
ethno-regional identity, including in provinces with a history of separatism. Furthermore, 
participants did not perceive these two aspects of their identity to be in competition with 
each other. However, participants from minority ethno-regional backgrounds tended be 
less positive about both their national and ethno-regional identities due to the negative 
experiences they had for being part of a minority group. 
Meanwhile, religious identity is considered to be the most salient aspect of the 
participants’ identity. Participants of all religious backgrounds, for instance, considered 
religion to be their fundamental source of moral guidance which helps them determine 
good from bad and right from wrong. As such, religious identity affects most aspects of 
people’s lives, including their preferences for marriage partners as well as their political 
choices. This central and overarching role of religion within people’s identity, in 
combination with the Muslim-majority environment in Indonesia, helps explain the 
continued demands of political Islamists for constitutional status for Islam in the country.  
Participants’ assessment of their religious identity, however, depended on their 
status as part of the Muslim majority or as part of religious minorities. A large majority 
of Muslim participants viewed their religious identity positively, both as a result of their 
reflection on the positive accommodation they received from the state for their religious 
practices as well as on the internal values of the religion in itself. By contrast, participants 
from minority religions tended to view their religious identity as less than positive as 
they reflected on the negative socio-political implications of their minority status. 
Participants from minority religions who perceived their religious identity positively, 
meanwhile, tended to reflect on the internal values of their religions, such as the positive 
values of their religious practices. 
Looking at the relationship between national, ethno-regional and religious 
identities, national identity is more likely to be in competition with religious identity, as 
the ideals of an inclusive, largely secular state compete against ideals of a state based on 
religious (Islamic) laws. To the present, however, the use of these narratives has also 
enabled Indonesia to keep the aspirations of political Islamists in check by portraying 
Indonesia as a pious pan-religious nation. This situation again demonstrates the 
paramount role of narratives in aligning different identities within a functioning social 
group by emphasising similarities among their members while minimising the 
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significance of intragroup differences. Depending on their particular context, internally 
diverse nations can focus on ethnic, civic or cultural similarities among their members in 
their narrative to ensure their cohesion and integrity. 
In addition to a unifying narrative, internally diverse states also have to manage 
their cultural pluralism. States have to decide the most appropriate approach towards their 
cultural pluralism in line with their chosen narrative. The right balance of recognition 
and accommodation for various cultural groups is particularly important to ensure 
people’s allegiance and contentment with the state. In contrast, the repression of identities 
which people consider to be very salient is likely to provoke resistance. With regard to 
this salience of identity, this thesis challenges the traditional liberal approach to 
multiculturalism which suggests that citizens of a state can completely relegate their 
particular attachments to the private sphere and focus exclusively on a shared civic 
identity in public. This liberal approach underestimates the salience of various aspects of 
people’s identity as shown by participants of this research. For example, as participants 
in this research consider religious identity to be more salient than their national identity, 
it is unlikely that their religious identity does not affect their understanding and 
performance of their civic national identity. 
After addressing the relationship between national, ethno-regional and religious 
identities in Indonesia, this thesis analysed Indonesia’s framework for cultural pluralism 
in consideration of post-1998 democratisation processes in the country. To this end, for 
comparative purposes and to give a historical context, I also examined conditions 
pertaining to nation-building in Indonesia prior to 1998, specifically since the era of 
Indonesia’s ‘National Awakening’ in the 1920s to the end of the New Order in 1998.  
In pre-1998 Indonesia, nation-building had been a primarily elite-driven top-
down process which is dependent on the elites’ comprehension of identity and diversity. 
During Indonesia’s ‘National Awakening’ in the 1920s, elites consisting of educated 
youth organisations led nationalist movements across the archipelago, emphasising the 
shared plight of Dutch colonialism and the shared desire for political self-determination. 
In this era, ethno-regional and religious diversity were put on the backseat as elites 
focused on attaining political independence as a common goal for the whole ‘nation’. 
This era in particular recalls theories on post-colonialism which state that post-colonial 
states are seen to be shaped by their colonial experience, including their territory. In this 
instance, Indonesia’s borders have been determined by past borders of the Dutch colonial 
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territory. Furthermore, as the educated youth in this era received an education fashioned 
after the Dutch model, their understanding of nationhood was shaped by Western 
political theories of the time, including the concept of the nation-state, in which 
homogeneity is expected from the population of a state. The pre-existing internal 
diversity of the post-colonial state has hence been subjected to a nation-building process 
which standardised the people’s understanding of their national identity.  
The elite-led nation-building process continued throughout much of Indonesia’s 
pre-1998 history, including the eras of Soekarno’s and Suharto’s respective presidencies. 
Both Soekarno and Suharto focused on the civic aspects of identity but neglected the 
importance of ethno-regional and religious identities. Instead, they adopted an 
assimilationist approach to diversity in what can be called a shallow multiculturalism: 
cultural diversity was recognised and valued as a national asset, such as for tourism 
purposes, but otherwise there was a lack of adequate accommodation for the expression 
of ethno-regional identities under a centralistic governance. 
Soekarno, Indonesia’s first president, conceived the Pancasila as the Indonesia’s 
ideological foundation, consisting of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, 
democracy and social justice. The Pancasila emphasises the civic dimension of the 
Indonesian national identity. Soekarno also adopted a syncretic approach to reconcile 
different political and religious ideologies, emphasising their common objectives of 
political independence and welfare for the people. Soekarno’s syncretic approach 
towards nationalism, Islamism and communism showed his attempt to employ a 
particular narrative to align ideologies that were rarely considered to be compatible with 
each other. During the New Order (1966-1998), Suharto continued to promote Pancasila 
as the basis of the Indonesian state. Suharto furthermore continued to promote the 
narrative of a diverse but united Indonesian nation, made up by various ethno-regional 
‘sub-nations’.  
Both Soekarno’s and Suharto’s approach to nation-building reflected the 
modernist approach to nationalism, in which modern means of communication, including 
mass media, enabled the dissemination of the idea of the Indonesian nation to large 
numbers of people across the archipelago. The mass media was accompanied by the 
dissemination of a standardised Indonesian language, Bahasa Indonesia, which 
facilitated communication across various ethno-cultural groups. Furthermore, the idea of 
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the Indonesian nation, including its history of fighting against colonialism, was 
systematically spread through a centralised education system.  
The systematic dissemination of the Indonesian nationhood was even more 
apparent during Suharto’s distinctly authoritarian and militaristic presidency in the New 
Order. In this era, ethno-regional aspirations and various forms of political competition 
were repressed. The narrative of ethno-regional diversity was determined by the central 
government in a top-down manner. At the same time, the central government only 
sanctioned three political parties to give the state some semblance of democracy. In 
effect, political competition, including the aspirations of political Islamists, were strongly 
controlled by the state.  
Prior to 1998, the repression experienced by ethno-cultural groups resulted in 
some separatist conflicts, for example in Aceh and West Papua. These separatist 
movements reflect how the repression of salient identities can generate discontent which 
may erupt in disruptive or violent manners. In the case of separatism in Aceh, the ethno-
regional movement was also imbued with a religious dimension, as the separatist 
movement aspired to establish a state based on Islamic law. 
The demand of Acehnese separatists for an Islamic state, in turn, recalls the long-
standing debate on the ideal relationship between the Indonesian state and religion, 
particularly Islam. This debate first took place before Indonesia’s independence, with 
political Islamists arguing that, as a Muslim-majority state, Indonesia should adopt 
Islamic law as the basis of the state, while secular nationalists wanted a religiously neutral 
state. This debate reflects how varying interpretations of national identity are possible 
among members of the same nation. This situation can pose a challenge if these 
interpretations differ fundamentally from each other, making it difficult to be 
accommodate them within a functioning state with a viable national identity. In the 
Indonesian case, the compromise between political Islamists and secular nationalists 
resulted in a constitution which portrays Indonesia as a pious, pan-religious nation. 
 As the constitution is the basis for all laws and regulations in Indonesia, it is the 
best place to start analysing Indonesia’s present framework for diversity and 
multicultural policies. The most noticeable aspect about the constitution is Indonesia’s 
national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is usually translated into Unity in Diversity 
in English. Furthermore, the constitution highlights two kinds of diversity. Firstly, ethno-
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regional diversity, which is acknowledged in articles that address regional autonomy. 
Secondly, religious diversity, which is acknowledged in articles warranting the freedom 
of religion and cementing the existence of a religious court. 
The present Indonesian constitution has undergone significant amendments post-
1998, including the articles on regional autonomy, which delegate the authority to make 
decisions to regional governments with the exception of decisions pertaining to foreign 
affairs, national security and fiscal matters. In this regard, this thesis has shown some 
effects of democratisation on internally diverse states which enables the bottom-up 
expression of particular identities. In post-1998 Indonesia, democratisation has allowed 
the creation of regional autonomy laws which allow provinces to make political decisions 
in accordance with local values and hold local direct elections. In turn, regional autonomy 
has allowed people to be more content with the state. Renewed freedom of association 
has further allowed political Islamists to channel their aspirations through Islamic 
political parties. At the same time, a renewed freedom of expression has enabled the 
expression of views that challenge the very foundations of the state, for example, the 
now-disbanded Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia that campaigned to replace the Pancasila with 
Islamic law. The situation in Indonesia thus reflects scholarly debates on the effect of 
democratisation on internally diverse states, as democratisation can lead to more 
inclusive political practices, but also lead to the fragmentation of the state. Indonesia’s 
example indicates that the effect of democratisation on a culturally diverse state depends 
on the exact type of diversity: in this case, religious diversity is more polarising than 
ethno-regional diversity. 
I have examined Indonesia’s present framework for diversity for multiculturalism 
through three dimensions. First, Indonesia’s framework for diversity has been examined 
through the context in which elites laid out the foundations for multiculturalism. A 
multiculturalist foundation of the state should explicitly accommodate the collective 
rights of various ethno-regional and religious groups, with the celebration of diverse 
identities as an end in itself. However, in Indonesia, the framework for diversity is the 
result of a political compromise between secular nationalists and Islamists. Hence, 
policies pertaining to diversity have primarily been a means for the self-preservation of 
the state, safeguarding the country’s overall national unity and diversity.  
Indonesia’s present framework for diversity has become more multiculturalist 
post-1998; it grants more accommodation for diverse ethno-regional and religious 
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identities. Yet, above all, this framework for diversity is still intended to preserve the 
integrity of the state, which is apparent in the differentiation of the state’s treatment of 
ethno-regional diversity and religious diversity. There is more accommodation for the 
expression of ethno-regional identities than religious identities, as ethno-regional 
identities are not considered to constitute a similar challenge to Indonesia’s overall 
national identity and unity. The prevalent narrative of ethno-regional groups as 
Indonesia’s sub-nations and the complementary relationship between national and ethno-
regional identities has enabled more space for the expression of ethno-regional identities. 
For instance, regional autonomy laws have allowed the establishment of new 
administrative provinces based on ethnic and cultural boundaries, and discrimination 
based on people’s ethno-regional identity is classified as a criminal offense. In turn, 
participants expressed contentment with the state due to the space provided for the 
expression of ethno-regional identities. In contrast, the freedom to express religious 
identities is limited, as the state only acknowledges six world religions (Islam, 
Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism) in their 
mainstream interpretation. Furthermore, the state continues to mollify the demands of 
political Islamists by providing various privileges for Islam not enjoyed by any other 
religious groups in the country. These privileges further indicate that multicultural 
policies in Indonesia have not been established solely for the celebration of diverse 
identities. 
Second, I have examined the extent of legal pluralism in Indonesia, including the 
range of particular groups who are recognised and accommodated by the state. A 
multiculturalist state should provide equal treatment to its various ethno-regional and 
religious groups, regardless of their size or political leverage. However, Indonesia’s legal 
pluralism does not extend equal treatment to all of its religious and ethno-regional groups. 
The expression of religious identity in Indonesia, as stated previously, is limited to six 
legally recognised world religions. Out of these six religions, Islam enjoys the most 
privileges from the state, reflecting the political sway of Islamist groups in the country. 
Meanwhile, laws against blasphemy further prohibit the public display and proselytising 
of faiths beyond the mainstream traditions of the six recognised religions, which inhibits 
minority groups such as the Ahmadiyahs to freely practice their faith. Furthermore, 
despite increasing recognition from the state, Indonesia’s indigenous faith groups do not 
enjoy the same accommodation as world religions; these faith groups even struggle to be 
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recognised as ‘religions’, particularly because they do not fit the mould of monotheistic 
religions. In addition, participants largely displayed pejorative views to indigenous faith 
groups, suggesting an established negative public narrative about them. 
The way the size and political sway of cultural groups affect their standing in the 
state is also apparent in how larger ethno-regional groups are more likely to have their 
rights accommodated by the state. In particular, Indonesia’s framework for ethno-
regional diversity still has to improve its accommodation of its traditional 
societies/indigenous peoples, such as through the reconciliation of national legislations 
with customary laws pertaining to the utilisation of customary lands. These customary 
rights used to be entirely overlooked in the pre-1998 era; therefore, present efforts to 
increase the recognition and accommodation of these rights are a step in the right 
direction for a more multiculturalist approach to diversity, but it is still a work in 
progress. 
 Third, I have examined multiculturalism in Indonesia through the way cultural 
groups perceive themselves and each other. Within an ideal multiculturalist setting, 
intergroup differences are not perceived in a pejorative manner, but accepted and even 
celebrated. Instead of a superficially peaceful coexistence with unaddressed grievances 
and prejudices between cultural groups, there should be sustainable meaningful positive 
interaction among and between cultural groups. In Indonesia, however, prejudices 
continue to exist between various ethno-regional and religious groups despite the largely 
peaceful situation across the country, with perhaps the current exception in West Papua. 
Participants revealed their prejudice towards other groups, for example, during 
discussions on the viability of mixed marriages. There are unspoken grievances and 
mistrust between ethno-regional and religious groups that are hard to capture through 
statistics, and there are no policies in place to explicitly address these grievances. 
Participants’ attitude towards interethnic and interreligious marriages was a 
further indication of an existing projection of negative images between social groups. 
Religious identity constitutes a particularly salient marker for difference which inhibits 
interfaith courtship and marriage, perpetuated by marriage laws which necessitate a 
religious covenant for marriages to be legal. Thus, Indonesia’s marriage laws contribute 
to the continued segregation between religious groups. By contrast, there is no legal 
hurdle for interethnic marriages in Indonesia, and younger, unmarried participants stated 
that they would consider marrying someone from an ethno-regional background different 
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from themselves. However, participants from both older and younger generations 
indicated continued prejudice between different ethno-regional groups, attaching 
negative stereotypes to groups different from their own background. 
In addition, minority groups continue to experience various types of 
discrimination and members of minority groups tend to resign themselves to their 
disadvantaged position, as shown by minority participants in this research. Experiences 
shared by participants of minority religions confirmed that world religions other than 
Islam are merely tolerated instead of accepted, let alone celebrated. Among participants, 
for example, university students from the Muslim majority were unaware of the lack of 
disadvantages faced by their peers from minority religions, such as examinations or 
groups assignments being conducted during minority religious holidays. The 
participants’ experience with cultural diversity thus depends on their status as part of the 
majority or minority. 
The present state of the relationship between cultural groups in Indonesia is partly 
affected by the management of cultural groups during the colonial era. For example, past 
classification of citizens according to their ethno-regional or religious identities can result 
in persisting stereotypes and prejudice. This is the case with Chinese-Indonesians who 
used to be classified as ‘foreign Orientals’ during the colonial era vis-à-vis ethno-regional 
groups who were classified as ‘natives’. To the present day, Chinese-Indonesians are still 
often construed as an immigrant ethnic group even though many have lived in Indonesia 
for generations. This situation shows the way colonialism continues to affect post-
colonial countries for decades after their political independence. 
Considering the three aforementioned dimensions of multiculturalism in 
Indonesia, this thesis has argued that the Indonesian state has adopted an inequitable 
framework for diversity. This framework has thus far been successful in maintaining 
Indonesia’s overall national identity and unity and providing considerable 
accommodation for the expression of various ethno-regional and religious identities. 
However, this framework has its limitations. For instance, despite considerable privileges 
extended to Islam, there has been no end to the debate on the relation between the state 
and religion, as evident from continued demands for a constitutional status for Islam. 
Indonesia’s framework for diversity also has yet to provide equitable treatment to its 
diverse ethno-regional and religious groups, particularly for currently vulnerable groups 
such as traditional societies and indigenous faith groups. In addition, intergroup relations 
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continue to be weighed down by unaddressed grievances and prejudices, even though 
they are largely peaceful at the surface.  
 Furthermore, Indonesia’s framework for diversity has created an environment 
which normalises privileges for the Muslim majority and limitations for religious 
minorities. Thus, the state has not provided equal recognition and accommodation to all 
cultural groups within it; larger groups with more political sway are more likely to have 
their cultural needs recognised and accommodated by the state. Meanwhile, smaller 
groups with lesser leverage may have to resign themselves to their disadvantaged position 
in society. Indonesia is thus challenged with fostering a more equitable and inclusive 
framework for diversity which can withstand the sway of political Islamists without 
sacrificing minority rights, especially religious minorities. Altogether, this thesis has 
highlighted some positive achievements as well as considerable deficiencies within 
Indonesia’s framework for diversity. Hence, finding and maintaining a better balance 
between the celebration of diversity and the maintenance of unity remains the central 
challenge for the Indonesian state.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
The findings of this research have shown that the current post-1998 framework for 
diversity in Indonesia has largely been able to maintain the nation’s overall identity and 
unity, but there are some improvements to be done. With respect to ethno-regional 
diversity, the state can continue with its existing framework for regional autonomy, as 
the space provided for the expression of ethno-regional identities, including the 
establishment of new administrative provinces, have not caused a waning in the people’s 
sense of belonging to Indonesia. By contrast, this space has increased the people’s 
contentment with the state. However, the state has to further increase its recognition and 
accommodation of the traditional rights of Indonesia’s indigenous communities by 
incorporating their rights into national legislation. At the same time, the Indonesian 
government should continue to spread the narrative of Indonesia being a nation that 
consists of diverse sub-nations, as this narrative has been the main factor that allows the 




 The state further has to be more active in promoting religious moderation and 
tolerance. The teaching of religion and religious practices should be accompanied by 
values of positive interfaith relations; citizenship studies should also put more emphasis 
on positive interfaith relations. The current conditions pertaining to religious diversity in 
Indonesia are particularly inequitable, as the Muslim majority enjoys privileges while 
religious minorities have to resign themselves to disadvantages. The state has to live up 
to its claims of warranting religious freedom as stated in the constitution and avoid 
superfluous adoption of Islamic practices into national legislations. Furthermore, the 
government must be more cognizant of the experiences of religious minorities and, in 
some cases, provide them with affirmative action. Specifically, the state needs to be more 
specific in making discrimination on the basis of religious identity a criminal offense, as 
it previously did for ethno-regional identity.  
   
Recommendations for Future Research 
There are some recommendations for future research pertaining to national identity and 
multiculturalism in Indonesia. As presented in the introduction, the fieldwork for this 
thesis was only conducted in four out of 34 provinces: Aceh, Jakarta, Maluku and West 
Java. While these provinces have provided a good variation of locations in terms of local 
context and demographics, similar research can be done in other locations across the 
country. Provinces such as Hindu-majority Bali or other Christian-majority areas could 
provide particularly interesting insights. West Papua, with its ongoing case of separatism, 
is important location for assessing the ability of the Indonesian state to remain united. 
Given sufficient time and resources, similar research could be conducted across all 
provinces in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, because the fieldwork for this thesis was largely contained to urban 
and suburban areas around the capital city of each province, future research could include 
more rural areas, where the population may feel stronger ethno-regional attachments than 
the population of urban areas. Thus, there may be interesting variations within the same 
provinces. The comparison between diverse urban areas and more homogeneous rural 
areas can contribute to the understanding of the way exposure to cultural pluralism affects 
people’s understanding of diversity and multiculturalism.  
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In this research, I chose to focus on ethno-regional and religious identities and 
their connection to people’s understanding of national identity, because these are the two 
aspects of diversity highlighted in Indonesia’s constitution. However, there are more 
aspects to people’s identities than ethno-regional and religious ones. As shown by some 
participants’ aversion to LGBTQ issues and the salience of religion, for instance, it would 
be interesting to examine feelings of national identity and belonging among Indonesians 
who identify as queer.  
In addition, the demand of political Islamists for more accommodation of Islamic 
law in the country has been a recurring theme throughout this thesis. As such, a further 
study examining the attitude of the members of Muslim political parties pertaining to the 
Indonesian national identity can shed more light on the current conditions pertaining to 
Islamist aspirations in the country. Furthermore, another study could compare the attitude 
of people from different political alignments to examine their understanding of the ideal 
Indonesian national identity. 
Furthermore, for this research, I examined variations between provinces, between 
majority and minority groups, as well as between older and younger participants. For 
future research, it would be interesting to examine to what extent other factors such as 
participants’ level of education and economic class contribute to their perception and 
understanding of their national identity. While this research has focused on laypeople 
participants from various backgrounds as well as university students, future research 
could control for the occupation of participants by focusing on particular vocational 
groups. For example, a study on members of the armed forces or civil servants could 
yield salient results.  
There were some intriguing points that could not be followed up directly with 
participants, as analysis was done following the completion of the fieldwork. For 
example, some findings indicated that participants in Aceh and Maluku displayed more 
positive feelings about their national identity and claimed a stronger sense of attachment 
to Indonesia than their peers in Jakarta and West Java. This finding could be further 
examined. I have reasoned that the local history of separatism has compelled participants 
to claim a strong sense of attachment towards Indonesia, either due to a stronger local 
socialisation of national identity or to the participants’ reluctance to be affiliated with 
separatism. For future research, it would be fruitful to study to what extent a local history 
of separatism and/or violent conflict affects people’s sense of attachment towards their 
233 
 
country. Altogether, these recommendations should contribute to a better understanding 
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Özkırımlı, Umut. Contemporary Debates on Nationalism : A Critical Engagement.  
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
———. Theories of Nationalism : A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed.  Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
———. Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. 3rd ed.  London: Palgrave, 
2017. 
Paget, Roger K., ed. Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno's Defence Oration in the Political 
Trial of 1930. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Paham, Martini. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (9 May 2018). 
Parekh, Bhikhu C. Rethinking Multiculturalism : Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. 
2nd ed.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
247 
 
Parker, Lyn, Chang-Yau Hoon, and Raihani. “Young People's Attitudes Towards Inter-
Ethnic and Inter-Religious Socializing, Courtship and Marriage in Indonesia.” 
South East Asia Research 22, no. 4 (2014): 467-86. 
Pasha, Kemal. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (9 February 2018). 
Peacock, James. Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective. Goodyear Regional 
Anthropology Series. edited by Edward Norbeck Pacific Palisades, California: 
Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1973. 
“Penetapan Presiden Nomor 1 Tahun 1965 Tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan 
Dan/Atau Penodaan Agama.” edited by Government of Indonesia, 1965. 
“Pengumuman Pendaftaran Bakal Pasangan Calon Dalam Pemilihan Gubernur Dan 
Wakil Gubernur Maluku Tahun 2018.” edited by Komisi Pemilihan Umum 
Provinsi Maluku, 2018. 
“Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2019 Tentang Administrasi 
Kependudukan.” edited by Government of Indonesia, 2019. 
Permana, Aan. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (7 May 2018). 
Phillips, Anne. Gender and Culture. Gender & Culture.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. 
———. Multiculturalism without Culture.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Pierce, Roger. Research Methods in Politics : A Practical Guide.  London: Sage, 2008. 
“Pilkada Maluku Berjalan Damai, ‘Masyarakat Jenuh’ Dengan Isu Sara Dan Konflik.” 
BBC, accessed 2018 https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44637916. 
Pisani, Elizabeth. Indonesia Etc. : Exploring the Improbable Nation. Indonesia Etcetera. 
First edition. ed.  New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014. 
Polymenopoulou, Eleni. “Lgbti Rights in Indonesia: A Human Rights Perspective.” Asia-
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 19, no. 1 (2018): 27-44. 
Prasetyawan, Wahyu. “Ethnicity and Voting Patterns in the 2007 and 2012 Gubernatorial 
Elections in Jakarta.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33, no. 1 (2014): 
29-54. 
“Profil Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Aman).” AMAN, accessed 13 September 
2018,  http://www.aman.or.id/profil-aliansi-masyarakat-adat-nusantara/. 
Purdey, Jemma. Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999.  Singapore: Singapore 
Press, 2006. 
Rachman, Arief. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (3 May 2018). 
Rahayu, Agustini. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (9 May 2018). 
248 
 
Raihani. “Minority Right to Attend Religious Education in Indonesia.” Al-Jami'ah: 
Journal of Islamic Studies 53, no. 1 (2015): 1-26. 
Ramage, Douglas. Politics in Indonesia : Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of 
Tolerance.  London: Routledge, 1995. 
Ransome, Paul. Ethics and Values in Social Research. Ethics & Values in Social 
Research. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
Read, Melvyn, and David Marsh. “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods.” 
Chap. 11 in Theory and Methods in Political Science, edited by David Marsh and 
Gerry Stoker, 231-48. London: Palgrave McMillan, 2002. 
Reid, Anthony. “Remembering and Forgetting War and Revolution.” in Beginning to 
Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present, edited by Mary S. Zurbuchen, 
168-208. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005. 
Richards, Lyn. Handling Qualitative Data : A Practical Guide. 2nd ed.  London: SAGE, 
2009. 
Ricklefs, M. C. A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200. 3rd ed. ed.  Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1300. 2nd ed.  Hampshire: 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1983. 
Ropi, Ismatu. Religion and Regulation in Indonesia.  Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017. 
Roy, Srirupa. Beyond Belief : India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism.  
Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. 
Rubin, Herbert J., and Irene S. Rubin. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data.  
London: Sage, 1995. 
“Ruling No. 35/Puu-X-2012.” edited by Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 
2012. 
Salazar, Jose Miguel. “Social Identity and National Identity.” in Social Identity: 
International Perspectives, edited by Stephen Worchel, J. Francisco Morales, 
Dario Paez and Jean-Claude Deschamps, 114-23. London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd, 1998. 
Salim, Arskal. Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern 
Indonesia.  Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008. 
Sande, Gerald N., and Mark P. Zanna. “Cognitive Dissonance Theory: Collective 
Actions and Individual Reactions.” Chap. 3 in Theories of Group Behavious, 
249 
 
edited by Brian Mullen and George R. Goethals, 49-70. New York: Spinger-
Verlag, 1987. 
Schefold, Reimar. “The Domestication of Culture: Nation-Building and Ethnic Diversity 
in Indonesia.” Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 154, no. 2 (1998): 259-80. 
Schulte Nordholt, Henk. “Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, Modernity, and the Post-
Colonial State.” Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the 
Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 167, no. 4 (2011): 386-404. 
Schulze, Fritz. “From Colonial Times to Revolution and Integration.” Chap. 4 in Aceh: 
History, Politics and Culture, edited by Arndt Graf, Susanne Schroter and Edwin 
Wieringa, 63-77. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010. 
Shah, Dian A. H. “Constitutional Arrangements on Religion and Religious Freedom in 
Malaysia and Indonesia: Furthering or Inhibiting Rights?”. The Indonesian 
Journal of International & Comparative Law: Socio-Political Perspectives 1, no. 
1 (2014): 260. 
Shah, Dian Abdul Hamed. Constitutions, Religion and Politics in Asia : Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka.  Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017. 
Sherif, Muzafer. Group Conflict and Co-Operation: Their Social Psychology.  London: 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1967. 
Silvita, Mary. “Presiden Non-Muslim Dalam Komunitas Masyarakat Muslim.” Islamica: 
Jurnal Studi Keislaman 7, no. 1 (2014): 44-60. 
Sites, Bodies and Stories: Imagining Indonesian History. edited by Susan Legene, 
Bambang Purwanto and Henk Schulte Nordholt Singapore: NUS Press, 2015. 
Smith, Anthony D. National Identity.  London: Penguin, 1991. 
———. Nationalism. Key Concepts. 2nd ed.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010. 
———. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century.  New York: New York University Press, 
1979. 
Sneddon, James N. The Indonesian Language : Its History and Role in Modern Society.  
Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press, 2003. 
Sombolinggi, Rukka. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (14 May 2018). 
Somers, Margaret. “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network 
Approach.” Theory and Society 23, no. 5 (1994): 605-49. 
250 
 
Spencer, Vicki. “"Communitarianism" and Patriotism.” in Handbook of Patriotism, 
edited by Mitja Sardoc, 1-20. Cham: Springer, 2019. 
———. Herder's Political Thought : A Study of Language, Culture, and Community.  
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. 
———. “Herder and Nationalism: Reclaiming the Principle of Cultural Respect.” 
Australian Journal of Politics & History 43, no. 1 (1997): 1-13. 
“Statistik Politik 2016.” edited by Badan Pusat Statistik. Indonesia: Badan Pusat 
Statistik, 2017. 
Subagio, Johanes. Interview by Budi Annisa Sidi (21 February 2018). 
Suciati. “Visual Effects of the First Ladies' Kebaya Clothing on the Image of Indonesian 
Women's Appearances.” IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and 
Engineering 128, no. 1 (2016): 1-4. 
“Sumpah Pemuda.” Pemerintah Provinsi DKI Jakarta, accessed 12 April 2017,  
http://www.jakarta.go.id/web/encyclopedia/detail/3036/Sumpah-Pemuda. 
Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta. Indonesia's Population : 
Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape.  Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 
Tajfel, Henri. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
———. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” In Annual Review of Psychology, 
1-39, 1982. 
Tan, Lena. Metropolitan Identities and Twentieth-Century Decolonization. Metropolitan 
Identities and 20th Century Decolonization.  Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. 
Taylor, Charles. “Atomism.” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, edited by Charles 
Taylor, 187-210. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
———. “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate.” in Philosophical 
Arguments, edited by Charles Taylor, 181-203. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995. 
———. “Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein.” in 
Philosophical Arguments, edited by Charles Taylor, 61-78. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995. 
———. “The Politics of Recognition.” in Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader, 
edited by Colin Farelly, 269-81. London: SAGE Publication, 2004. 
251 
 
———. Reconciling the Solitudes.  Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993. 
———. Sources of the Self : The Making of the Modern Identity. 1st pbk. ed.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
———. “Understanding and Ethnocentricity.” Chap. 4 in Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, edited by Charles Taylor, 116-33. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Taylor, Jean Gelman. Indonesia: Peoples and History.  New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003. 
Tip, Linda K., Hanna Zagefka, Roberto Gonzales, Rupert Brown, Marco Cinirella, and 
Xue Na. “Is Support for Multiculturalism Threatened By...Threat Itself?”. 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012): 22-30. 
Tjipta Sari, Betty, Fons van de Vijver, Atha Chasiotis, and Michael Bender. 
“Contextualized Bilingualism among Adolescents from Four Different Ethnic 
Groups in Indonesia.” International Journal of Bilingualism  (2018): 1-14. 
Tokawa, Kenji. “Indigenous Legal Traditions and Canadian Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: 
Indonesian Lessons for Legal Pluralism in Canada.” Journal of legal pluralism 
and unofficial law 48, no. 1 (2016): 17-40. 
Tonny, S. B. Hoedodo, Surjo Joko, and Qodir Zuly. “Local Political Conflict and Pela 
Gandong Amidst the Religious Conflicts.” Journal of Government and Politics 
4, no. 2 (2013): 336-49. 
Toy-Cronin, Bridgette. “Ethical Issues in Insider-Outsider Research.” Chap. 30 in The 
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research Ethics, edited by Ron Iphofen and 
Martin Tolich, 455-70. London: Sage Publications, 2018. 
Turner, Mark, Owen Podger, Maria Sumardjono, and Wayan K. Tirthayasa. 
Decentralisation in Indonesia: Redesigning the State.  Canberra: Asia Pacific 
Press, 2003. 
“Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.” edited by Government 
of Indonesia, 1945. 
“Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 Tentang Perkawinan.” 
edited by Government of Indonesia, 1974. 
“Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 2009 Tentang Kepariwisataan.” 
edited by Government of Indonesia, 2009. 
“Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 24 Tahun 2013 Tentang Administrasi 
Kependudukan.” edited by Government of Indonesia, 2013. 
252 
 
“Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2008 Tentang Penghapusan 
Diskriminasi Ras Dan Etnis.” edited by Government of Indonesia, 2008. 
Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and 
Pressure for Change. Revised Edition ed.  London: Routledge, 1993. 
Verkuyten, Maykel. “Multiculturalism and Tolerance: An Intergroup Perspective.” in 
The Psychology of Social and Cultural Diversity, edited by Richard J. Crisp, 145-
70. Oxford, UK, 2010. 
———. The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity.  Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2005. 
Vickers, Adrian. “History of Modern Indonesia.” Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
Vincent, Andrew. Nationalism and Particularity.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Vitikainen, Annamari. The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism : Towards an Individuated 
Approach to Cultural Diversity.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Wahib, Ahmad Bunyan. “Questioning Liberal Islam in Indonesia: Response and Critique 
to Jaringan Islam Liberal.” Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 44, no. 1 
(2006): 23-51. 
Wahid, Ramli Abdul. “Aliran Minoritas Dalam Islam Di Indonesia.” Journal of 
Contemporary Islam and Muslim Societies 1, no. 2 (2018): 141-63. 
Weltman, David, and Michael Billig. “The Political Psychology of Contemporary Anti‐
Politics: A Discursive Approach to the End‐of‐Ideology Era.” Political 
Psychology 22, no. 2 (2001): 367-82. 
Whitebrook, Maureen. “Identity, Narrative and Politics.” New York: Taylor and Francis, 
2014. 
Wiciarz, Krystian. “The Formation and Persistence of the Indonesian National 
Community.” Hemispheres 26 (2011): 163-74. 
Wickert, Jürgen D. Borobudur. 9th ed.  Jakarta: Intermasa, 1988. 
Woodward, Mark, Mariani Yahya, Inayah Rohmaniyah, Diana Coleman, Chris Lundry, 
and Ali Amin. “The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the 
State in Indonesia.” Contemporary Islam 8, no. 2 (2014): 153-71. 
———. “The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in 
Indonesia.” Dynamics of Muslim Life 8, no. 2 (2014): 153-71. 









Occupation Age Sex Ethnic 
group 










40 M Batak Islam Vocational 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-01 
2 Clerk at a bank 34 M Acehnese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Married Acehnese Islam A-02 
3 Admin support 35 F Acehnese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a A-03 
4 Waiter at coffee 
shop 
36 M Acehnese Islam Vocational 
school 
Single n/a n/a A-04 
5 Employee at a 
small enterprise 
32 M Acehnese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a A-05 




Single n/a n/a A-06 
7 Cook 64 F Acehnese Islam Junior high 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-07 
8 Cook 55 F Minang Islam Junior high 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-08 
9 Cook 59 F Acehnese Islam Junior high 
school 
Widowed Acehnese  Islam A-09 
10 High school 
teacher 
35 F Acehnese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Married Acehnese Islam A-10 
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11 Florist 40 F Chinese Protestant Undergradua
te degree 
Married Chinese Protestant A-11 
12 Cleaner 33 F Acehnese Islam Senior high 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-12 
13 Cleaner 50 F Acehnese Islam Elementary 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-13 
14 Cleaner 42 F Acehnese Islam Elementary 
school 
Married Acehnese Islam A-14 
15 Cleaner 36 M Acehnese Islam Junior high 
school 





Occupation Age Sex Ethnic 
group 







1 Cleaner 35 F Javanese Islam Senior high 
school 
Married Javanese Islam J-01 
2 Taxi driver 58 M Batak Protestant Senior high 
school 
Married Javanese Protestant J-02 
3 Batik vendor 48 F Javanese Islam Senior high 
school 
Married Minang Islam J-03 
4 Blogger/photogr
apher 





Single n/a n/a J-04 
5 Street food 
vendor 
45 M Sundanese Islam Junior high 
school 
Married Sundanese Islam J-05 







Single n/a n/a J-06 
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7 Baby-sitter 21 F Javanese-
Sundanese 
Islam Senior high 
school 
Single n/a n/a J-07 
8 Jewellery shop 
owner 
55 F Chinese Buddhism Undergradua
te degree 
Married Chinese Buddhism J-08 
9 Technician at 
optometrist 
22 M Riau Islam Vocational 
school 
Single n/a n/a J-09 
10 Security guard 56 M Batak Protestant Senior high 
school 
Married Batak Protestant J-10 
11 Marketing staff 
for multinational 
company 
31 F Sundanese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Married Minang Islam J-11 
12 Stage actress 27 F Tolaki Muslim Undergradua
te degree 





Occupation Age Sex Ethnic 
group 







1 School teacher 42 F Maluku Protestant Undergradua
te degree 
Married Maluku Protestant M-01 
2 Retiree/corner 
shop owner  
73 M Javanese Catholic Military 
academy 
Widowed Maluku Catholic M-02 
3 Labourer 47 M Maluku Protestant Junior high 
school 
Married Maluku Protestant M-03 
4 Mechanic 23 M Butonese Islam Vocational 
school 
Single n/a n/a M-04 
5 Mechanic 23 M Bugis Islam Vocational 
school 





18 F Maluku Islam Senior high 
school  
Single n/a n/a M-06 
7 Shopkeeper 24 F Maluku Protestant Senior high 
school 
Single n/a n/a M-07 
8 Office 
administrator 
25 F Maluku Protestant Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a M-08 
9 Seamstress 23 F Butonese Islam Vocational 
school 
Single n/a n/a M-09 
10 Recent graduate 22 F Maluku Protestant Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a M-10 
11 Housewife 38 F Maluku Islam Junior high 
school 
Married Butonese Islam M-11 
12 Corner shop 
owner 
51 F Maluku Islam Junior high 
school 
Married Maluku Islam M-12 
13 Housewife 31 F Maluku Islam Senior high 
school 
Married Maluku Islam M-13 
 
West Java  
No
. 
Occupation Age Sex Ethnic 
group 















31 M Mandar Islam Undergradua
te degree 






3 IT staff 32 F Sundanese Islam Undergradua
te degree 




4 Accounting staff 25 M Sundanese Islam Vocational 
school 




25 M Chinese Catholic Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a WJ-
05 






7 Office manager 39 M Sundanese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Married Sundanese Islam WJ-
07 
8 Office assistant 24 F Sundanese Islam Vocational 
school 
Single n/a n/a WJ-
08 
9 Office assistant 25 F Javanese Islam Vocational 
school 
Single  n/a n/a WJ-
09 
10 Intern at a start-
up 
21 F Batak Protestant Undergradua
te degree 




30 M Sundanese Islam Undergradua
te degree 
Married Sundanese Islam WJ-
11 
12 IT staff 24 M Chinese Protestant Undergradua
te degree 




21 F Chinese Protestant Undergradua
te degree 
Single n/a n/a WJ-
13 
14 Driver 26 M Sundanese Islam Senior high 
school 
Single n/a n/a WJ-
14 




Single n/a n/a WJ-
15 









Appendix 2: Sample interview questions for laypeople participants 
 
1. How do you describe your own identity?  
2. Which ethnic group(s) and religion do you identify with?  
3. What is your age, occupation and educational background? 
4. How do you feel about being Indonesian? 
5. How do you feel about being part of your ethnic group? 
6. How do you feel about being part of your religious group? 
7. What part of your identity do you feel as the most important one? 
8. How do you use Indonesian and your regional language? Which one do you use 
predominantly? 
9. What are your thoughts and experience regarding diversity in the area where you 
live? 
10. Are you married, or in a romantic relationship with someone? Does your partner 
share the same ethnicity and/or religion with you? 
11. Is there any ethnic or religious diversity within your family, including 
aunts/uncles/first cousins? 
12. Does someone’s ethnic or religious background matter to you when looking for a 
potential marriage partner? 
13. Do you get much information around cultural diversity in Indonesia? What do you 
see in the media and how do you feel about it? 
14. Do you have any personal experience with discrimination? 
15. Regarding the upcoming 2018 regional gubernatorial elections, what criteria do you 
feel are most important to look for in a candidate? Do the ethnicity and religion of a 
candidate matter to you? 
16. What could be improved or done differently to further increase your sense of 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire template for university students 
 
Reference Number: 17/131 
 
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA/ 
IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 





Age/Usia   : 
Gender/Gender  : 
Religion/Agama  : 
Ethnicity/Suku Bangsa : 
Area of origin/Daerah asal : 
 
1. How do you feel about being Indonesian? Select one option and explain why. 
Bagaimana perasaan Saudara/i menjadi bagian dari Bangsa Indonesia?Pilih salah 
satu dan jelaskan mengapa. 
□ Very positive/Sangat positif Why/Mengapa? 
□ Positive/Positif 
□ Indifferent/Biasa saja 
□ Negative/Negatif 
□ Very negative/Sangat negatif  
 
2. How strong is your sense of attachment to the Indonesian state? Select one option and 
explain why. 
Sekuat apa rasa memiliki Saudara/i terhadap Negara Indonesia? Pilih salah satu 
dan jelaskan mengapa. 
□ Very strong/sangat kuat   Why/Mengapa? 
□ Strong/kuat 
□ Indifferent/Biasa saja 
□ Weak/Lemah 





3. What could be improved or done differently to further increase your sense of 
attachment to the Indonesian state? 
Hal apa yang dapat diperbaiki atau diubah untuk meningkatkan rasa memiliki 






4. How do you feel about being part of your ethnic group? Select one option and explain 
why. 
Bagaimana perasaan Saudara/i menjadi bagian dari suku bangsa Saudara/i?Pilih 
salah satu dan jelaskan mengapa. 
□ Very positive/Sangat positif Why/Mengapa? 
□ Positive/Positif 
□ Indifferent/Biasa saja 
□ Negative/Negatif 
□ Very negative/Sangat negatif 
5. How do you feel about being part of your religious group? Select one option and 
explain why. 
Bagaimana perasaan Saudara/i menjadi penganut agama Saudara/i?Pilih salah 
satu dan jelaskan mengapa. 
□ Very positive/Sangat positif Why/Mengapa? 
□ Positive/Positif 
□ Indifferent/Biasa saja 
□ Negative/Negatif 
□ Very negative/Sangat negatif 
 
6. Please rank these affiliations from most to least important to you (1: most important, 
5: least important) 
Mohon urutkan afiliasi di bawah ini dari yang paling penting bagi Saudara/i (1: 
paling penting, 5: kurang penting) 
□ the Indonesian State/Negara Indonesia  (      ) 
□ the Indonesian Nation/Bangsa Indonesia (      ) 
□ Religion/Agama     (      ) 
□ Sub-nationality or Ethnicity/Suku bangsa (      ) 
□ Area of origin/Daerah asal   (      ) 
7. What language(s) do you speak on a daily basis? Please specify the language you use 
the most in these circumctances: 
Bahasa apa sajakah yang Saudara/i gunakan sehari-hari? Mohon sebutkan bahasa 
yang paling sering digunakan dalam situasi-situasi berikut: 
□ At home or with family/Di rumah, dengan keluarga: 
□ On campus/Di kampus: 
□ With friends/Dengan teman-teman: 




8. If you went to an event with a dress code that says ‘national clothes’, what type of 
clothing would you wear? 
Jika Saudara/i menghadiri acara yang mewajibkan mengenakan ‘pakaian nasional’, 





9. Do you have people in your family who are from a different ethnic group or different 
religion from you? 
Apakah Saudara/i memiliki anggota keluarga dari kelompok etnis atau agama yang 
berbeda dengan Saudara/i?  
□ No/tidak 
□ Yes/ya → Please specify the ethnicity or religion/mohon sebutkan suku bangsa 
atau agamanya:   
 
    
    How do you feel about this diversity in your family? 
    Bagaimana perasaan Saudara/i terkait kebhinnekaan di keluarga Saudara/i?  
□ Very positive/sangat positif 
□ Positive/positif 
□ Indifferent/biasa saja  
□ Negative/negatif 
□ Very negative/sangat negatif 
10. Do you have close friends who are from a different ethnic group or different religion 
from you? Apakah Saudara/i memiliki sahabat dari kelompok etnis atau agama yang 
berbeda dengan Saudara/i? 
□ No/tidak 
□ Yes/ya → Please specify the ethnicity or religion/mohon sebutkan suku bangsa 
atau agamanya:      
     
How do you feel about this diversity in your circle of close friends? 
   Bagaimana perasaan Saudara terkait kebhinnekaan di lingkaran persahabatan 
Saudara/i?  
□ Very positive/sangat positif 
□ Positive/positif 
□ Indifferent/biasa saja  
□ Negative/negatif 
□ Very negative/sangat negatif 
11. Have you had romantic relations with people from different ethnicities and/or religion 
from you?  
Apakah Saudara/i pernah memiliki hubungan asmara dengan orang dari suku bangsa 
dan/atau agama yang berbeda?  
□ No/tidak 
□ Yes/ya → Please specify the ethnicity or religion/mohon sebutkan suku bangsa 




     
    How have people reacted to this relationship? 
    Bagaimana reaksi orang-orang terhadap hubungan asmara tersebut?  
□ Very positive/sangat positif 
□ Positive/positif 
□ Indifferent/biasa saja  
□ Negative/negatif 
□ Very negative/sangat negatif 
12. Have you ever faced discrimination because of your ethnicity?  
Apakah Saudara/i pernah mengalami diskriminasi karena suku bangsa Saudara/i? 
□ No/tidak 





13. Have you ever faced discrimination because of your religion? 
Apakah Saudara/i pernah mengalami diskriminasi karena agama Saudara/i? 
□ No/tidak 




14. What type of school did you attend before university? 
Sebelum universitas, Saudara/i bersekolah di jenis sekolah apa? 
□ Public school/sekolah negeri 
□ Private school/sekolah swasta 
□ Religious school/sekolah keagamaan 
Please specify/mohon sebutkan nama sekolahnya: 
15. What are your thoughts about and experience with diversity on your campus? 







16. Are there any other issues pertaining to national identity and multiculturalism in 
Indonesia that you wish to raise? 
Adakah hal-hal lain terkait identitas nasional dan kebhinnekaan di Indonesia yang 




Appendix 5: List of focus group discussion participants 
University Aceh A 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Acehnese Islam 19 M 
2 Acehnese Islam 18 M 
3 Indonesian Islam 21 F 
4 Indonesian Islam 20 M 
5 Acehnese Islam 20 F 
6 Acehnese Islam 23 F 
7 Javanese Islam 19 F 
8 Acehnese Islam 19 M 
9 Acehnese Islam 18 M 
10 Acehnese Islam 24 M 
 
University Aceh A – Minority Students 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Papuan Protestant 19 M 
2 Papuan Catholic 22 M 
3 Papuan Catholic 22 F 
4 Papuan Protestant 20 M 
 
University Aceh B 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Acehnese Islam 20 F 
2 Indonesian Islam 20 F 
3 Acehnese Islam 23 F 
4 Acehnese Islam 22 M 
5 Batak Islam 19 M 
6 Acehnese Islam 20 F 
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7 Indonesian Islam 19 F 
8 Acehnese Islam 19 F 
9 Acehnese Islam 18 M 
10 Acehnese Islam 22 M 
11 Acehnese Islam 18 F 
12 Acehnese Islam 20 M 
 
University Jakarta A 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Javanese Islam 19 F 
2 Ambonese Protestant 19 F 
3 Javanese Islam 18 F 
4 Borneo/Dayak Catholic 20 F 
5 Sundanese Islam 18 F 
6 Indonesian Islam 19 M 
7 Batak Protestant 18 M 
8 Batak Protestant 19 F 
9 Chinese-Indonesian Buddhism 21 M 
10 Chinese-Indonesian Buddhism 19 F 
11 Sundanese Islam 18 F 
12 Javanese Islam 18 M 
 
University Jakarta B 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Javanese Islam 18 F 
2 Javanese Islam 18 F 
3 Indonesian Islam 18 F 
4 Batak Protestant 19 F 
5 Batak Protestant 19 M 
6 Javanese Islam 18 M 
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7 Sundanese Islam 19 F 
8 Manado Catholic 20 F 
9 Javanese Catholic 19 M 
10 Minang Islam 19 F 
11 Sundanese Islam 18 F 
12 Javanese Islam 18 M 
 
University Maluku A 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Moluccan Islam 19 M 
2 Butonese Islam 20 F 
3 Moluccan Protestant 19 M 
4 Indonesian Protestant 23 M 
5 Indonesian Protestant 19 M 
6 Indonesian Protestant 19 F 
7 Moluccan Islam 19 M 
8 Javanese Islam 21 M 
9 Moluccan Protestant 20 F 
10 Indonesian Islam 19 F 
 
University Maluku B 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Indonesian Protestant 20 M 
2 Indonesian Catholic 19 F 
3 Moluccan Protestant 20 M 
4 Moluccan Protestant 20 F 
5 Moluccan Islam 19 F 
6 Moluccan Islam 20 M 
7 Moluccan Protestant 18 M 
8 Indonesian Protestant 20 F 
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9 Moluccan Catholic 20 F 
10 Indonesian Protestant 19 F 
11 Indonesian Protestant 20 M 
12 Moluccan Protestant 20 M 
 
University West Java A 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Sundanese Islam 21 F 
2 Sundanese Islam 21 M 
3 Sundanese Islam 22 F 
4 Mixed Hindu 20 F 
5 Indonesian n/a 20 M 
6 Javanese Islam 21 M 
7 Batak Protestant 21 F 
8 Chinese-Indonesian Protestant 19 M 
9 Sundanese Islam 19 F 
10 Sundanese Islam 22 F 
 
University West Java A – Minority Students 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Chinese-Indonesian Catholic 18 F 
2 Chinese-Indonesian Catholic 19 F 
3 Chinese-Indonesian Catholic 19 M 
4 Chinese-Indonesian Protestant 19 M 
 
University West Java B 
No Ethnicity Religion Age Sex 
1 Sundanese Islam 19 F 
2 Minang Islam 20 F 
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3 Javanese Catholic 20 F 
4 Chinese-Indonesian Buddhism 21 M 
5 Sundanese Islam 21 M 
6 Minang Islam 18 F 
7 Mixed Protestant 19 M 
8 Malay Islam 19 F 
9 Sundanese Islam 20 F 





Appendix 6: Sample questions for focus group discussions 
1. Please elaborate on what you think is the Indonesian national identity – are there 
any characteristics you associate particularly with being ‘Indonesian’? 
2. How do you personally feel about being Indonesian? 
3. How do you feel about diversity among the population of Indonesia? 
4. How do you feel about diversity on campus? 
5. What are your personal experiences with discrimination on campus? 
6. Do you think your cultural/ethnic/religious group is well represented at the national 
level, for example through government policies or by the media? 
7. What could be improved or done differently to further increase your sense of 




Appendix 7: List of elite participants 
No
. 











Banda Aceh 13 February 
2018 
2 Wirya Adiwena Researcher Habibie 
Foundation 
Jakarta 7 May 2018 
3 Saifuddin 
Bantasyam  
Law professor Universitas 
Syiah Kuala 








Jakarta 31 January 
2018 
5 Hasan Caretaker  Darma Bhakti 
Buddhist 
Temple 
Banda Aceh 26 February 
2018 




Jakarta 7 May 2018 
7 Petrus Canisius 
Mandagi 
Bishop Roman Catholic 
Diocese of 
Amboina 

















Jakarta 29 January 
2018 







Jakarta 9 May 2018 
11 Kemal Pasha Anthropologist Universitas 
Malukissaleh 
Banda Aceh 9 February 
2018 





Jakarta 7 May 2018 
































Jakarta 14 May 2018 
16 Johanes Subagio Parishioner Catholic Church 
of the Holy 
Heart 
Banda Aceh 21 February 
2018 

















Appendix 8: Sample interview questions for elites 
1. How would you describe the Indonesian national identity? 
2. How do you view the diversity among the population of Indonesia? 
3. What is the role of your position/institution in relation to national identity and 
multiculturalism in Indonesia? 
4. What are your personal experiences in dealing with Indonesia’s cultural diversity 
during your current/past position? 
5. What issues do you see arising out of diversity in Indonesia, and what do you think 
should be done to address them? 
 
Note: These are only guiding questions and were tailored according to each 





Appendix 9: Information sheet for individual laypeople participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
(One-on-One Interview for Laypeople) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate I 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and I thank 
you for considering our request.   
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD at the University 
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
This research explores how national identity is constituted in Indonesia. It aims to 
examine the factors which challenge the Indonesian national identity and those that 
contribute to its maintenance. It also looks into how government policies shape national 
identity and vice-a-versa.  
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
This project seeks participants from the following criteria: 
1. Public figures and officials of the Indonesian government, selected according 
their position; 
2. Tertiary students; 
3. The grass-roots of society.  
Participants should hold an Indonesian citizenship and be at least 18 years old.  
Participants will be presented with a small souvenir as a token of appreciation. 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in a one-on-
one interview for the duration of approximately 30 minutes to an hour.  
Please be aware that if you decide not to take part in the project or at any moment wish 






What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
Interviews will involve an open-questioning technique and will be recorded on a digital 
voice recorder, unless the participant objects to being recorded. The general line of 
questioning involves asking about interviewees’ thoughts and perceptions on national 
identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia. The precise nature of the questions which will 
be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops. Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee 
has not been able to review the precise questions to be used. 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant 
or uncomfortable, you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
All laypeople participating in interviews will remain anonymous. Please be aware that 
we will make every attempt to preserve your anonymity. You will also be given the 
option on your willingness to be recorded.  It is absolutely up to you which option you 
prefer. 
The results of the project will be submitted as a PhD dissertation, and may be published 
as academic articles. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project.  
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only my supervisor and I 
will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained 
for at least five years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants 
will be destroyed at the completion of research even though the data derived from the 
research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free 
to contact either:- 
Budi Annisa Sidi and  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Department of Politics   Department of Politics 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (Ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 








IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
LEMBAR INFORMASI BAGI PESERTA 
(Wawancara Pribadi bagi Masyarakat Umum) 
 
Terima kasih atas ketertarikan Bapak/Ibu terhadap proyek ini. Mohon pelajari lembar 
informasi ini dengan seksama sebelum menentukan kesediaan untuk berpartisipasi. 
Terima kasih apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan melibatkan diri dalam penelitian ini. Apabila 
tidak, maka tidak terdapat kerugian sedikitpun bagi Bapak/Ibu, dan kami ucapkan terima 
kasih atas perkenan pertimbangan Bapak/Ibu. 
 
Apakah tujuan dari proyek ini? 
Proyek ini merupakan bagian dari program PhD (S3) pada University of Otago di 
Dunedin, Selandia Baru. Penelitian ini bertujuan menelaah pembentukan identitas 
nasional di Indonesia dengan mempelajari faktor-faktor yang membantu maupun 
menghambat pembentukan identitas nasional tersebut. Penelitian ini juga menelaah 
bagaimana kebijakan pemerintah membentuk identitas nasional, dan sebaliknya. 
 
Partisipan seperti apakah yang dibutuhkan? 
Proyek ini mencari partisipan dari kriteria berikut ini: 
1. Figur publik dan pejabat pemerintah Indonesia yang dipilih berdasarkan 
kewenangan atau jabatannya;  
2. Mahasiswa; 
3. Kalangan akar rumput masyarakat.  
Partisipan adalah Warga Negara Indonesia (WNI) yang berusia setidaknya 18 tahun.  
Partisipan akan mendapatkan cenderamata sebagai tanda terima kasih atas 
keikutsertaannya. 
 
Apakah yang diharapkan dari para partisipan? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu akan 
diminta untuk berpartisipasi dalam wawancara pribadi dengan durasi 30 menit sampai 
dengan satu jam. Apabila Bapak/Ibu tidak berkenan berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini, atau 
kapanpun Bapak/Ibu ingin mengakhiri partisipasinya, maka tidak terdapat kerugian 




Data atau Informasi apakah yang dikumpulkan, dan bagaimana data/informasi 
tersebut akan digunakan? 
Wawancara pribadi akan dilakukan dengan teknik tanya jawab terbuka dan direkam 
secara audio, kecuali apabila terdapat keberatan dari partisipan. Secara umum, 
pertanyaan wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran dan persepsi partisipan mengenai 
identitas nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang akan diajukan 
tidak ditentukan secara rinci sejak awal, melainkan akan mengikuti alur percakapan 
dalam wawancara. Oleh karena itu, Komite Etik University of Otago memahami cakupan 
wawancara ini, namun tidak dapat menelaah seluruh pertanyaan yang akan diajukan. 
Apabila perkembangan wawancara menimbulkan ketidaknyamanan bagi Bapak/Ibu, 
maka Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu menolak menjawab pertanyaan maupun 
mengakhiri keikutsertaannya dalam proyek ini tanpa kerugian apapun. 
Masyarakat umum yang menjalani wawancara dijamin anonimitasnya. Kami akan 
sepenuhnya menjaga anonimitas Bapak/Ibu. Bapak/Ibu dapat menentukan kesediaan 
untuk direkam secara audio. Bapak/Ibu memiliki kebebasan sepenuhnya untuk 
menentukan hal tersebut di atas.   
Hasil penelitian ini akan dipublikasikan sebagai disertasi PhD/S3 dan kemungkinan juga 
akan diterbitkan dalam jurnal akademik. Bapak/Ibu dapat meminta hasil-hasil penelitian 
ini.  
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan secara aman dan hanya dapat diakses oleh peneliti 
serta pembimbingnya. Data tersebut akan disimpan untuk setidaknya lima tahun, namun 
informasi pribadi partisipan akan dimusnahkan pada akhir penelitian. Hanya data yang 
relevan bagi hasil penelitian akan disimpan untuk jangka waktu panjang yang tidak 
ditentukan. 
Dapatkah partisipan berubah pikiran dan mengundurkan diri? 
Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan 
kerugian apapun bagi Bapak/Ibu.  
 
Bagaimana apabila partisipan memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu memiliki pertanyaan terkait proyek ini, baik saat ini maupun di masa 
mendatang, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi: 
Budi Annisa Sidi dan  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Jurusan Politik  Jurusan Politik 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 




Appendix 10: Consent form for individual laypeople participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR   
GRASS-ROOTS INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information such as audio recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend 
will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
involves asking about interviewees’ thoughts and perceptions on national identity 
and multiculturalism in Indonesia.  The precise nature of the questions which will be 
asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops. In the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way 
that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any 
kind. 
 
5. This research project is funded by the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education 
(Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP). Participants will be given a token of 
gratitude for their participation. 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but my participation is anonymous and 




7.     I, as the participant: a) agree to being recorded in the interview,   OR
  
 
  b) disagree to being recorded. 
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (Ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 






Reference code: 17/131 
 
 
IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
FORMULIR PERSETUJUAN BAGI 
PARTISIPAN WAWANCARA MASYARAKAT UMUM 
 
Saya telah membaca Lembar Informasi proyek ini dan memahami tujuannya. Segala 
pertanyaan yang saya ajukan telah dijawab secara memuaskan. Saya mengetahui bahwa 
saya berhak meminta informasi lebih lanjut sewaktu-waktu. 
Saya mengetahui bahwa:- 
1. Keikutsertaan saya dalam proyek ini sepenuhnya sukarela; 
 
2. Saya dapat mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini sewaktu-waktu tanpa kerugian 
apapun; 
 
3. Informasi pribadi yang dapat mengidentifikasi saya, seperti rekaman audio, akan 
dimusnahkan pada akhir proyek ini, namun data mentah yang menentukan hasil 
penelitian akan disimpan secara aman untuk setidaknya lima tahun; 
 
4.  Proyek ini menggunakan teknik tanya jawab terbuka. Secara umum, pertanyaan 
wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran dan persepsi partisipan mengenai identitas 
nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang akan diajukan tidak 
ditentukan secara rinci sejak awal, melainkan akan mengikuti alur percakapan dalam 
wawancara. Apabila saya merasa tidak nyaman dengan perkembangan wawancara 
maupun pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan, saya dapat menolak untuk menjawab 
maupun mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan kerugian apapun 
bagi saya.  
 
5. Penelitian ini didanai oleh Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP. Partisipan 
akan mendapatkan tanda terima kasih untuk keikutsertaannya.  
 
6. Hasil proyek ini akan dipublikasikan dan tersedia di Perpustakaan University of 
Otago (Dunedin, Selandia Baru). Namun demikian, keikutsertaan saya bersifat 
anonim dan segala upaya akan dilakukan untuk menjamin anonimitas saya.  
 
7.    Saya, selaku partisipan:  a) setuju direkam audio saat wawancara,  
 ATAU  
 





Saya setuju berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Nama peneliti lapangan 
 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 




Appendix 11: Information sheet for university student participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
(Self-Administered Questionnaire) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate I 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and I thank 
you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD at the University 
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
This research aims to explore how national identity is constituted in Indonesia. It aims to 
examine the factors which challenge the Indonesian national identity and which 
contribute to its maintenance. It also looks into how government policies shape national 
identity and vice versa.  
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
This project seeks participants from the following criteria: 
1. Public figures and officials of the Indonesian government, selected according 
their position; 
2. Tertiary students; 
3. The grass-roots of society.  
Participants should hold an Indonesian citizenship and be at least 18 years old.  
Participants will be presented with a small souvenir as a token of appreciation. 
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to fill out a self-
administered questionnaire containing eight (8) open-ended questions. 
Please be aware that if you decide not to take part in the project or at any moment wish 




What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
Questionnaires are to be filled out by participants in their own time and at their own 
convenience and will be collected after a maximum of three (3) days since their 
distribution. Questionnaires may be filled in Indonesian or English. A souvenir will be 
presented upon the return of a complete questionnaire.  
In the event of questions that make you feel hesitant or uncomfortable, you are reminded 
of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and also that you may 
withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
All questionnaire participants will remain anonymous. Please be aware that we will make 
every attempt to preserve your anonymity.  
The results of the project will be submitted as a PhD dissertation, and may be published 
as academic articles. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project.  
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only my supervisor and I 
will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained 
for at least five years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants 
will be destroyed at the completion of research even though the data derived from the 
research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free 
to contact either:- 
Budi Annisa Sidi and  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Department of Politics   Department of Politics 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (Ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 








IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
LEMBAR INFORMASI BAGI PESERTA 
(Kuesioner Mandiri) 
 
Terima kasih atas ketertarikan Bapak/Ibu terhadap proyek ini. Mohon pelajari lembar 
informasi ini dengan seksama sebelum menentukan kesediaan untuk berpartisipasi. 
Terima kasih apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan melibatkan diri dalam penelitian ini. Apabila 
tidak, maka tidak terdapat kerugian sedikitpun bagi Bapak/Ibu, dan kami ucapkan terima 
kasih atas perkenan pertimbangan Bapak/Ibu. 
 
Apakah tujuan dari proyek ini? 
Proyek ini merupakan bagian dari program PhD (S3) pada University of Otago di 
Dunedin, Selandia Baru. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan menelaah pembentukan identitas nasional di Indonesia dengan 
mempelajari faktor-faktor yang membantu maupun menghambat pembentukan identitas 
nasional tersebut. Penelitian ini juga menelaah bagaimana kebijakan pemerintah 
membentuk identitas nasional, dan sebaliknya. 
Partisipan seperti apakah yang dibutuhkan? 
Proyek ini mencari partisipan dari kriteria berikut ini: 
1. Figur publik dan pejabat pemerintah Indonesia yang dipilih berdasarkan 
kewenangan atau jabatannya;  
2. Mahasiswa; 
3. Kalangan akar rumput masyarakat.  
Partisipan adalah Warga Negara Indonesia (WNI) yang berusia setidaknya 18 tahun.  
Partisipan akan mendapatkan cenderamata sebagai tanda terima kasih atas 
keikutsertaannya. 
Apakah yang diharapkan dari para partisipan? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu akan 
diminta untuk Mengisi sebuah kuesioner tertulis yang terdiri atas delapan (8) pertanyaan. 
Dalam hal Bapak/Ibu tidak berkenan berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini, atau pada saat 





Data atau Informasi apakah yang dikumpulkan, dan bagaimana data/informasi 
tersebut akan digunakan? 
Kuesioner dapat diisi oleh partisipan sesuai dengan keluangan waktunya dan akan 
dikumpulkan selambat-lambatnya tiga (3) hari setelah dibagikan. Kuesioner dapat diisi 
menggunakan Indonesian maupun Bahasa Inggris. Cenderamata akan diberikan pada 
partisipan yang telah mengembalikan kuesioner yang telah diisi. 
Apabila terdapat pertanyaan yang menimbulkan ketidaknyamanan bagi partisipan, maka 
partisipan dapat menolak menjawab pertanyaan maupun mengakhiri keikutsertaannya 
dalam proyek ini tanpa kerugian apapun. 
Partisipan yang mengisi kuesioner dijamin anonimitasnya. Kami akan sepenuhnya 
menjaga anonimitas Bapak/Ibu.  
Hasil penelitian ini akan dipublikasikan sebagai disertasi PhD/S3 dan kemungkinan juga 
akan diterbitkan dalam jurnal akademik. Bapak/Ibu dapat meminta hasil-hasil penelitian 
ini.  
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan secara aman dan hanya dapat diakses oleh peneliti 
serta pembimbingnya. Data tersebut akan disimpan untuk setidaknya lima tahun, namun 
informasi pribadi partisipan akan dimusnahkan pada akhir penelitian. Hanya data yang 
relevan bagi hasil penelitian akan disimpan untuk jangka waktu panjang yang tidak 
ditentukan. 
Dapatkah partisipan berubah pikiran dan mengundurkan diri? 
Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan 
kerugian apapun bagi Bapak/Ibu.  
Bagaimana apabila partisipan memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu memiliki pertanyaan terkait proyek ini, baik saat ini maupun di masa 
mendatang, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi: 
Budi Annisa Sidi dan  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Jurusan Politik  Jurusan Politik 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 




Appendix 12: Consent form for university student participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
CONSENT FORM  FOR   
QUESTIONNAIRE PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information such as written questionnaires may be destroyed at 
the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves the filling out of a questionnaire on my thoughts and 
perceptions on national identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia. In the event of 
questions which make me feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer 
any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any 
disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5. This research project is funded by the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education 
(Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP). Participants will be given a token of 
gratitude for their participation. 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but my participation is anonymous and 






I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 




Reference code: 17/131 
 
 
IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
FORMULIR PERSETUJUAN BAGI 
PARTISIPAN KUESIONER 
 
Saya telah membaca Lembar Informasi proyek ini dan memahami tujuannya. Segala 
pertanyaan yang saya ajukan telah dijawab secara memuaskan. Saya mengetahui bahwa 
saya berhak meminta informasi lebih lanjut sewaktu-waktu. 
Saya mengetahui bahwa:- 
1. Keikutsertaan saya dalam proyek ini sepenuhnya sukarela; 
 
2. Saya dapat mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini sewaktu-waktu tanpa kerugian 
apapun; 
 
3. Informasi pribadi saya, seperti kuesioner tertulis, akan dimusnahkan pada akhir 
proyek ini, namun data mentah yang menentukan hasil penelitian akan disimpan 
secara aman untuk setidaknya lima tahun; 
 
4.  Proyek ini menggunakan kuesioner tertulis sejumlah delapan pertanyaan terbuka. 
Saya memiliki waktu tiga (3) hari maksimum untuk menyelesaikan dan 
mengembalikan kuesioner dengan pertanyaan seputar pemikiran, persepsi dan 
pengalaman saya mengenai identitas nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. 
Apabila saya merasa tidak nyaman dengan pertanyaan-pertanyaan dalam kuesioner, 
saya dapat menolak untuk menjawab maupun mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini 
tanpa menimbulkan kerugian apapun bagi saya.  
 
5. Penelitian ini didanai oleh Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP. Partisipan 
akan mendapatkan tanda terima kasih untuk keikutsertaannya.  
 
6. Hasil proyek ini akan dipublikasikan dan tersedia di Perpustakaan University of 
Otago (Dunedin, Selandia Baru). Namun demikian, keikutsertaan saya bersifat 





Saya setuju berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Nama peneliti lapangan 
 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 




Appendix 13: Information sheet for focus group discussion participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
(Focus Group Discussion)  
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate I 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and I thank 
you for considering our request.   
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD at the University 
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
This research explores how national identity is constituted in Indonesia. It aims to 
examine the factors which challenge the Indonesian national identity and which 
contribute to its maintenance. It also looks into how government policies shape national 
identity and vice versa.  
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
This project seeks participants from the following criteria: 
1. Public figures and officials of the Indonesian government, selected according 
their position; 
2. Tertiary students; 
3. The grass-roots of society.  
Participants should hold an Indonesian citizenship and be at least 18 years old.  
Participants will be presented with a small souvenir as a token of appreciation. 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in a Focus 
Group Discussion for the duration of approximately an hour. 
Please be aware that if you decide not to take part in the project or at any moment wish 





What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
Focus Groups will involve a discussion following a set of pre-determined questions and 
will be recorded on a digital voice recorder. The general line of questioning involves 
asking about interviewees’ thoughts, perceptions and experience on national identity and 
multiculturalism in Indonesia. Depending on the way the discussion develops, new 
themes may be added to the pre-determined questions. Consequently, although the 
University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the pre-determined questions 
for discussion, the Committee has not been able to review all the questions to be used. 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant 
or uncomfortable, you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
All Focus Group participants will remain anonymous. Please be aware that we will make 
every attempt to preserve your anonymity.  
The results of the project will be submitted as a PhD dissertation, and may be published 
as academic articles. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project.  
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only my supervisor and I 
will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained 
for at least five years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants 
will be destroyed at the completion of research even though the data derived from the 
research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free 
to contact either:- 
Budi Annisa Sidi and  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Department of Politics   Department of Politics 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (Ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 








IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
LEMBAR INFORMASI BAGI PESERTA 
(Focus Group Discussion/FGD) 
 
Terima kasih atas ketertarikan Bapak/Ibu terhadap proyek ini. Mohon pelajari lembar 
informasi ini dengan seksama sebelum menentukan kesediaan untuk berpartisipasi. 
Terima kasih apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan melibatkan diri dalam penelitian ini. Apabila 
tidak, maka tidak terdapat kerugian sedikitpun bagi Bapak/Ibu, dan kami ucapkan terima 
kasih atas perkenan pertimbangan Bapak/Ibu. 
 
Apakah tujuan dari proyek ini? 
Proyek ini merupakan bagian dari program PhD (S3) pada University of Otago di 
Dunedin, Selandia Baru. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan menelaah pembentukan identitas nasional di Indonesia dengan 
mempelajari faktor-faktor yang membantu maupun menghambat pembentukan identitas 
nasional tersebut. Penelitian ini juga menelaah bagaimana kebijakan pemerintah 
membentuk identitas nasional, dan sebaliknya. 
Partisipan seperti apakah yang dibutuhkan? 
Proyek ini mencari partisipan dari kriteria berikut ini: 
1. Figur publik dan pejabat pemerintah Indonesia yang dipilih berdasarkan 
kewenangan atau jabatannya;  
2. Mahasiswa; 
3. Kalangan akar rumput masyarakat.  
Partisipan adalah Warga Negara Indonesia (WNI) yang berusia setidaknya 18 tahun.  
Partisipan akan mendapatkan cenderamata sebagai tanda terima kasih atas 
keikutsertaannya. 
Apakah yang diharapkan dari para partisipan? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu akan 
diminta untuk ikut serta dalam Focus Group Discussion dengan durasi sekitar satu jam. 
Dalam hal Bapak/Ibu tidak berkenan berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini, atau pada saat 






Data atau Informasi apakah yang dikumpulkan, dan bagaimana data/informasi 
tersebut akan digunakan? 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) berupa diskusi kelompok, dan akan mengikuti sejumlah 
pertanyaan yang telah ditentukan sebelumnya dan direkam secara audio. Secara umum, 
pertanyaan wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran, persepsi dan pengalaman partisipan 
mengenai identitas nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Diskusi kelompok dapat 
mengangkat tema-tema yang menarik dan menimbulkan pertanyaan lanjutan baru. Oleh 
karena itu, Komite Etik University of Otago memahami cakupan diskusi ini, namun tidak 
dapat menelaah seluruh pertanyaan yang akan diajukan. 
Apabila perkembangan wawancara maupun diskusi menimbulkan ketidaknyamanan bagi 
partisipan, maka partisipan dapat sewaktu-waktu menolak menjawab pertanyaan maupun 
mengakhiri keikutsertaannya dalam proyek ini tanpa kerugian apapun. 
Peserta FGD dijamin anonimitasnya. Kami akan sepenuhnya menjaga anonimitas 
Bapak/Ibu.  
Hasil penelitian ini akan dipublikasikan sebagai disertasi PhD/S3 dan kemungkinan juga 
akan diterbitkan dalam jurnal akademik. Bapak/Ibu dapat meminta hasil-hasil penelitian 
ini.  
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan secara aman dan hanya dapat diakses oleh peneliti 
serta pembimbingnya. Data tersebut akan disimpan untuk setidaknya lima tahun, namun 
informasi pribadi partisipan akan dimusnahkan pada akhir penelitian. Hanya data yang 
relevan bagi hasil penelitian akan disimpan untuk jangka waktu panjang yang tidak 
ditentukan. 
Dapatkah partisipan berubah pikiran dan mengundurkan diri? 
Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan 
kerugian apapun bagi Bapak/Ibu.  
 
Bagaimana apabila partisipan memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu memiliki pertanyaan terkait proyek ini, baik saat ini maupun di masa 
mendatang, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi: 
Budi Annisa Sidi dan  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Jurusan Politik  Jurusan Politik 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 




Appendix 14: Consent form for focus group discussion participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
CONSENT FORM  FOR   
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3.    An audio recording is made for the duration of the Focus Group Discussion; 
 
4. Personal identifying information such as audio recordings may be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend 
will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
5.  This project involves an open-ended discussion. The general line of questioning 
involves asking about interviewees’ thoughts and perceptions on national identity 
and multiculturalism in Indonesia.  The precise nature of the questions which will be 
asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
discussion develops. In the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way 
that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any 
kind. 
 
6. This research project is funded by the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education 
(Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP). Participants will be given a token of 
gratitude for their participation. 
 
7. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but my participation is anonymous and 





I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 




Reference code: 17/131 
 
 
IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
FORMULIR PERSETUJUAN BAGI 
PARTISIPAN FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION (FGD) 
 
Saya telah membaca Lembar Informasi proyek ini dan memahami tujuannya. Segala 
pertanyaan yang saya ajukan telah dijawab secara memuaskan. Saya mengetahui bahwa 
saya berhak meminta informasi lebih lanjut sewaktu-waktu. 
Saya mengetahui bahwa:- 
1. Keikutsertaan saya dalam proyek ini sepenuhnya sukarela; 
 
2. Saya dapat mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini sewaktu-waktu tanpa kerugian 
apapun; 
 
3.    Diskusi dalam FGD akan direkam secara audio; 
 
3. Informasi pribadi saya, seperti rekaman audio, akan dimusnahkan pada akhir proyek 
ini, namun data mentah yang menentukan hasil penelitian akan disimpan secara 
aman untuk setidaknya lima tahun; 
 
4.  Proyek ini menggunakan teknik diskusi terbuka. Secara umum, pertanyaan 
wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran dan persepsi partisipan mengenai identitas 
nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang akan diajukan tidak 
ditentukan secara rinci sejak awal, melainkan akan mengikuti alur percakapan dalam 
wawancara. Apabila saya merasa tidak nyaman dengan perkembangan wawancara 
maupun pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan, saya dapat menolak untuk menjawab 
maupun mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan kerugian apapun 
bagi saya.  
 
5. Penelitian ini didanai oleh Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP. Partisipan 
akan mendapatkan tanda terima kasih untuk keikutsertaannya.  
 
6. Hasil proyek ini akan dipublikasikan dan tersedia di Perpustakaan University of 
Otago (Dunedin, Selandia Baru). Namun demikian, keikutsertaan saya bersifat 






Saya setuju berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Nama peneliti lapangan 
 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 





Appendix 15: Information sheet for elite participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
(One-on-One Interview for Public Officials) 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate I 
thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and I thank 
you for considering our request.   
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a PhD at the University 
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
This research explores how national identity is constituted in Indonesia. It aims to 
examine the factors which challenge the Indonesian national identity and those that 
contribute to its maintenance. It also looks into how government policies shape national 
identity and vice-a-versa.  
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
This project seeks participants from the following criteria: 
1. Public figures and officials of the Indonesian government, selected according 
their position; 
2. Tertiary students; 
3. The grass-roots of society.  
Participants should hold an Indonesian citizenship and be at least 18 years old.  
Participants will be presented with a small souvenir as a token of appreciation. 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in a one-on-
one interview for the duration of approximately 30 minutes to an hour.  
Please be aware that if you decide not to take part in the project or at any moment wish 






What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
Interviews will involve an open-questioning technique and will be recorded on a digital 
voice recorder, unless the participant objects to being recorded. The general line of 
questioning involves asking about interviewees’ thoughts and perceptions on national 
identity and multiculturalism in Indonesia. The precise nature of the questions which will 
be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops. Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee 
has not been able to review the precise questions to be used. 
In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant 
or uncomfortable, you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
On the Consent Form, you will be given options regarding your anonymity. No 
participant should be identified without their consent and all grass-root participants will 
be anonymous. However with your consent, for public officials it would be preferable to 
attribute contributions made to individual participants, in which case you will be 
identified by your name and your position. If you prefer to be anonymous, you will be 
given the option to be cited by affiliation (as an anonymous representative of your 
organisation) or not to be cited at all. You will also be given the option on your 
willingness to be recorded.  It is absolutely up to you which of these options you prefer. 
The results of the project will be submitted as a PhD dissertation, and may be published 
as academic articles. You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project.  
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only my supervisor and I 
will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained 
for at least five years in secure storage. Any personal information held on the participants 
will be destroyed at the completion of research even though the data derived from the 
research will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free 
to contact either:- 
Budi Annisa Sidi and  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Department of Politics   Department of Politics 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (Ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 








IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
LEMBAR INFORMASI BAGI PESERTA 
(Wawancara Pribadi bagi Pejabat Publik) 
 
Terima kasih atas ketertarikan Bapak/Ibu terhadap proyek ini. Mohon pelajari lembar 
informasi ini dengan seksama sebelum menentukan kesediaan untuk berpartisipasi. 
Terima kasih apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan melibatkan diri dalam penelitian ini. Apabila 
tidak, maka tidak terdapat kerugian sedikitpun bagi Bapak/Ibu, dan kami ucapkan terima 
kasih atas perkenan pertimbangan Bapak/Ibu. 
 
Apakah tujuan dari proyek ini? 
Proyek ini merupakan bagian dari program PhD (S3) pada University of Otago di 
Dunedin, Selandia Baru. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan menelaah pembentukan identitas nasional di Indonesia dengan 
mempelajari faktor-faktor yang membantu maupun menghambat pembentukan identitas 
nasional tersebut. Penelitian ini juga menelaah bagaimana kebijakan pemerintah 
membentuk identitas nasional, dan sebaliknya. 
 
Partisipan seperti apakah yang dibutuhkan? 
Proyek ini mencari partisipan dari kriteria berikut ini: 
1. Figur publik dan pejabat pemerintah Indonesia yang dipilih berdasarkan 
kewenangan atau jabatannya;  
2. Mahasiswa; 
3. Kalangan akar rumput masyarakat.  
Partisipan adalah Warga Negara Indonesia (WNI) yang berusia setidaknya 18 tahun.  
Partisipan akan mendapatkan cenderamata sebagai tanda terima kasih atas 
keikutsertaannya. 
 
Apakah yang diharapkan dari para partisipan? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu berkenan berpartisipasi dalam penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu akan 
diminta untuk berpartisipasi dalam wawancara pribadi dengan durasi 30 menit sampai 
dengan satu jam. Apabila Bapak/Ibu tidak berkenan berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini, atau 
kapanpun Bapak/Ibu ingin mengakhiri partisipasinya, maka tidak terdapat kerugian 
sedikitpun bagi Bapak/Ibu. 
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Data atau Informasi apakah yang dikumpulkan, dan bagaimana data/informasi 
tersebut akan digunakan? 
Wawancara pribadi akan dilakukan dengan teknik tanya jawab terbuka dan direkam 
secara audio, kecuali apabila terdapat keberatan dari partisipan. Secara umum, 
pertanyaan wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran dan persepsi partisipan mengenai 
identitas nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang akan diajukan 
tidak ditentukan secara rinci sejak awal, melainkan akan mengikuti alur percakapan 
dalam wawancara. Oleh karena itu, Komite Etik University of Otago memahami cakupan 
wawancara ini, namun tidak dapat menelaah seluruh pertanyaan yang akan diajukan. 
Apabila perkembangan wawancara menimbulkan ketidaknyamanan bagi Bapak/Ibu, 
maka Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu menolak menjawab pertanyaan maupun 
mengakhiri keikutsertaannya dalam proyek ini tanpa kerugian apapun. 
Pada Formulir Kesediaan, Bapak/Ibu akan diberikan pilihan mengenai anonimitas 
partisipan. Tidak ada partisipan yang akan diidentifikasi tanpa kesediaannya. Apabila 
diinginkan, kami akan sepenuhnya menjaga anonimitas Bapak/Ibu. Namun, dengan 
perkenan Bapak/Ibu, kami sangat berterima kasih apabila Bapak/Ibu bersedia 
diidentifikasi, termasuk jabatan atau kedudukannya apabila diperlukan. Bapak/Ibu juga 
dapat memilih untuk diidentifikasi melalui afiliasi (sebagai perwakilan anonim dari 
organisasi Bapak/Ibu). Bapak/Ibu juga dapat menentukan kesediaan untuk direkam 
secara audio. Bapak/Ibu memiliki kebebasan sepenuhnya untuk menentukan hal-hal 
tersebut di atas.   
Hasil penelitian ini akan dipublikasikan sebagai disertasi PhD/S3 dan kemungkinan juga 
akan diterbitkan dalam jurnal akademik. Bapak/Ibu dapat meminta hasil-hasil penelitian 
ini.  
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan secara aman dan hanya dapat diakses oleh peneliti 
serta pembimbingnya. Data tersebut akan disimpan untuk setidaknya lima tahun, namun 
informasi pribadi partisipan akan dimusnahkan pada akhir penelitian. Hanya data yang 
relevan bagi hasil penelitian akan disimpan untuk jangka waktu panjang yang tidak 
ditentukan. 
Dapatkah partisipan berubah pikiran dan mengundurkan diri? 
Bapak/Ibu dapat sewaktu-waktu mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan 
kerugian apapun bagi Bapak/Ibu.  
 
Bagaimana apabila partisipan memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut? 
Apabila Bapak/Ibu memiliki pertanyaan terkait proyek ini, baik saat ini maupun di masa 
mendatang, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi: 
Budi Annisa Sidi dan  Assoc. Prof Vicki Spencer 
Jurusan Politik  Jurusan Politik 
University of Otago   University of Otago 
annisa.sidi@postgrad.otago.ac.nz   vicki.spencer@otago.ac.nz 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 
kerahasiaannya dan Bapak/Ibu akan mendapatkan hasil investigasi kasus terkait.   
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Appendix 16: Consent form for elite participants (bilingual) 




NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM: 
CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING IN INDONESIA 
 
CONSENT FORM  FOR   
PUBLIC OFFICIAL INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  
All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to 
request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information such as audio recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend 
will be retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
involves asking about interviewees’ thoughts and perceptions on national identity 
and multiculturalism in Indonesia.  The precise nature of the questions which will be 
asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the 
interview develops. In the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way 
that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular 
question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any 
kind. 
 
5. This research project is funded by the Indonesian Endowment Fund for Education 
(Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP). Participants will be given a token of 
gratitude for their participation. 
 
6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to 




7. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,   OR 
  b) prefer to be named by affiliation,   OR 
                                   c) would rather remain anonymous. 
 
 
8.     I, as the participant: a) agree to being recorded in the interview,   OR
  
 
  b) disagree to being recorded. 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or 
email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and 









Reference code: 17/131 
 
 
IDENTITAS NASIONAL DAN MULTIKULTURALISME: 
TANTANGAN TERHADAP PEMBANGUNAN BANGSA DI INDONESIA 
 
FORMULIR PERSETUJUAN BAGI 
PARTISIPAN WAWANCARA PEJABAT PUBLIK 
 
Saya telah membaca Lembar Informasi proyek ini dan memahami tujuannya. Segala 
pertanyaan yang saya ajukan telah dijawab secara memuaskan. Saya mengetahui bahwa 
saya berhak meminta informasi lebih lanjut sewaktu-waktu. 
Saya mengetahui bahwa: 
1. Keikutsertaan saya dalam proyek ini sepenuhnya sukarela; 
 
2. Saya dapat mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini sewaktu-waktu tanpa kerugian 
apapun; 
 
3. Informasi pribadi yang dapat mengidentifikasi saya, seperti rekaman audio, akan 
dimusnahkan pada akhir proyek ini, namun data mentah yang menentukan hasil 
penelitian akan disimpan secara aman untuk setidaknya lima tahun; 
 
4.  Proyek ini menggunakan teknik tanya jawab terbuka. Secara umum, pertanyaan 
wawancara terkait dengan pemikiran dan persepsi partisipan mengenai identitas 
nasional dan multikulturalisme di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang akan diajukan tidak 
ditentukan secara rinci sejak awal, melainkan akan mengikuti alur percakapan dalam 
wawancara. Apabila saya merasa tidak nyaman dengan perkembangan wawancara 
maupun pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan, saya dapat menolak untuk menjawab 
maupun mengundurkan diri dari proyek ini tanpa menimbulkan kerugian apapun 
bagi saya.  
 
5. Penelitian ini didanai oleh Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan/LPDP. Partisipan 
akan mendapatkan tanda terima kasih untuk keikutsertaannya.  
 
6. Hasil proyek ini akan dipublikasikan dan tersedia di Perpustakaan University of 
Otago (Dunedin, Selandia Baru). Namun demikian, segala upaya akan dilakukan 




7. Saya, selaku partisipan: a) bersedia disebutkan namanya,   
 ATAU 
    b) lebih suka disebutkan afiliasinya,  
 ATAU 
                                     c) ingin tetap anonim. 
 
 
8.     Saya, selaku partisipan: a) setuju direkam audio saat wawancara,  
 ATAU  
 
     b) tidak ingin direkam. 
 
Saya setuju berpartisipasi dalam proyek ini. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Nama peneliti lapangan 
 
 
Penelitian ini telah mendapatkan persetujuan Komite Etik University of Otago. Apabila 
Bapak/Ibu meragukan kode etik penelitian ini, maka Bapak/Ibu dapat menghubungi 
Komite Etik tersebut melalui Administrator Komite Etik (Telp. +643 479 8256 atau email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Segala hal yang disampaikan oleh Bapak/Ibu terjaga 









Appendix 17: Letter of ethics approval 
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